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   i	  
Abstract	  	  This	  dissertation	  explores	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests,	  and	  considers	  how	  civil	  interests	  constrain	  the	  legitimate	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  John	  Locke	  presents	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  interests	  in	  A	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration	  as	  the	  legitimate	  object	  of	  political	  authority’s	  concern.	  	  First,	  I	  identify	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  social	  contract	  in	  Locke’s	  Letter.	  	  I	  argue	  for	  the	  prominence	  of	  Locke’s	  contractarian	  line	  of	  argument	  in	  his	  case	  for	  toleration.	  	  Second,	  I	  trace	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  through	  the	  historical	  social	  contract	  arguments	  of	  Locke’s	  
Second	  Treatise,	  Thomas	  Hobbes’	  Leviathan,	  and	  Immanuel	  Kant’s	  major	  political	  works.	  	  I	  demonstrate	  the	  utility	  of	  analyzing	  the	  social	  contract	  in	  light	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  by	  clarifying	  puzzling	  features	  of	  each	  theory,	  specifically	  Hobbes’	  conflicting	  remarks	  on	  religious	  liberty,	  and	  Kant’s	  elusive	  notion	  of	  possible	  consent.	  	  Third,	  I	  abstract	  the	  social	  contract	  argument	  for	  identifying	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  from	  its	  historical	  expression	  to	  argue	  that	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  consist	  of	  their	  lives	  and	  liberty.	  	  I	  additionally	  justify	  my	  appeal	  to	  the	  social	  contract,	  and	  specify	  its	  details	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  my	  argument.	  	  Finally,	  I	  apply	  the	  social	  contract	  argument	  centred	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  interests	  to	  argue	  against	  legal	  moralism	  as	  theory	  of	  criminalization	  and	  criminal	  law.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  is	  conceptually	  untenable,	  and	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  provides	  an	  illegitimate	  justification	  for	  criminalization	  and	  the	  criminal	  law.	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Introduction	  In	  A	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration	  John	  Locke	  writes,	  “The	  commonwealth	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  a	  society	  of	  men	  constituted	  only	  for	  the	  procuring,	  preserving,	  and	  advancing	  of	  their	  own	  civil	  interests.”	  	  Though	  offered	  as	  a	  foundational	  claim	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  society	  by	  a	  historically	  prominent	  political	  philosopher,	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  has	  garnered	  surprisingly	  little	  philosophical	  investigation.	  	  My	  dissertation	  explores	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests,	  and	  considers	  how	  civil	  interests	  constrain	  the	  legitimate	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  	  In	  the	  Letter,	  Locke	  presents	  the	  category	  of	  civil	  interests	  as	  the	  proper	  object	  of	  political	  action,	  the	  legitimate	  object	  of	  political	  authority’s	  concern.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  in	  the	  Letter	  we	  can	  identify	  a	  vital	  connection	  between	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  social	  contract.	  	  That	  is,	  we	  can	  determine	  the	  specific	  interests	  that	  count	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  by	  considering	  the	  ends	  of	  persons	  engaging	  in	  political	  cooperation,	  and	  setting	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  association,	  from	  a	  pre-­‐political	  circumstance.	  	  Locke	  identifies	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  as	  their	  lives,	  liberty,	  physical	  integrity,	  and	  outward	  possessions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  broad	  terms,	  I	  identify	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  as	  it	  first	  appears	  in	  Locke’s	  Letter,	  trace	  it	  through	  the	  history	  of	  social	  contract	  theory,	  and	  explore	  its	  implications	  for	  contemporary	  political	  societies.	  	  I	  aim	  to	  establish	  its	  prominence	  in	  Locke’s	  work	  on	  toleration,	  its	  utility	  in	  analyzing	  social	  contract	  theories,	  and	  its	  importance	  for	  understanding	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  cooperation,	  and	  the	  limits	  of	  legitimate	  political	  action.	  	   	  	  
	   2	  
	   This	  study	  is	  worthwhile	  for	  two	  related	  reasons.	  	  First,	  Locke’s	  Letter	  is	  a	  rich	  source	  of	  political	  philosophical	  insights.	  	  Though	  written	  in	  1685,	  in	  parts,	  it	  reads	  like	  a	  modern	  work	  of	  political	  theory.	  	  And	  though	  Locke	  wrote	  the	  Letter	  to	  advocate	  for	  policies	  of	  religious	  toleration	  appropriate	  for	  seventeenth	  century	  England,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  this	  endeavour,	  he	  offers	  enduring	  insights	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  association.	  	  It	  is	  surprising	  then	  to	  realize	  that	  the	  Letter’s	  most	  compelling	  arguments,	  that	  resonate	  most	  profoundly	  in	  contemporary	  political	  contexts,	  have	  been	  dismissed	  by	  some	  of	  Locke’s	  most	  prominent	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  commentators.	  	  Locke’s	  Letter,	  specifically	  his	  notion	  of	  civil	  interests	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  social	  contract,	  is	  a	  worthy	  object	  of	  philosophical	  investigation.	  	  	  	  	  Second,	  we	  continue	  to	  struggle	  with	  setting	  the	  boundaries	  of	  legitimate	  political	  action.	  	  We	  see	  prominent	  challenges	  to	  the	  justifications	  of	  political	  action	  with	  incredible	  frequency.	  	  In	  the	  last	  two	  years,	  in	  Canada	  alone,	  the	  Quebec	  government	  proposed	  to	  enact	  a	  charter	  of	  secular	  values	  that	  would	  ban	  ostentatious	  religious	  symbols	  in	  public	  space,	  Muslim	  women	  encountered	  bans	  on	  face	  coverings	  at	  citizenship	  ceremonies,	  and	  self-­‐proclaimed	  Pastafarians	  fought	  for	  the	  right	  to	  appear	  in	  their	  government	  issued	  photo	  identification	  with	  spaghetti	  strainers	  on	  their	  heads.	  	  Governments	  have	  offered	  a	  myriad	  of	  justifications	  for	  their	  actions,	  some	  reasonable,	  others	  confounding.	  	  These	  justifications,	  and	  the	  surrounding	  public	  debates	  reveal	  not	  only	  the	  inescapable	  reality	  that	  the	  line	  between	  permissible	  government	  action	  and	  individuals’	  freedoms	  is	  blurry,	  but	  also	  the	  more	  interesting	  idea	  that	  we	  are	  not	  quite	  sure	  what	  political	  society	  is	  all	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about.	  	  That	  is,	  we	  still	  have	  much	  to	  learn	  from	  a	  clear	  analysis	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  our	  political	  cooperation,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  society	  and	  authority.	  	  	  In	  Locke’s	  Letter	  we	  find	  a	  social	  contract	  argument	  aimed	  at	  defining	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  that	  helps	  us	  think	  clearly	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  political	  cooperation,	  and	  the	  permissible	  limits	  of	  political	  action.	  	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  engage	  Locke’s	  argument,	  and	  use	  it	  as	  a	  departure	  point	  for	  exploring	  the	  ends	  of	  political	  cooperation,	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  legitimate	  political	  authority.	  	  	   In	  chapter	  one	  I	  argue	  for	  the	  prominence	  of	  Locke’s	  contractarian	  line	  of	  argument	  in	  his	  Letters	  on	  toleration.	  	  With	  an	  eye	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  his	  case	  for	  toleration,	  I	  argue	  that	  only	  his	  contractarian	  line	  of	  argument	  can	  establish	  his	  claim	  that	  civil	  government	  ought	  to	  concern	  itself	  with	  only	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  from	  which	  his	  conclusion	  in	  favour	  of	  toleration	  follows.	  	  	  	  	   In	  chapter	  two	  I	  argue	  that	  social	  contract	  theories	  can	  generally	  be	  interpreted	  in	  light	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests.	  	  Further,	  I	  consider	  the	  social	  contract	  theories	  of	  Locke’s	  Second	  Treatise,	  Hobbes’	  Leviathan,	  and	  Kant’s	  major	  political	  works,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests.	  	  This	  analysis	  illuminates	  otherwise	  puzzling	  features	  of	  each	  theory,	  and,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  doing	  so,	  demonstrates	  its	  utility.	  	  In	  Locke	  we	  get	  a	  fuller	  account	  of	  how	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  designate	  certain	  interests	  as	  their	  civil	  interests.	  	  In	  Hobbes	  we	  achieve	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  his	  conflicting	  remarks	  on	  religious	  liberty.	  	  And,	  in	  Kant,	  we	  clarify	  his	  elusive	  conception	  of	  possible	  consent.	  	  In	  chapter	  three	  I	  abstract	  from	  the	  history	  of	  social	  contract	  theory	  to	  justify	  my	  appeal	  to	  the	  social	  contract,	  specify	  the	  details	  of	  my	  account	  of	  the	  social	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contract,	  and	  present	  a	  social	  contract	  argument	  for	  identifying	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  I	  acknowledge	  and	  respond	  to	  David	  Hume’s	  famous	  criticism	  that	  the	  social	  contract	  is	  a	  fiction	  with	  no	  political	  import.	  	  I	  present	  my	  account	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract,	  and	  the	  circumstances	  of	  their	  political	  cooperation,	  to	  identify	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  as	  their	  lives	  and	  liberty.	  	  	  	  	  	  	   In	  chapter	  four	  I	  apply	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter	  to	  argue	  against	  legal	  moralism	  as	  a	  theory	  of	  criminalization	  and	  of	  criminal	  law.	  	  Legal	  moralism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  the	  immorality	  of	  conduct	  is	  a	  salient	  reason	  for	  criminalizing	  it.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  is	  an	  untenable	  version	  of	  legal	  moralism	  in	  that,	  when	  pressed,	  it	  forfeits	  any	  meaningful	  claim	  to	  enforcing	  morality	  as	  such.	  	  And	  I	  argue	  that	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  offers	  politically	  illegitimate	  reasons	  for	  criminalization	  and	  criminal	  law	  because	  the	  enforcement	  of	  pre-­‐political	  morality	  could	  not	  be	  the	  object	  of	  agreement	  among	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract.	  	  	   Above	  all	  I	  aim	  to	  articulate	  the	  view	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  persons’	  political	  cooperation	  constrains	  the	  legitimate	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  That	  is,	  in	  justifying	  political	  action	  we	  ought	  to	  appeal	  only	  to	  ends	  and	  values	  that	  emerge	  from	  parties	  entering	  political	  society	  and	  subjecting	  themselves	  to	  political	  authority.	  	  Civil	  interests	  represent	  the	  point	  of	  agreement	  among	  independent	  persons	  cooperating	  politically,	  and,	  therefore,	  constitute	  the	  object	  of	  legitimate	  political	  concern.	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1	  –	  Civil	  Interests	  and	  Locke’s	  Mandate	  Argument	  for	  Toleration	  
1.1	  –	  Introduction	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  consider	  Locke’s	  main	  arguments	  in	  A	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration.1	  	  I	  argue	  for	  the	  prominence	  and	  strength	  of	  his	  contractarian	  “mandate	  argument”	  in	  establishing	  the	  conclusion	  that	  civil	  governments	  ought	  to	  concern	  themselves	  with	  only	  the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  persons’	  civil	  interests.2	  I	  begin	  by	  looking	  briefly	  at	  the	  historical	  and	  political	  context	  in	  which	  Locke	  wrote	  the	  Letter.	  	  I	  then	  consider	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Letter’s	  arguments	  and	  conclusions.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  only	  the	  mandate	  argument	  provides	  a	  framework	  for	  establishing	  the	  Letter’s	  conclusions.	  	  Finally,	  I	  look	  at	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument	  as	  it	  appears	  in	  the	  Letter,	  and	  as	  it	  evolves	  over	  the	  course	  of	  Locke’s	  later	  Letters.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  mandate	  argument	  provides	  strong	  support	  for	  the	  
Letter’s	  conclusions.	  	  	  	  	  
1.2–	  The	  Historical	  Context	  of	  A	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration	  As	  David	  Wootton	  notes	  in	  his	  introduction	  to	  Locke’s	  Political	  Writings,	  the	  context	  in	  which	  Locke	  wrote	  the	  Letter	  is	  difficult	  to	  pin	  down.	  	  Locke	  scholars	  generally	  agree	  that	  the	  Letter	  was	  written	  late	  in	  1685	  while	  Locke	  was	  in	  exile	  in	  the	  Dutch	  Republic	  for	  participating	  in	  subversive	  political	  activities.	  	  At	  the	  time,	  religious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Locke	  wrote	  the	  Epistola	  de	  Tolerantia	  in	  Latin.	  	  It	  was	  translated	  to	  English	  by	  William	  Popple	  and	  published	  in	  1689.	  2	  Richard	  Vernon	  names	  Locke’s	  three	  main	  arguments	  in	  the	  Letter:	  “the	  argument	  from	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  state”,	  “the	  argument	  from	  belief”,	  and	  “the	  argument	  from	  error”	  in	  his	  Introduction	  to	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  xv.	  	  I	  explore	  each	  of	  these	  arguments	  below.	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toleration	  was	  a	  pressing	  political	  issue.	  	  In	  1685	  in	  England,	  James	  II	  ascended	  to	  the	  throne	  and	  soon	  after	  would	  offer	  a	  policy	  of	  toleration	  to	  Catholics	  and	  dissenting	  Protestants.	  	  James	  himself	  was	  Catholic	  and	  this	  worried	  many	  in	  England.	  	  People	  commonly	  associated	  Catholicism	  with	  authoritarianism,	  and	  they	  believed	  that	  allowing	  Catholicism	  to	  gain	  traction	  in	  England	  was	  contrary	  to	  the	  national	  interest.	  	  In	  the	  same	  year	  in	  France,	  Louis	  XIV	  revoked	  his	  policy	  of	  toleration	  and	  exposed	  French	  Protestants	  to	  violent	  persecution.	  	  Many	  fled	  to	  the	  Dutch	  Republic	  where	  Locke	  temporarily	  resided.	  	   Disagreement	  persists	  regarding	  Locke’s	  immediate	  motivation	  for	  writing	  the	  Letter.	  	  Richard	  Ashcraft	  takes	  Locke	  to	  have	  been	  advancing	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  radical	  English	  Dissenters	  among	  whom	  he	  lived	  while	  in	  exile	  in	  the	  Dutch	  Republic.3	  	  They,	  and	  their	  Whig	  associates	  in	  England,	  sought	  toleration	  for	  non-­‐conforming	  Protestants	  but	  not	  for	  Catholics.	  	  Additionally,	  they	  demanded	  that	  any	  policy	  of	  toleration	  receive	  the	  assent	  of	  parliament;	  James’	  toleration	  was	  granted	  on	  his	  prerogative	  alone.	  	  Ashcraft	  suggests	  that,	  in	  the	  Letter,	  Locke	  provides	  arguments	  tailor	  made	  for	  the	  Dissenters’	  purposes.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  Mark	  Goldie	  suggests	  that	  Locke	  was	  no	  radical.	  	  Despite	  the	  perceived	  religious	  radicalism	  of	  the	  
Letter,	  Locke	  remained	  a	  member	  of	  the	  established	  Church	  for	  his	  entire	  life.4	  	  Goldie	  suggests	  instead	  that	  Locke	  wrote	  the	  Letters,	  specifically	  his	  later	  Letters,	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Ashcraft,	  Richard,	  Revolutionary	  Politics	  &	  Locke’s	  Two	  Treatises	  of	  Government,	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  498.	  4	  Goldie,	  Mark,	  “John	  Locke,	  Jonas	  Proast	  and	  Religious	  Toleration	  1688-­‐1692,”	  John	  Walsh	  (ed.)	  The	  Church	  of	  England	  c.	  1688-­c.	  1833,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  144.	  	  Wootton,	  David,	  Introduction	  to	  John	  Locke:	  Political	  
Writings,	  (Indianapolis,	  IN:	  Hackett,	  2003),	  98.	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support	  the	  objectives	  of	  a	  Low	  Church	  faction	  within	  the	  established	  church.	  	  They	  sought	  a	  liberalization	  of	  the	  Church’s	  structure	  and	  many	  of	  its	  practices.5	  	  	  	   Though	  political	  circumstances	  in	  England	  and	  elsewhere	  in	  Europe	  certainly	  provided	  the	  occasion	  for	  Locke	  to	  write	  the	  Letter,	  and	  he	  may	  have	  sought	  to	  advance	  a	  particular	  cause,	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  suppose	  that	  the	  strength	  of	  Locke’s	  case	  for	  toleration	  rests	  entirely	  on	  the	  particulars	  of	  his	  context.	  	  Richard	  Vernon	  suggests	  that	  Locke’s	  sought	  to	  provide	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  toleration,	  and	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  conduct	  political	  theory	  abstracted	  from	  one’s	  immediate	  political	  circumstances.6	  	  	  	  So,	  because	  we	  cannot	  definitively	  isolate	  Locke’s	  immediate	  context	  in	  writing	  the	  Letter,	  and	  because	  of	  the	  universality	  at	  which	  Locke’s	  political	  theory	  seems	  to	  aim,	  Wootton	  suggests	  that	  readers	  must	  work	  from	  the	  Letter’s	  text	  alone.	  	  Along	  similar	  lines,	  Jeremy	  Waldron,	  in	  his	  famous	  critique	  of	  the	  Letter,	  declares	  at	  the	  outset	  that	  he	  will,	  “consider	  the	  Lockean	  case	  as	  a	  political	  argument	  –	  that	  is,	  as	  a	  practical	  intellectual	  resource	  that	  can	  be	  abstracted	  from	  the	  antiquity	  of	  its	  context	  and	  deployed	  in	  the	  modern	  debate	  about	  liberal	  theories	  of	  justice	  and	  political	  morality.”7	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  approach	  Locke’s	  Letters	  as	  Wootton	  and	  Waldron	  urge.	  	  I	  ultimately	  argue	  that	  a	  line	  of	  argument	  in	  Locke’s	  Letters	  is	  strong	  and	  relevant	  in	  contemporary	  political	  contexts.	  	  While	  I	  will	  certainly	  acknowledge	  contextual	  aspects	  of	  Locke’s	  work	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  necessary	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Goldie,	  “John	  Locke,	  Jonas	  Proast,	  and	  Religious	  Toleration	  1688-­‐1692,”	  161.	  6	  Vernon,	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  xi.	  7	  Waldron,	  Jeremy,	  “Locke:	  Toleration	  and	  the	  Rationality	  of	  Persecution,”	  in	  Susan	  Mendus	  (ed.),	  Justifying	  Toleration,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1988),	  61.	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the	  text,8	  I,	  like	  Waldron,	  am	  primarily	  interested	  in	  Locke’s	  arguments	  as	  contributions	  to	  political	  philosophy.	  	  	  	  	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Locke’s	  arguments	  for	  toleration	  were	  not	  entirely	  novel.	  	  Again,	  when	  Locke	  wrote	  the	  Letter,	  the	  struggle	  for	  religious	  toleration	  was	  a	  live	  political	  issue	  with	  enormous	  implications	  for	  people’s	  everyday	  lives.	  	  Accordingly,	  many	  politicians	  and	  pamphleteers	  wrote	  extensively	  on	  the	  topic.	  	  Ashcraft	  takes	  a	  worthwhile	  look	  at	  the	  writings	  of	  Henry	  Care,	  Robert	  Ferguson,	  and	  William	  Penn,	  and	  considers	  their	  influence	  on	  the	  development	  of	  Locke’s	  views	  on	  toleration.9	  	  Additionally,	  as	  Vernon	  points	  out,	  radical	  Leveller	  William	  Walwyn	  presented	  a	  variation	  of	  several	  of	  the	  arguments	  that	  Locke	  would	  draw	  upon	  in	  the	  Letter.10	  	  Suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  many,	  perhaps	  most,	  of	  Locke’s	  arguments	  were	  in	  the	  air	  at	  the	  time.	  	  Locke	  however	  distinguishes	  himself	  from	  others	  writing	  on	  toleration	  at	  the	  time	  by	  approaching	  the	  problem	  with	  a	  philosophical	  rigor	  uncharacteristic	  of	  most	  political	  pamphleteers.	  	  Further,	  Locke	  develops	  and	  refines	  his	  case	  for	  toleration	  over	  the	  course	  of	  several	  hundred	  pages	  in	  response	  to	  Jonas	  Proast’s	  criticisms.	  	  Proast,	  an	  academic	  and	  churchman,	  responded	  to	  Locke’s	  Letter	  the	  year	  after	  its	  publication.	  	  Locke	  subsequently	  wrote	  a	  Second	  and	  a	  Third	  Letter	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  For	  example,	  by	  acknowledging	  certain	  of	  Locke’s	  religious	  assumptions,	  see	  1.3,	  1.4	  below,	  and	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  limits	  he	  places	  on	  toleration,	  see	  4.3.2,	  120	  below.	  9	  Ashcraft,	  Revolutionary	  Politics	  &	  Locke’s	  Two	  Treatises	  of	  Government,	  480-­‐489.	  10	  Vernon,	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  xiii,	  xvi.	  	  See	  Walwyn,	  William,	  “Toleration	  justified	  and	  persecution	  condemned,”	  in	  Andrew	  Sharp	  (ed.),	  The	  English	  Levellers,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  9-­‐30.	  	  I	  count	  five	  distinct	  lines	  of	  argument	  that	  appear	  both	  in	  Walwyn	  and	  in	  Locke’s	  Letters.	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in	  response	  to	  Proast.	  	  In	  1704,	  fifteen	  years	  after	  the	  publication	  of	  his	  original	  
Letter,	  Locke	  died,	  leaving	  A	  Fourth	  Letter	  for	  Toleration	  unfinished.11	  	  	  	  	  
1.3	  –	  The	  Letter’s	  Arguments	  and	  Conclusions	  I	  turn	  now	  to	  the	  argumentative	  structure	  of	  the	  Letter.	  	  Locke’s	  ultimate	  conclusion	  in	  the	  Letter	  is	  that	  civil	  government12	  ought	  to	  adopt	  a	  policy	  of	  toleration.	  	  However,	  he	  does	  not	  deploy	  the	  Letter’s	  three	  main	  arguments	  in	  direct	  support	  of	  this	  final	  conclusion.	  	  Rather,	  Locke	  presents	  them	  as	  support	  for	  an	  intermediate	  conclusion	  from	  which	  his	  ultimate	  conclusion	  follows.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  argumentative	  structure	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  priority	  of	  the	  Letter’s	  arguments.	  	  	  Vernon	  helpfully	  terms	  the	  Letter’s	  three	  main	  arguments	  “the	  argument	  from	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  state”,	  “the	  argument	  from	  belief”,	  and	  “the	  argument	  from	  error”.13	  	  Proast	  and	  Waldron,	  two	  of	  the	  Locke’s	  most	  famous	  critics,	  argue	  that	  the	  entire	  strength	  of	  the	  Letter	  rests	  on	  the	  success	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  belief.14	  	  This,	  however,	  cannot	  be	  the	  case.	  	  Proast	  and	  Waldron	  fail	  to	  appreciate	  the	  Letter’s	  argumentative	  structure.	  	  Again,	  Locke	  does	  not	  present	  his	  three	  arguments	  as	  direct	  support	  for	  toleration.	  	  Rather,	  the	  three	  arguments	  are	  explicitly	  advanced	  as	  support	  for	  an	  intermediate	  conclusion,	  namely,	  that	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  civil	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Vernon,	  Richard,	  The	  Career	  of	  Toleration:	  John	  Locke,	  Jonas	  Proast,	  and	  After,	  (Montreal:	  McGill	  Queen’s	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  3.	  12	  And,	  additionally,	  religious	  associations	  and	  private	  individuals.	  13	  Vernon,	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  xv.	  14	  Proast,	  Jonas,	  The	  Argument	  of	  the	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration,	  Briefly	  Considered	  and	  Answered,	  in	  Richard	  Vernon	  (ed.)	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  60.	  	  Waldron,	  “Locke:	  Toleration	  and	  the	  Rationality	  of	  Persecution,”	  65.	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government	  reaches	  only	  to	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  Given	  the	  Letter’s	  argumentative	  structure,	  priority	  must	  be	  given	  to	  the	  argument	  from	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  state.	  	  Before	  stating	  his	  intermediate	  conclusion,	  and	  laying	  out	  his	  main	  arguments,	  Locke	  introduces	  the	  ideas	  of	  a	  commonwealth	  and	  of	  civil	  interests.	  	  He	  writes,	  “The	  commonwealth	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  a	  society	  of	  men	  constituted	  only	  for	  the	  procuring,	  preserving,	  and	  advancing	  of	  their	  own	  civil	  interests.”15	  	  Here	  I	  take	  Locke’s	  mention	  of	  persons’	  “civil	  interests”	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  general	  category	  of	  civil	  interests,	  whatever	  particular	  interests	  end	  up	  populating	  the	  general	  category.	  	  So	  Locke	  defines	  the	  commonwealth,	  and	  the	  general	  category	  of	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  in	  relation	  to	  one	  another.	  	  We	  ought	  to	  understand	  commonwealths	  as	  societies	  constituted	  for	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  and	  we	  should	  understand	  the	  category	  of	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  as	  the	  things	  for	  which	  commonwealths	  are	  constituted	  to	  protect	  and	  promote.	  	  Giving	  content	  to	  the	  category	  of	  civil	  interests,	  Locke	  continues,	  “Civil	  interests	  I	  call	  life,	  liberty	  health,	  and	  indolency	  of	  body;	  and	  the	  possession	  of	  outward	  things,	  such	  as	  money,	  lands,	  houses,	  furniture,	  and	  the	  like.”16	  	  So	  civil	  interests	  are	  the	  interests	  that	  political	  society	  aims	  at	  protecting	  and	  promoting.	  	  And,	  in	  particular,	  Locke	  takes	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  to	  consist	  of	  their	  lives,	  liberty,	  physical	  integrity,	  and	  certain	  outward	  possessions.	  	  	  	  	  Immediately	  before	  presenting	  his	  three	  arguments,	  Locke	  clearly	  states	  the	  conclusion	  that	  he	  intends	  to	  establish.	  	  He	  writes:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Locke,	  John,	  A	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration,	  in	  David	  Wootton	  (ed.),	  John	  Locke:	  
Political	  Writings,	  (Indianapolis:	  Hackett,	  2003),	  393.	  	  Hereafter	  cited	  as	  Letter.	  16	  Locke,	  Letter,	  393.	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Now	  that	  the	  whole	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  magistrate	  reaches	  only	  to	  these	  civil	  concernments,	  and	  that	  all	  civil	  power,	  right,	  and	  dominion	  is	  bounded	  and	  confined	  to	  the	  only	  care	  of	  promoting	  these	  things;	  and	  that	  it	  neither	  can	  nor	  ought	  in	  any	  manner	  to	  be	  extended	  to	  the	  salvation	  of	  souls,	  these	  following	  considerations	  seem	  unto	  me	  abundantly	  to	  demonstrate.17	  	  	  Locke’s	  intermediate	  conclusion	  is	  that	  civil	  government	  may	  only	  legitimately	  concern	  itself	  with	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  Further,	  religious	  concerns,	  like	  the	  salvation	  of	  souls,	  are	  not	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  that	  once	  this	  claim	  is	  established,	  it	  follows	  that	  civil	  governments	  ought	  to	  adopt	  policies	  of	  toleration.	  	  If	  the	  proper	  jurisdiction	  of	  civil	  government	  is	  limited	  to	  a	  concern	  for	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  then	  it	  does	  wrong	  when	  it	  pursues	  ends	  other	  than	  the	  promotion	  and	  protection	  of	  civil	  interests.	  	  And	  if	  substantive	  religious	  matters	  like	  the	  salvation	  of	  souls	  are	  not	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  then	  civil	  government	  is	  obligated	  to	  refrain	  from	  interfering	  in	  religious	  matters,	  or	  in	  other	  words,	  civil	  government	  ought	  to	  adopt	  a	  policy	  of	  toleration.	  	  Though	  this	  last	  claim	  is	  Locke’s	  ultimate	  conclusion	  in	  the	  Letter,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  realize	  that	  his	  three	  main	  arguments	  are	  advanced	  to	  establish	  his	  intermediate	  conclusion,	  what	  I	  will	  call	  the	  “civil	  interest	  claim”.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  realize	  that	  Locke’s	  civil	  interest	  claim	  contains	  both	  a	  positive	  and	  a	  negative	  assertion.	  	  First,	  Locke	  claims	  that	  civil	  government	  ought	  to	  concern	  itself	  with	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  Second,	  he	  claims	  that	  civil	  government	  
ought	  not	  to	  concern	  itself	  with	  anything	  else,	  specifically,	  substantive	  religious	  matters.	  	  So	  to	  fully	  establish	  the	  civil	  interest	  claim	  on	  which	  his	  ultimate	  conclusion	  rests,	  Locke’s	  arguments	  must	  establish	  both	  its	  positive	  and	  negative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Locke,	  Letter,	  394.	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aspects.	  	  While	  all	  three	  of	  Locke’s	  main	  arguments	  support	  the	  negative	  claim,	  I	  argue	  that	  only	  the	  mandate	  argument	  provides	  a	  framework	  for	  establishing	  the	  positive	  claim.	  	  Further,	  if	  we	  read	  Locke’s	  arguments	  in	  the	  Letter	  as	  he	  presents	  them,	  not	  only	  as	  a	  narrow	  case	  for	  toleration,	  but	  as	  a	  broader	  account	  of	  the	  proper	  role	  and	  limits	  of	  political	  authority,	  then	  we	  cannot	  ignore	  the	  unique	  capacity	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument	  to	  support	  Locke’s	  broader	  objective.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  we	  ought	  to	  regard	  the	  mandate	  argument	  as	  primary.	  I	  turn	  now	  to	  the	  arguments.	  	  The	  first	  argument	  that	  Locke	  presents	  to	  support	  his	  civil	  interest	  claim	  is	  the	  argument	  from	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  state,	  or	  the	  mandate	  argument.	  	  Locke	  argues	  that,	  “…	  the	  care	  of	  souls	  is	  not	  committed	  to	  the	  civil	  magistrate,	  any	  more	  than	  to	  other	  men.”18	  	  Substantive	  religious	  concerns	  like	  the	  “care	  of	  souls”	  are	  not	  committed	  to	  civil	  government	  by	  God,	  nor	  are	  they	  committed	  to	  civil	  government	  by	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  people.	  	  Locke	  argues	  that	  we	  have	  no	  indication	  that	  God	  has	  granted	  the	  authority	  to	  anyone	  to	  coerce	  others	  to	  believe	  in	  or	  practice	  a	  particular	  religion,	  and,	  more	  importantly	  for	  present	  purposes,	  we	  cannot	  understand	  persons	  to	  have	  consented	  to	  being	  compelled	  to	  observe	  a	  particular	  religion.19	  	  	  	  	  Implicit	  in	  this	  argument	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  that	  civil	  government	  may	  not	  exercise	  coercive	  power	  in	  ways	  not	  “committed”	  to	  it.	  	  This	  claim	  is	  central	  to	  Locke’s	  conception	  of	  political	  legitimacy.	  	  Political	  authority	  must	  be	  conferred	  upon	  civil	  government	  from	  without	  for	  it	  to	  rule	  rightfully.	  	  No	  authority	  is	  natural;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Locke,	  Letter,	  394.	  19	  I	  consider	  and	  assess	  the	  strength	  of	  Locke’s	  underlying	  reasons	  for	  why	  persons	  would	  not	  include	  religious	  salvation	  among	  their	  civil	  interests	  in	  the	  next	  section.	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all	  authority	  requires	  justification.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  justification	  explaining	  the	  external	  source	  of	  authority,	  we	  ought	  to	  regard	  persons	  as	  naturally	  free	  from,	  or	  independent	  of,	  authority	  over	  them.	  	  Civil	  government	  receives	  its	  authority	  to	  govern	  from	  without.	  	  	  Further,	  the	  character	  of	  civil	  government’s	  authority	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  content	  of	  the	  commission	  that	  grants	  it	  authority.	  	  Locke	  considers	  two	  sources	  from	  which	  rightful	  authority	  can	  emanate.	  	  God	  could	  confer	  the	  right	  to	  govern	  upon	  civil	  government,	  or	  the	  people	  to	  be	  governed	  could	  themselves	  confer	  the	  right.	  	  Neither	  Locke’s	  critics	  nor	  I	  take	  issue	  with	  claim	  that	  God	  has	  not	  conferred	  this	  right	  on	  civil	  government	  generally	  or	  to	  any	  government	  in	  particular.20	  	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument	  that	  follows,	  I	  leave	  aside	  the	  aspects	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  focus	  on	  a	  commission	  from	  God	  and	  concern	  myself	  with	  the	  aspects	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  focus	  on	  persons’	  consent.	  	  	  The	  connection	  between	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument	  and	  his	  civil	  interest	  claim	  is	  clear.	  	  The	  mandate	  argument	  provides	  provisional	  support	  to	  both	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  civil	  interest	  claims.	  	  Locke	  explicitly	  presents	  the	  negative	  case.	  	  Civil	  government	  may	  not	  concern	  itself	  with	  religious	  matters	  because	  the	  right	  to	  do	  so	  has	  not	  been	  conferred	  upon	  it.	  	  Further,	  we	  can	  infer	  the	  positive	  case.	  	  Civil	  government	  may,	  and	  perhaps	  should,	  protect	  and	  promote	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  because	  it	  has	  received	  authorization	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Further,	  a	  host	  of	  difficult	  issues	  would	  arise	  if	  one	  were	  to	  claim	  that	  God	  had	  conferred	  on	  civil	  government	  the	  right	  to	  compel	  people	  to	  the	  true	  religion.	  	  Most	  importantly,	  who	  would	  have	  the	  authoritative	  interpretation	  of	  God’s	  word	  if	  disagreement	  existed?	  	  It’s	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  that	  a	  supposed	  commission	  from	  God	  would	  remove	  the	  need	  for	  the	  people’s	  consent.	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I	  consider	  and	  assess	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  underlie	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  	  In	  this	  section	  my	  primary	  concern	  is	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  arguments	  in	  the	  Letter.	  	  The	  important	  point	  at	  this	  early	  stage	  is	  that	  we	  can	  identify	  a	  framework	  unique	  to	  the	  mandate	  argument,	  and	  that	  it	  provides	  provisional	  support	  for	  both	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  aspects	  of	  the	  civil	  interest	  claim.	  	  Next	  I	  consider	  whether	  Locke’s	  two	  other	  main	  arguments	  in	  the	  
Letter	  equally	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  establishing	  his	  civil	  interest	  claim.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  they	  do	  not	  and	  therefore	  that	  priority	  must	  be	  given	  to	  the	  mandate	  argument.	  Locke	  next	  presents	  the	  argument	  from	  belief.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  tools	  characteristic	  of	  civil	  government	  are	  unfit	  for	  the	  task	  of	  altering	  religious	  beliefs,	  and	  therefore,	  that	  civil	  government	  ought	  not	  to	  deploy	  them	  for	  that	  purpose.	  	  The	  power	  of	  civil	  government,	  “consists	  in	  outward	  force;	  but	  true	  and	  saving	  religion	  consists	  in	  the	  inward	  persuasion	  of	  the	  mind…”21	  	  Locke	  argues	  that	  the	  means	  distinctive	  of	  civil	  government,	  namely,	  “confiscation	  of	  estate,	  imprisonment,	  (and)	  torments,”22	  are	  inefficacious	  in	  altering	  people’s	  beliefs.	  	  For	  one	  to	  achieve	  religious	  salvation,	  Locke	  assumes	  that	  one	  must	  fully	  believe	  in	  the	  true	  religion.	  	  The	  threat	  of	  punishment,	  however,	  cannot	  succeed	  in	  changing	  persons’	  beliefs.	  	  Try	  as	  one	  might,	  one	  cannot	  change	  his	  honestly	  held	  beliefs	  in	  response	  to	  threats.	  	  Locke	  therefore	  concludes	  that,	  “the	  magistrate’s	  power	  extends	  not	  to	  the	  establishing	  of	  any	  articles	  of	  faith,	  or	  forms	  of	  worship,	  by	  the	  force	  of	  his	  laws.”23	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Locke,	  Letter,	  395.	  22	  Locke,	  Letter,	  395.	  23	  Locke,	  Letter,	  395.	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How	  does	  the	  argument	  from	  belief	  stand	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  civil	  interest	  claim	  that	  it	  purports	  to	  support?	  	  At	  first	  glance,	  the	  argument	  from	  belief	  provides	  a	  very	  compelling	  case	  for	  the	  negative	  civil	  interest	  claim.	  	  If	  the	  means	  available	  to	  civil	  government	  are	  entirely	  inefficacious	  in	  realizing	  religious	  ends,	  namely	  the	  salvation	  of	  souls,	  then	  it	  is	  irrational	  to	  deploy	  them	  for	  that	  purpose.	  	  Further,	  it	  would	  be	  immoral	  to	  punish	  persons	  for	  a	  purpose	  that	  cannot	  be	  attained	  with	  punishment.	  	  This	  would,	  in	  effect,	  amount	  to	  punishment	  to	  no	  end.	  	  If	  Locke	  is	  right	  that	  the	  threat	  of	  punishment	  cannot	  alter	  persons’	  beliefs,	  then	  he	  has	  provided	  a	  strong	  argument	  for	  why	  the	  religious	  salvation	  of	  citizens	  should	  not	  be	  counted	  among	  the	  proper	  ends	  of	  civil	  government.24	  	  	  However,	  the	  argument	  from	  belief	  does	  not	  similarly	  provide	  support	  to	  the	  positive	  civil	  interest	  claim.	  	  On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  the	  argument	  from	  belief	  is	  entirely	  negative.	  	  It	  only	  gives	  reasons	  for	  not	  counting	  certain	  things	  among	  the	  rightful	  ends	  of	  civil	  government.	  	  Specifically,	  ends,	  like	  securing	  citizens’	  religious	  salvation,	  that	  cannot	  be	  attained	  using	  civil	  government’s	  distinctive	  means,	  must	  fall	  outside	  of	  its	  jurisdiction.	  	  The	  argument	  from	  belief	  offers	  no	  support	  for	  the	  positive	  civil	  interest	  claim.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  no	  argument	  here	  for	  what	  we	  
should	  regard	  as	  within	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction.	  	  There	  are	  no	  reasons	  for	  including	  anything	  among	  people’s	  civil	  interests.	  	  	  Though	  the	  argument	  from	  belief	  seems	  entirely	  negative,	  perhaps	  we	  can	  extract	  support	  for	  the	  positive	  civil	  interest	  claim	  from	  it.	  	  Above	  I	  inferred	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  The	  strength	  of	  this	  argument	  rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  political	  authority	  deploys	  religious	  coercion	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  achieving	  persons’	  salvation.	  	  I	  consider	  the	  challenge	  to	  Locke’s	  arguments	  religious	  coercion	  for	  other	  ends	  presents,	  see	  1.4,	  34,	  and	  3.4,	  98-­‐99	  below.	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positive	  corollary	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument;	  perhaps	  the	  same	  can	  be	  done	  with	  the	  argument	  from	  belief.	  	  As	  it	  appears	  in	  the	  Letter,	  the	  argument	  from	  belief	  contends	  that	  civil	  government	  should	  not	  pursue	  ends	  that	  its	  distinctive	  means,	  namely	  outward	  force,	  cannot	  attain.	  	  Perhaps	  then	  the	  positive	  corollary	  of	  this	  claim	  would	  be	  that	  civil	  government	  may,	  or	  perhaps	  should,	  pursue	  any	  ends	  that	  outward	  force	  can	  attain.	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  civil	  government	  is	  limited	  only	  by	  its	  means.	  Civil	  government	  has	  licence	  to	  use	  its	  coercive	  power	  to	  attain	  any	  ends	  that	  such	  power	  can	  in	  fact	  secure.	  The	  question	  becomes	  whether	  this	  positive	  corollary	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  belief	  supports	  the	  positive	  civil	  interest	  claim:	  that	  the	  care	  of	  citizens’	  civil	  interests	  falls	  within	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction.	  	  At	  first	  glace	  the	  positive	  argument	  from	  belief	  is	  overly	  broad.	  	  Locke	  asserts	  that	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  include	  their	  lives,	  liberty,	  physical	  integrity	  and	  possessions.25	  	  The	  positive	  corollary	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  belief	  would	  include	  many	  more	  things	  as	  civil	  interests	  than	  Locke	  seems	  to	  have	  in	  mind.	  	  The	  only	  requirement	  for	  classifying	  something	  as	  a	  civil	  interest	  would	  be	  that	  outward	  force	  could	  bring	  it	  about.	  	  On	  this	  scheme	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  would	  include	  everything	  that	  outward	  force	  can	  bring	  about.	  	  There	  would	  be	  no	  prima	  facie	  grounds	  for	  accusing	  civil	  government	  of	  overstepping	  its	  rightful	  bounds	  so	  long	  as	  it	  pursued	  ends	  that	  its	  characteristic	  means	  could	  achieve.	  	  For	  example,	  political	  authority	  would	  act	  within	  its	  rightful	  bounds	  in	  mandating	  specific	  dress	  codes	  or	  hairstyles	  for	  trivial	  reasons	  like	  the	  personal	  preference	  of	  the	  head	  of	  state,	  or	  for	  no	  reason	  at	  all.	  	  So	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  I	  take	  up	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  Locke’s	  list	  of	  civil	  interests	  is	  exhaustive	  in	  the	  next	  two	  chapters.	  
	   17	  
long	  as	  state	  coercion	  could	  successfully	  influence	  persons’	  choice	  of	  clothing	  and	  hairstyle,	  which	  it	  certainly	  can,	  the	  political	  action	  would	  be	  legitimate.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Proast,	  in	  his	  response	  to	  the	  Letter,	  defends	  a	  claim	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  positive	  corollary	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  belief.	  	  He	  writes,	  “Doubtless	  commonwealths	  are	  instituted	  for	  the	  attaining	  of	  all	  the	  benefits	  which	  political	  government	  can	  yield.”26	  	  Though	  Proast	  provides	  little	  support	  for	  this	  claim,	  it	  provides	  the	  occasion	  for	  Locke	  to	  respond.	  	  Locke	  argues	  that	  Proast’s	  claim	  mistakenly	  dissolves	  the	  distinctness	  of	  different	  types	  of	  societies.	  	  We	  differentiate	  types	  of	  societies	  by	  the	  ends	  for	  which	  they	  are	  “instituted”.	  	  If	  we	  presume	  that	  civil	  society	  is	  instituted	  for	  “attaining	  all	  the	  benefits	  it	  can	  any	  way	  yield,”	  why	  should	  we	  not	  presume	  the	  same	  of	  other	  types	  of	  societies?	  	  If	  we	  do,	  we	  lose	  any	  way	  of	  differentiating	  between	  political	  societies	  and	  religious	  associations,	  between	  families	  and	  businesses.	  	  All	  societies,	  we	  would	  have	  to	  assume,	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  attaining	  all	  of	  the	  benefits	  they	  could	  possibly	  obtain.27	  One	  might	  respond	  by	  arguing	  that	  civil	  society	  is	  the	  association	  endowed	  with	  outward	  force	  to	  pursue	  its	  ends.	  	  But,	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  all	  societies	  are	  instituted	  for	  the	  same	  ends,	  that	  would	  be	  an	  arbitrary	  attribution.	  	  On	  this	  scheme,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  any	  particular	  society	  should	  have	  a	  monopoly	  on	  outward	  force,	  unless,	  of	  course,	  it	  was	  conferred	  on	  that	  society	  by	  the	  participants.	  	  If	  the	  right	  to	  use	  outward	  force	  were	  granted	  to	  a	  society	  by	  the	  participants,	  it	  would	  presumably	  be	  done	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  securing	  some	  specified	  ends.	  	  Because	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Proast,	  The	  Argument	  of	  the	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration,	  62.	  27	  Locke,	  John,	  A	  Second	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration,	  in	  Richard	  Vernon	  (ed.),	  Locke	  
on	  Toleration,	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  103.	  	  Hereafter	  cited	  as	  Second	  Letter.	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coercion	  entails	  the	  loss	  of	  liberty,	  we	  will	  always	  need	  compelling	  reasons	  for	  presuming	  that	  a	  society	  has	  been	  authorized	  to	  use	  outward	  force	  in	  this	  way.	  	  This	  reasoning	  belongs	  firmly	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  exchange	  between	  Locke	  and	  Proast	  illuminates	  an	  ambiguity	  in	  their	  language	  that	  enables	  them	  to,	  at	  times,	  talk	  past	  each	  other.	  	  Though	  both	  speak	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  civil	  society	  is	  “constituted”,	  or	  at	  times	  “instituted”,	  they	  seem	  to	  use	  these	  words	  to	  make	  contrary	  points.	  	  Locke	  argues	  that	  civil	  society	  is	  constituted	  to	  protect	  and	  promote	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  only.	  	  Proast,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  argues	  that	  civil	  society	  is	  constituted	  to	  pursue	  all	  of	  the	  goods	  that	  it	  can	  secure.	  	  Locke	  consistently	  uses	  the	  word	  “constituted”	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  process	  or	  act	  of	  having	  formed	  a	  society.	  	  Locke’s	  usage	  of	  the	  word	  alludes	  to	  the	  intentions	  of	  persons	  forming	  political	  societies.	  	  Proast	  occasionally	  conforms	  to	  this	  usage;	  however,	  at	  times,	  he	  seems	  to	  use	  “constituted”	  or	  “instituted”	  to	  refer	  only	  to	  the	  capacities	  of	  a	  society	  once	  it	  is	  formed,	  regardless	  of	  the	  intentions	  of	  those	  who	  formed	  it.28	  	  On	  the	  latter	  sense	  of	  the	  word,	  Proast	  is	  correct	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  civil	  society	  is	  constituted	  to	  pursue	  any	  and	  all	  ends	  that	  it	  can	  secure.	  	  The	  claim	  amounts	  to	  a	  tautology.	  	  If	  by	  “constituted”	  one	  simply	  means	  fit	  to	  do	  something,	  it	  is	  trivially	  true	  that	  all	  things	  are	  constituted	  to	  do	  whatever	  they	  can,	  in	  fact,	  do.	  	  Combined	  with	  Proast’s	  claim	  that	  outward	  force,	  deployed	  in	  the	  right	  way,	  is	  efficacious	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  changing	  people’s	  beliefs,	  he	  is	  correct	  to	  claim	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  One	  could,	  for	  example,	  speak	  of	  a	  washboard	  being	  made	  (or	  constituted	  in	  the	  latter	  sense)	  for	  use	  as	  a	  percussion	  instrument,	  though	  it	  was	  obviously	  first	  built	  (or	  constituted	  in	  the	  former	  sense)	  for	  washing	  clothes.	  	  This	  is	  just	  to	  say	  that	  washboards	  are	  perfectly	  suited	  for,	  say,	  playing	  in	  a	  skiffle	  band	  regardless	  of	  their	  original	  intended	  purpose.	  	  Thanks	  to	  Seth	  Zuk	  for	  this	  example.	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civil	  society	  is	  constituted	  (in	  the	  latter	  sense)	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  pursuing	  citizens’	  religious	  salvation.	  	  This	  is	  just	  to	  say	  that	  civil	  government	  is	  well	  equipped	  to	  pursue	  the	  goal.	  	  Though	  this	  claim	  amounts	  to	  a	  positive	  corollary	  to	  the	  argument	  from	  belief,	  it	  is	  open	  to	  the	  criticisms	  considered	  above	  and	  does	  not	  supplant	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument,	  that	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  reaches	  only	  to	  the	  ends	  for	  which	  it	  is	  constituted	  (in	  the	  former	  sense).29	  The	  third	  and	  final	  argument	  that	  Locke	  explicitly	  advances	  in	  support	  of	  the	  civil	  interest	  claim	  is	  the	  argument	  from	  error.	  	  The	  argument	  from	  error	  claims	  that	  even	  if	  civil	  government’s	  characteristic	  means	  were	  efficacious	  in	  changing	  persons’	  beliefs,	  endeavouring	  to	  do	  so	  would	  lead	  to	  absurd	  consequences.30	  	  Though	  Locke	  assumes	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  true	  religion,	  the	  political	  decision	  makers	  of	  the	  world	  practice	  countless	  disparate	  religions.	  	  It	  would	  be	  unacceptably	  risky	  for	  individual	  citizens	  and	  ultimately	  counterproductive	  to	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  true	  religion	  for	  political	  decision	  makers	  to	  coercively	  enforce	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  religion	  they	  each	  take	  to	  be	  true.	  	  More	  people	  worldwide	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  believe	  in	  and	  follow	  false	  religions	  than	  the	  true	  one.	  	  Further,	  an	  individual’s	  chances	  of	  being	  coerced	  into	  the	  true	  religion	  would	  depend	  entirely	  on	  the	  place	  of	  her	  birth.	  	  Locke	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  absurd	  to	  suppose	  that	  God	  would	  endorse	  a	  policy	  that	  led	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Vernon	  points	  to	  Locke	  and	  Proast’s	  divergent	  uses	  of	  the	  word	  “power”	  to	  make	  the	  same	  point.	  	  Locke	  speaks	  of	  civil	  government’s	  “power”	  to	  refer	  to	  its	  authority.	  	  Proast	  speaks	  of	  civil	  government’s	  “power”	  to	  refer	  to	  its	  capacity.	  	  Vernon	  stresses	  that	  this	  illuminates	  one	  of	  the	  main	  points	  of	  contrast	  between	  Locke	  and	  Proast.	  	  Proast	  conflates	  the	  two	  senses	  of	  “power”	  and	  assumes	  that	  whenever	  civil	  government	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  secure	  a	  good	  it	  is	  justified	  in	  doing	  so.	  	  Locke	  insists	  that	  civil	  government	  is	  constrained	  by	  its	  authority	  before	  questions	  of	  its	  capacity	  arise.	  Vernon,	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  xix-­‐xxi.	  	  30	  Locke,	  Letter,	  395-­‐396.	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these	  consequences.	  	  He	  concludes	  that	  individuals	  ought	  therefore	  to	  retain	  the	  right	  to	  choose	  their	  religions	  for	  themselves.31	  Like	  the	  argument	  from	  belief,	  the	  argument	  from	  error	  is	  entirely	  negative.	  	  It	  speaks	  only	  to	  why	  religion	  should	  not	  fall	  within	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction.	  	  The	  argument	  from	  error	  is,	  at	  least	  partially,	  a	  consequentialist	  argument.	  	  It	  suggests	  that,	  given	  the	  plurality	  of	  religious	  beliefs	  held	  by	  political	  decision	  makers,	  a	  policy	  of	  persecution,	  if	  universalized,	  would	  lead	  to	  bad	  consequences.	  	  Persons	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  achieve	  salvation	  and	  the	  true	  religion	  would	  flounder.32	  	  The	  clear	  goal	  of	  one	  wishing	  to	  place	  religious	  concerns	  within	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  would	  be	  to	  ensure	  persons’	  salvation	  and	  to	  further	  the	  ends	  of	  the	  true	  religion.	  	  So	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  regard	  persons’	  religious	  salvation	  as	  among	  their	  civil	  interests	  because	  doing	  so	  would	  be	  self-­‐defeating.	  	  Attempts	  to	  coercively	  promote	  persons’	  salvation,	  and	  further	  the	  ends	  of	  the	  true	  religion,	  are	  bound	  to	  do	  more	  harm	  than	  good.	  	  These	  considerations	  show	  how	  the	  argument	  from	  error	  supports	  the	  negative	  civil	  interest	  claim.	  Can	  we	  generate	  a	  positive	  corollary	  to	  the	  argument	  from	  error	  to	  support	  the	  positive	  civil	  interest	  claim?	  	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  we	  can.	  	  Though	  the	  argument	  from	  error	  instructs	  that	  civil	  government	  ought	  not	  to	  involve	  itself	  in	  activities	  that	  will	  likely	  subvert	  individuals’	  pursuit	  of	  salvation	  and	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  true	  religion,	  we	  cannot	  simply	  urge	  civil	  government	  to	  involve	  itself	  in	  activities	  that	  will	  promote	  these	  aims.	  	  The	  argument	  from	  error	  shows	  that	  civil	  government’s	  attempts	  at	  actively	  promoting	  substantive	  religious	  ends	  are	  self-­‐defeating.	  	  Attempting	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Locke,	  Letter,	  396.	  32	  Vernon,	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  xvii.	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coercively	  promote	  religious	  ends	  is	  precisely	  what	  leads	  to	  bad	  and	  absurd	  consequences.	  	  Generalizing	  the	  argument	  further	  does	  not	  help	  support	  the	  positive	  civil	  interest	  claim.	  	  A	  positive	  argument	  that	  claimed	  that	  civil	  government	  ought	  to	  pursue	  all	  ends	  that	  are	  not	  self-­‐defeating	  would	  be	  overly	  broad	  and	  lead	  to	  additional	  absurdities.	  	  	  	  	  	  Proast	  protests	  that	  civil	  government	  may	  not	  enforce	  its	  favoured	  religion,	  but	  may	  enforce	  the	  true	  religion.33	  	  This	  approach,	  however,	  does	  not	  remedy	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  error.	  	  As	  Locke	  points	  out	  in	  response	  to	  Proast,	  everyone	  believes	  that	  his	  religion	  is	  the	  true	  religion.	  	  It	  would	  be	  absurd	  for	  one	  to	  claim	  that	  he	  believed	  in	  a	  religion	  yet	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  religion	  to	  be	  true.	  	  Even	  if,	  as	  Proast	  maintains,	  believers	  in	  the	  true	  religion	  can	  know	  with	  certainty	  that	  their	  religion	  is	  true,	  one	  cannot	  deny	  that	  adherents	  of	  false	  religions	  believe	  in	  the	  truth	  of	  their	  religion	  just	  as	  vigorously	  as	  believers	  of	  the	  true	  religion.	  	  Therefore,	  one	  could	  not	  implement	  the	  principle	  that	  civil	  government	  may	  only	  enforce	  the	  true	  religion	  in	  any	  way	  that	  would	  avoid	  the	  consequences	  at	  which	  the	  argument	  from	  error	  points.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  establish	  the	  primacy	  of	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument	  in	  the	  Letter.	  	  Though	  the	  Letter’s	  ultimate	  conclusion	  is	  that	  civil	  government	  ought	  to	  adopt	  a	  policy	  of	  toleration,	  Locke	  aims	  to	  establish	  it	  by	  first	  establishing	  an	  intermediate	  conclusion.	  	  The	  Letter’s	  intermediate	  conclusion	  is	  that	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  reaches	  only	  to	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  and	  that	  religious	  salvation	  is	  not	  among	  them.	  	  This	  intermediate	  conclusion,	  Locke’s	  civil	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Proast,	  The	  Argument	  of	  the	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration,	  65.	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interest	  claim,	  contains	  both	  a	  positive	  and	  a	  negative	  claim.	  	  While	  all	  three	  of	  Locke’s	  arguments	  provide	  prima	  facie	  support	  for	  the	  negative	  civil	  interest	  claim,	  only	  the	  mandate	  argument	  supports	  the	  positive	  claim.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  suppose,	  as	  Proast	  and	  Waldron	  do,	  that	  Locke’s	  case	  for	  toleration	  rests	  entirely	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  belief.	  	  Given	  that	  Locke	  aims	  to	  show	  that	  toleration	  follows	  from	  a	  proper	  understanding	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  civil	  government’s	  authority,	  priority	  must	  be	  given	  to	  the	  mandate	  argument.	  	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  mandate	  argument	  provides	  the	  foundations	  of	  a	  strong	  political	  argument	  for	  establishing	  Locke’s	  civil	  interest	  claim	  and	  his	  ultimate	  conclusion	  in	  favour	  of	  toleration.	  	  	  	  
1.4	  –	  The	  Mandate	  Argument	  and	  Civil	  Interests	  	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  analyze	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument.	  	  I	  first	  consider	  its	  original	  formulation	  in	  the	  Letter	  and	  then	  look	  at	  subsequent	  formulation	  in	  Locke’s	  later	  
Letters.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  mandate	  argument	  provides	  strong	  support	  for	  Locke’s	  civil	  interest	  claim	  and	  for	  toleration.	  	  	  	   To	  review,	  in	  its	  simplest	  form	  the	  mandate	  argument	  states	  that	  the	  right	  to	  govern	  must	  be	  conferred	  on	  civil	  government	  from	  without.	  	  Or,	  in	  other	  words,	  civil	  government’s	  authority	  must	  be	  granted	  to	  it.	  	  Further,	  the	  extent	  of	  this	  authority	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  content	  of	  such	  a	  grant	  or	  conferral.	  	  Locke	  briefly	  entertains	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  authority	  to	  govern	  could	  be	  granted	  by	  God,	  but	  focuses	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  persons	  who	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  civil	  government’s	  authority	  must	  be	  the	  ones	  to	  confer	  the	  right	  to	  govern	  on	  it.	  	  Thus,	  the	  mandate	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argument	  introduces	  a	  line	  of	  contractarian	  reasoning	  in	  the	  Letter.	  	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument	  is	  an	  argument	  for	  religious	  toleration	  because	  it	  includes	  the	  claim	  that	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  would	  not	  authorize	  civil	  government	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  their	  religious	  salvation.	  	  Or	  in	  other	  words,	  salvation	  is	  not	  among	  the	  civil	  interests	  that	  persons	  would	  charge	  civil	  government	  with	  protecting	  and	  promoting.	  	  	  	   The	  reasons	  that	  Locke	  offers	  for	  why	  persons	  would	  be	  unwilling	  to	  alienate	  responsibility	  of	  their	  salvation	  to	  civil	  government	  evolve	  over	  the	  course	  of	  his	  
Letters.	  	  In	  the	  original	  Letter,	  Locke	  writes:	  	  No	  man	  can	  so	  far	  abandon	  the	  care	  of	  his	  own	  salvation	  as	  blindly	  to	  leave	  it	  to	  the	  choice	  of	  any	  other,	  whether	  prince	  or	  subject,	  to	  prescribe	  to	  him	  what	  faith	  or	  worship	  he	  shall	  embrace.	  	  For	  no	  man	  can,	  if	  he	  would,	  conform	  his	  faith	  to	  the	  dictates	  of	  another.	  	  All	  the	  life	  and	  power	  of	  true	  religion	  consists	  in	  the	  inward	  and	  full	  persuasion	  of	  the	  mind;	  and	  faith	  is	  not	  faith	  without	  believing.	  	  Whatever	  profession	  we	  make,	  to	  whatever	  outward	  worship	  we	  conform,	  if	  we	  are	  not	  fully	  satisfied	  in	  our	  own	  mind	  that	  the	  one	  is	  true,	  and	  the	  other	  well	  pleasing	  unto	  God,	  such	  profession	  and	  such	  practice,	  far	  from	  being	  any	  furtherance,	  are	  indeed	  great	  obstacles	  to	  our	  salvation.34	  	  	  	  Here,	  Locke	  offers	  three	  related	  reasons	  for	  why	  persons	  would	  not	  consent	  to	  civil	  government	  coercively	  enforcing	  religious	  beliefs.	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  third	  reason	  first,	  Locke	  suggests	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  religious	  beliefs	  requires	  that	  they	  be	  formed	  and	  held	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  in	  order	  to	  serve	  their	  purpose,	  namely,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  pleasing	  to	  God.	  	  Locke	  stresses	  the	  importance	  of	  inward	  persuasion	  in	  forming,	  and	  sincerity	  in	  holding	  religious	  beliefs.	  	  Any	  attempt	  to	  change	  one’s	  religious	  beliefs	  according	  to	  external	  pressure	  from	  the	  state,	  without	  being	  fully	  convinced	  that	  the	  beliefs	  are	  true,	  would	  be	  displeasing	  to	  God.	  	  Presumably,	  this	  would	  be	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Locke,	  Letter,	  394.	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case	  even	  if	  such	  practices	  or	  professions	  were	  only	  the	  first	  steps	  in	  eventually	  coming	  to	  accept	  those	  beliefs	  as	  true.	  	  Recognizing	  that	  this	  process	  would	  hinder	  one’s	  chances	  at	  salvation,	  Locke	  argues	  that	  it	  would	  be	  irrational	  for	  persons	  to	  authorize	  civil	  government	  to	  attempt	  to	  coercively	  enforce	  religious	  belief.	  	   Though	  I	  suppose	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  Locke’s	  assessment	  of	  what	  is	  pleasing	  to	  God	  is	  accurate,	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  very	  strong	  grounds	  for	  the	  mandate	  argument.	  	  As	  Vernon	  and	  Waldron	  point	  out,	  it	  relies	  on	  the	  particulars	  of	  Locke’s	  conception	  of	  true	  religion.35	  	  It	  therefore	  fails	  to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  standard	  that	  we	  have	  come	  to	  expect	  of	  Locke	  of	  providing	  a	  generalizable	  theory	  of	  toleration,36	  and	  fails	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  compelling	  political	  argument	  where	  the	  veracity	  and	  role	  of	  religious	  claims	  are	  very	  much	  at	  issue.	  	   Locke’s	  second	  reason	  for	  why	  persons	  would	  not	  authorize	  civil	  government	  to	  pursue	  religious	  ends	  echoes	  the	  reasoning	  of	  his	  argument	  from	  belief.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  persons’	  beliefs,	  religious	  or	  otherwise,	  cannot	  be	  altered	  by	  external	  pressure.	  	  Only	  reasoning	  and	  persuasion	  can	  affect	  persons’	  beliefs.	  	  It	  would	  therefore	  be	  irrational	  for	  persons	  to	  authorize	  civil	  government	  to	  attempt	  to	  change	  their	  religious	  beliefs	  by	  outward	  force.	  	  It	  would	  be	  irrational	  because	  it	  would	  require	  persons	  imposing	  pressures	  and	  punishments	  on	  themselves	  that	  would	  be	  ineffective	  and	  likely	  detrimental	  to	  their	  wellbeing.	  	  	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  though	  Locke’s	  reasoning	  here	  echoes	  his	  reasoning	  in	  the	  argument	  from	  belief,	  it	  takes	  on	  a	  different	  character	  within	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Vernon,	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  xxiii,	  Waldron,	  “Locke:	  Toleration	  and	  the	  Rationality	  of	  Persecution,”	  63.	  36	  Vernon,	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  xi.	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framework	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument.	  	  The	  question	  is	  not,	  “is	  it	  rational	  for	  civil	  government	  to	  coercively	  promote	  religious	  beliefs?”	  but,	  “is	  it	  rational	  for	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  social	  contract	  to	  authorize	  civil	  government	  coercively	  promoting	  religious	  beliefs?”	  	  As	  Wootton	  and	  Vernon	  point	  out,	  the	  argument	  from	  belief	  appeals	  to	  the	  rationality	  of	  civil	  government	  or	  its	  officials.	  	  The	  mandate	  argument,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  appeals	  to	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  persons	  subject	  to	  political	  authority.37	  	  This	  requires	  that	  we	  adopt	  the	  perspective	  of	  an	  individual	  seeking	  to	  engage	  in	  political	  cooperation,	  contemplating	  the	  powers	  she	  should	  confer	  upon	  civil	  government.	  Thus,	  as	  Vernon	  points	  out,	  the	  mandate	  argument	  additionally	  adds	  the	  prospective	  perspective	  of	  citizens	  seeking	  to	  engage	  in	  political	  cooperation.38	  	   	  Given	  that	  Locke	  refers	  back	  to	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  belief,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  Proast	  and	  Waldron’s	  criticism	  that,	  deployed	  in	  the	  right	  way,	  outward	  force	  can	  aid	  in	  the	  formation	  and	  alteration	  of	  beliefs.	  	  Though	  outward	  force	  cannot	  at	  once	  alter	  a	  person’s	  beliefs,	  punishments	  and	  incentives	  can	  force	  people	  to	  listen	  to	  the	  arguments	  that	  will	  persuade	  them.	  	  If	  Proast	  and	  Waldron	  are	  right,	  as	  Locke	  eventually	  appears	  to	  acknowledge,39	  we	  can	  ask	  whether	  it	  would	  ever	  be	  rational	  for	  parties	  to	  a	  social	  contract	  to	  authorize	  civil	  government	  to	  coercively	  enforce	  certain	  religious	  beliefs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Wootton,	  John	  Locke:	  Political	  Writing,	  99.	  	  Vernon,	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  xxi.	  38	  Vernon,	  The	  Career	  of	  Toleration,	  23.	  39	  Vernon	  notes	  the	  significance	  of	  Locke’s	  unwillingness	  to	  defend	  his	  argument	  from	  belief	  in	  its	  original	  form	  in	  his	  replies	  to	  Proast,	  in	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  xix.	  	  Locke’s	  replies	  to	  Proast,	  beginning	  in	  the	  Second	  Letter,	  consistently	  grant	  that	  this	  refined	  use	  of	  force	  could	  successfully	  aid	  in	  altering	  persons’	  beliefs.	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   Alex	  Tuckness	  argues	  that	  in	  certain	  circumstances	  it	  would	  be	  rational	  for	  persons	  to	  authorize	  religious	  coercion.40	  	  If	  state	  coercion,	  when	  deployed	  in	  the	  right	  way,	  is	  in	  fact	  efficacious	  in	  altering	  beliefs,	  and	  if	  people	  have	  any	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  civil	  government	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  access	  to	  religious	  truth,	  say	  by	  having	  access	  to	  the	  best	  religious	  scholars	  and	  advisors,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  rational	  for	  persons	  to	  consent	  to	  a	  state	  enforced	  religion.	  	  If	  successful,	  the	  benefits	  of	  eventually	  accepting	  true	  religion,	  or	  even	  the	  increased	  likelihood	  of	  accepting	  true	  religion,	  would	  far	  outweigh	  the	  injuries	  of	  religious	  persecution.	  	  Tuckness	  concludes	  that,	  “even	  if	  we	  grant	  that	  the	  government	  has	  only	  those	  powers	  that	  it	  would	  be	  rational	  for	  citizens	  to	  grant	  them	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  given	  certain	  assumptions	  about	  probabilities	  and	  payoffs,	  consent	  to	  religious	  coercion	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  perfectly	  rational.”41	  	  	  	   Proast	  and	  Waldron’s	  conclusions	  about	  the	  efficacy	  of	  force	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  changing	  beliefs	  certainly	  invite	  the	  sort	  of	  reasoning	  that	  Tuckness	  presents.	  	  However,	  I	  believe	  that	  Tuckness’	  argument	  misses	  a	  crucial	  element	  of	  the	  decision	  facing	  parties	  to	  a	  social	  contract.	  	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  their	  only	  two	  options	  are	  to	  pursue	  religious	  truth	  in	  complete	  isolation	  or	  to	  submit	  to	  civil	  government’s	  religious	  coercion.	  	  In	  order	  for	  religious	  salvation	  to	  be	  a	  legitimate	  end	  of	  civil	  government,	  the	  people	  would	  have	  to	  authorize	  civil	  government	  to	  coercively	  enforce	  religious	  beliefs.	  	  For	  this	  to	  happen,	  according	  to	  Tuckness,	  all	  that	  is	  required	  is	  that	  the	  people	  recognize	  that	  civil	  government	  has	  a	  slightly	  better	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Tuckness,	  Alex.	  “Locke’s	  Main	  Argument	  for	  Toleration.”	  Toleration	  and	  its	  Limits.	  Melissa	  S.	  Williams	  and	  Jeremy	  Waldron	  (eds.),	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  2008,	  114-­‐138),	  135.	  41	  Tuckness,	  “Locke’s	  Main	  Argument	  for	  Toleration,”	  135.	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chance	  of	  accessing	  religious	  truth	  than	  they	  do.	  	  However,	  if	  we	  suppose	  that	  people	  are	  capable	  of	  recognizing	  this	  prior	  to	  engaging	  in	  political	  cooperation,	  why	  should	  we	  suppose	  that	  they	  are	  incapable	  of	  recognizing	  this	  after	  entering	  political	  society?	  	  If	  they	  are	  equally	  capable	  of	  recognizing	  the	  privileged	  standing	  of	  civil	  government	  with	  regard	  to	  religious	  truth,	  then	  antecedently	  agreeing	  to	  religious	  persecution	  again	  seems	  irrational.	  	  Why	  would	  persons	  prefer	  to	  be	  coerced	  into	  accepting	  particular	  religious	  beliefs	  when	  they	  could	  simply	  consult	  religious	  experts	  themselves	  and	  consider	  the	  experts’	  arguments	  as	  they	  see	  fit,	  free	  from	  the	  injuries	  of	  persecution?	  	  Again,	  the	  mandate	  argument	  requires	  that,	  for	  religious	  coercion	  to	  be	  legitimate,	  parties	  to	  a	  social	  contract	  would	  first	  have	  to	  sanction	  it.	  	  I	  am	  suggesting	  that	  there	  are	  no	  features	  unique	  to	  the	  situation	  prior	  to	  political	  cooperation	  that	  would	  make	  it	  rational	  for	  persons	  to	  impose	  religious	  coercion	  upon	  themselves	  in	  political	  society.	  	  The	  concern	  for	  religious	  salvation	  that,	  at	  first	  glance,	  might	  make	  religious	  coercion	  appear	  attractive,	  would	  undermine	  the	  need	  for	  it	  in	  political	  society.	  	  Persons	  could	  procure	  the	  benefits	  of	  religious	  coercion	  without	  actually	  exposing	  themselves	  to	  the	  harms	  of	  religious	  coercion.	  	  	   These	  considerations	  relate	  to	  Locke’s	  final	  reason42	  for	  why	  persons	  would	  not	  authorize	  civil	  government	  to	  pursue	  religious	  ends.	  	  Locke	  insinuates	  that	  decisions	  regarding	  religion	  are	  so	  important	  that	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  blindly	  leave	  them	  to	  anyone	  else.	  	  We	  must	  retain	  responsibility	  for	  our	  own	  religious	  lives.	  	  Authorizing	  religious	  coercion	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  civil	  government	  would	  remove	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Which	  appears	  first	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument	  in	  the	  Letter.	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oneself	  from	  a	  process	  that	  one	  has	  a	  prudential,	  and	  perhaps	  religious,	  responsibility	  to	  actively	  engage	  in.43	  	  	  	   In	  response,	  Proast	  argues	  that	  in	  submitting	  to	  religious	  coercion,	  persons	  in	  fact	  show	  a	  greater	  concern	  for	  their	  religious	  lives	  than	  if	  they	  pursue	  religious	  ends	  on	  their	  own.44	  	  Persons	  ought	  to	  recognize	  that	  their	  biases	  and	  prejudices	  will	  prevent	  them	  from	  giving	  sufficient	  consideration	  to	  other	  religions.	  	  They	  ought	  therefore	  to	  submit	  themselves	  to	  the	  religious	  coercion	  of	  civil	  government	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  will	  give	  due	  consideration	  to	  another,	  and	  if	  Tuckness	  is	  right,	  more	  likely	  true	  religion.	  	  In	  authorizing	  civil	  government	  to	  pursue	  religious	  ends,	  persons	  express	  their	  commitment	  to	  their	  own	  salvation,	  in	  spite	  of	  their	  biases	  and	  prejudices.	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Here	  again,	  Proast	  fails	  to	  justify	  why	  people	  would	  regard	  religious	  coercion	  as	  necessary.	  	  In	  order	  for	  civil	  government	  to	  legitimately	  pursue	  religious	  ends,	  the	  people	  would	  first	  need	  to	  authorize	  it	  to	  do	  so.	  	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so	  for	  the	  reasons	  proposed	  by	  Proast,	  persons	  would	  have	  to	  overcome	  their	  religious	  biases	  and	  prejudices.	  	  Proast	  fails	  to	  offer	  a	  compelling	  reason	  for	  why	  persons	  would	  not	  similarly	  be	  able	  to	  overcome	  their	  biases	  once	  they	  were	  in	  political	  society.	  	  If	  persons	  in	  political	  society	  are	  equally	  able	  to	  overcome	  their	  religious	  biases	  and	  listen	  to	  the	  religious	  arguments	  that	  could	  aid	  in	  their	  salvation,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Ashcraft	  argues	  for	  the	  religious	  obligation	  to	  maintain	  responsibility	  for	  one’s	  own	  religious	  interests.	  	  Ashcraft,	  Revolutionary	  Politics	  &	  Locke’s	  Two	  Treatises	  of	  
Government,	  499.	  44	  Proast,	  The	  Argument	  of	  the	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration,	  63.	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for	  them	  to	  antecedently	  impose	  religious	  coercion	  upon	  themselves.	  	  Thus	  religious	  coercion	  is	  rendered	  unnecessary.45	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Locke’s	  mandate	  argument	  introduces	  a	  promising	  line	  of	  contractarian	  reasoning	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  toleration;	  however,	  as	  it	  first	  appears	  in	  the	  Letter,	  it	  has	  its	  limitations.	  	  As	  noted,	  some	  of	  Locke’s	  reasoning	  relies	  on	  particular	  assumptions	  about	  religious	  truth	  and	  the	  requirements	  for	  religious	  salvation.	  	  Additionally,	  Locke’s	  support	  for	  the	  mandate	  argument	  in	  the	  Letter	  invites	  arguments	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  Tuckness’	  that	  there	  are	  compelling	  reasons	  for	  parties	  to	  a	  social	  contract	  to	  consent	  to	  religious	  coercion.	  	  Perhaps,	  for	  example,	  persons	  would	  authorize	  religious	  coercion	  to	  hold	  them	  to	  their	  prior	  religious	  commitments.	  	  Though	  I	  think	  Locke	  would	  have	  strong	  grounds	  for	  rejecting	  these	  arguments,	  contemporary	  Locke	  scholars	  like	  Waldron	  and	  Tuckness	  remain	  unconvinced.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  significant	  shortcoming	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument	  as	  it	  appears	  in	  the	  Letter	  is	  that	  it	  presupposes	  that	  the	  end	  of	  religious	  persecution	  is	  the	  salvation	  of	  persons’	  souls.	  	  This	  version	  of	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument	  is	  silent	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  religious	  coercion	  where	  its	  stated	  purpose	  is	  other	  than	  to	  instil	  true	  religious	  beliefs	  in	  people,	  but	  rather,	  say,	  to	  ensure	  uniformity	  in	  religious	  practice	  for	  ends	  other	  than	  the	  care	  of	  persons’	  souls.	  	  	  	  	   In	  Locke’s	  later	  Letters	  on	  toleration	  he	  revisits	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument.	  	  In	  the	  later	  Letters,	  however,	  he	  provides	  new,	  and	  I	  believe	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  The	  possibility	  persists	  that	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  would	  recognize	  themselves	  as	  weak	  willed	  and	  sanction	  civil	  government	  to	  coercively	  hold	  them	  to	  their	  antecedently	  established	  religious	  commitments.	  	  I	  think	  the	  mandate	  argument	  as	  it	  appears	  in	  the	  second	  and	  third	  Letters	  begins	  to	  address	  this	  possibility.	  	  I	  address	  it	  directly,	  see	  3.4,	  103-­‐104	  below.	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stronger	  grounds	  for	  establishing	  that	  persons	  setting	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  political	  cooperation	  would	  not	  consent	  to	  religious	  coercion	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  civil	  government.	  	  In	  the	  Second	  Letter	  Locke	  writes:	  Nothing	  can	  ‘in	  reason	  be	  reckoned	  amongst	  the	  ends	  of	  any	  society’,	  but	  what	  may	  in	  reason	  be	  supposed	  to	  be	  designed	  by	  those	  who	  enter	  into	  it.	  	  Now	  nobody	  can	  in	  reason	  suppose	  that	  anyone	  entered	  into	  civil	  society	  for	  the	  procuring,	  securing,	  or	  advancing	  salvation	  of	  his	  soul,	  when	  he,	  for	  that	  end,	  needed	  not	  the	  force	  of	  civil	  society.	  	  ‘The	  procuring,	  therefore,	  securing,	  and	  advancing	  the	  spiritual	  and	  eternal	  interest	  of	  men,	  cannot	  in	  reason	  be	  reckoned	  amongst	  the	  ends	  of	  civil	  societies’…46	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Here	  Locke	  clearly	  reintroduces	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument	  and	  draws	  the	  connection	  between	  it	  and	  the	  civil	  interest	  claim.	  	  The	  ends	  of	  civil	  society,	  and	  consequently	  of	  civil	  government,	  are	  defined	  by	  the	  parties	  seeking	  to	  engage	  in	  political	  cooperation.	  	  The	  reasoning	  underlying	  this	  version	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument,	  however,	  does	  not	  simply	  echo	  that	  of	  the	  earlier	  version.	  	  Here	  Locke	  argues	  that	  people	  outside	  of	  political	  society	  simply	  do	  not	  need	  the	  force	  of	  civil	  government	  to	  successfully	  pursue	  their	  religious	  salvation.	  	  Parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  would	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  authorize	  religious	  coercion	  because	  they	  have	  all	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  pursue	  their	  salvation	  independently	  of	  political	  cooperation.	  	  Simply	  put,	  the	  inability	  to	  pursue	  religious	  interests	  as	  they	  see	  fit	  is	  not	  among	  the	  problems	  that	  persons	  would	  face	  outside	  of	  political	  society;	  and,	  therefore,	  it	  is	  not	  something	  that	  persons	  would	  include	  among	  their	  civil	  interests	  and	  look	  to	  civil	  government	  to	  remedy.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Locke,	  Second	  Letter,	  104-­‐105.	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Locke	  fills	  in	  this	  picture	  with	  the	  type	  of	  considerations	  that	  would	  inform	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  social	  contract	  when	  he	  again	  revisits	  the	  mandate	  argument	  in	  his	  Third	  Letter.	  	  He	  writes:	  	  The	  end	  of	  a	  commonwealth	  constituted	  can	  be	  supposed	  no	  other	  than	  what	  men	  in	  the	  constitution	  of,	  and	  entering	  into	  it,	  proposed;	  and	  that	  could	  be	  nothing	  but	  protection	  from	  such	  injuries	  from	  other	  men,	  which	  they	  desiring	  to	  avoid,	  nothing	  but	  force	  could	  prevent	  or	  remedy;	  all	  things	  but	  this	  being	  as	  well	  attainable	  by	  men	  living	  in	  neighbourhood	  without	  the	  bounds	  of	  a	  commonwealth,	  they	  could	  propose	  to	  themselves	  no	  other	  thing	  but	  this	  in	  quitting	  their	  natural	  liberty,	  and	  putting	  themselves	  under	  the	  umpirage	  of	  a	  civil	  sovereign,	  who	  therefore	  had	  the	  force	  of	  all	  the	  members	  of	  the	  commonwealth	  put	  into	  his	  hands,	  to	  make	  his	  decrees	  to	  this	  end	  obeyed.47	  	  Here	  Locke	  argues	  that	  the	  civil	  interests	  that	  persons	  engage	  in	  political	  cooperation	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  promoting	  and	  protecting,	  and	  that	  therefore	  fall	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  civil	  government,	  are	  those	  things	  that	  would	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  injury	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  others,	  and	  that	  only	  outward	  force	  can	  protect	  and	  promote.	  These	  vulnerabilities	  represent	  the	  distinctive	  problems	  that	  persons	  outside	  of	  political	  society	  would	  face.	  	  Consequently	  the	  prospect	  of	  remedying	  these	  problems	  is	  what	  would	  motivate	  persons	  to	  engage	  in	  political	  cooperation	  and	  put	  themselves	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  civil	  government.	  	  The	  interests	  that	  persons	  recognize	  cannot	  be	  secured	  but	  by	  the	  outward	  force	  of	  civil	  government	  are	  their	  civil	  interests.	  	  	  Here	  we	  get	  a	  better	  sense	  of	  how	  Locke	  generates	  his	  list	  of	  civil	  interests,	  namely,	  persons’	  lives,	  liberty,	  physical	  integrity,	  and	  their	  possession	  of	  outward	  things.	  	  Outside	  of	  political	  society,	  the	  possession	  of	  these	  things	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Locke,	  A	  Third	  Letter	  for	  Toleration,	  in	  Richard	  Vernon	  (ed.),	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  (Indianapolis:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  141.	  	  Hereafter	  cited	  as	  Third	  
Letter.	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injury	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  others.	  	  Further,	  there	  is	  little	  persons	  could	  do	  to	  successfully	  secure	  these	  things	  short	  of	  engaging	  in	  political	  cooperation	  and	  submitting	  the	  care	  of	  these	  things	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  civil	  government.	  	  Any	  other	  problems	  that	  arise	  outside	  of	  political	  society	  can	  equally	  well	  be	  solved	  outside	  of	  political	  society,	  without	  the	  force	  of	  civil	  government.	  	  Persons	  would	  therefore	  define	  their	  civil	  interests	  as	  their	  lives,	  liberty,	  physical	  integrity,	  and	  possession	  of	  outward	  things.	  	  As	  we	  see	  later	  in	  the	  same	  passage,	  persons	  would	  include	  nothing	  but	  these	  things	  enumerated	  by	  Locke,	  including	  their	  religious	  interests,	  among	  their	  civil	  interests.	  	   Locke	  continues:	  Now	  since	  no	  man	  or	  society	  of	  men	  can	  by	  their	  opinions	  in	  religion,	  or	  ways	  of	  worship,	  do	  any	  man	  who	  differed	  from	  them	  any	  injury,	  which	  he	  could	  not	  avoid	  or	  redress,	  if	  he	  desired	  it,	  without	  the	  help	  of	  force;	  the	  punishing	  any	  opinion	  in	  religion,	  or	  ways	  of	  worship	  by	  the	  force	  given	  the	  magistrate,	  could	  not	  be	  intended	  by	  those	  who	  constituted	  or	  entered	  into	  the	  commonwealth;	  and	  so	  could	  be	  no	  end	  of	  it,	  but	  quite	  the	  contrary.	  	  For	  force	  from	  a	  stronger	  hand	  to	  bring	  a	  man	  to	  a	  religion,	  which	  another	  thinks	  the	  true,	  being	  an	  injury	  which	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  everyone	  would	  avoid,	  protection	  from	  such	  injury	  is	  one	  of	  the	  ends	  of	  a	  commonwealth,	  and	  so	  every	  man	  has	  a	  right	  to	  toleration.48	  	  Here,	  Locke	  explicates	  the	  reasoning	  that	  underlies	  the	  claim	  that	  people’s	  religious	  interests	  are	  not	  among	  their	  civil	  interests.	  	  Building	  on	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  Second	  
Letter	  Locke	  here	  argues	  that	  even	  outside	  of	  political	  society	  persons’	  religious	  interests	  are	  secure.	  	  Persons	  are	  free	  to	  pursue	  religious	  salvation	  as	  they	  see	  fit;	  they	  may	  reason	  through	  and	  debate	  religious	  claims	  in	  any	  way	  they	  choose,	  in	  consultation	  with	  others	  as	  they	  desire.	  	  People	  simply	  do	  not	  need	  the	  outward	  force	  of	  civil	  government	  to	  pursue	  their	  religious	  ends.	  	  If	  civil	  government’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Locke,	  Third	  Letter,	  141.	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outward	  force	  is	  necessary	  at	  all	  with	  respect	  to	  religion,	  it	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  liberty	  of	  individuals	  to	  believe	  in	  and	  practice	  religions	  of	  their	  choosing,	  free	  from	  the	  threats	  of	  others.	  	  Far	  from	  authorizing	  religious	  coercion,	  parties	  to	  a	  social	  contract	  would	  locate	  their	  civil	  interest	  in	  the	  freedom	  from	  religious	  coercion.	  	  This	  version	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument	  demonstrates	  that	  substantive	  religious	  interests	  are	  certainly	  not	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  	   Implicit	  in	  this	  version	  of	  the	  argument	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  persons	  would	  only	  subject	  themselves	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  civil	  government,	  and	  thereby	  forfeit	  their	  natural	  freedom	  from	  authority,	  when	  it	  was	  necessary	  for	  realizing	  benefits	  that	  could	  not	  be	  achieved	  through	  other	  means.	  	  Putting	  oneself	  under	  civil	  government	  involves	  a	  prima	  facie	  loss	  of	  liberty.	  	  Upon	  entering	  political	  society,	  persons	  become	  subject	  to	  laws	  and	  threats	  of	  punishment,	  to	  which	  they	  were	  not	  previously	  subject.	  	  Making	  oneself	  vulnerable	  to	  new	  laws	  and	  punishments	  is	  perfectly	  rational	  where	  it	  represents	  an	  escape	  from	  greater	  or	  more	  pressing	  vulnerabilities,	  irrational	  when	  it	  does	  not.	  	  Accordingly,	  persons	  would	  forfeit	  their	  natural	  freedom	  from	  authority	  to	  protect	  their	  lives,	  liberty,	  physical	  integrity,	  and	  possessions	  because,	  despite	  their	  best	  efforts,	  without	  universal	  participation	  in	  political	  society,	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  civil	  government’s	  outward	  force,	  persons	  could	  not	  succeed	  in	  securing	  these	  things.	  	  Participation	  in	  political	  society	  represents	  persons’	  only	  opportunity	  at	  secure	  and	  lasting	  enjoyment	  of	  these	  vital	  interests.	  	  The	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  of	  persons’	  religious	  salvation.	  	  Outside	  of	  political	  society,	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persons’	  religious	  beliefs	  are	  not	  vulnerable	  to	  injury.49	  	  It	  would	  therefore	  be	  irrational	  for	  persons	  to	  consent	  to	  religious	  coercion.	  	  Doing	  so	  would	  make	  them	  vulnerable	  to	  injuries	  that	  they	  did	  not	  face	  outside	  of	  political	  society,	  or,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  perpetuate	  vulnerabilities	  that	  did.	  	  	  	  	   I	  take	  the	  mandate	  argument	  as	  it	  appears	  in	  the	  Third	  Letter	  to	  be	  Locke’s	  strongest	  formulation	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument,	  and	  his	  strongest	  argument	  for	  toleration	  in	  his	  four	  letters	  on	  the	  subject.	  	  It	  provides	  strong	  support	  for	  both	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  civil	  interest	  claims,	  and	  accordingly,	  for	  a	  policy	  of	  toleration.	  	  As	  I	  have	  argued,	  it	  is	  Locke’s	  only	  argument	  that	  successfully	  accomplishes	  this.	  	  Further,	  this	  version	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument	  retains	  its	  force	  regardless	  of	  the	  intended	  aim	  of	  religious	  persecution.	  	  The	  question	  of	  the	  intent	  of	  religious	  persecution	  never	  arises.	  	  Civil	  government	  only	  has	  the	  powers	  conferred	  on	  it	  by	  the	  persons	  endeavouring	  to	  cooperate	  politically,	  and	  they	  would	  not	  submit	  their	  religious	  interests	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  civil	  government.	  	  As	  Vernon	  emphasizes,	  Locke’s	  tolerant	  conclusions	  emerge	  out	  of	  circumstances	  of	  political	  cooperation	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  legitimate	  political	  authority.50	  	  Insofar	  as	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  political	  action,	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument	  for	  toleration	  ought	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  compelling.	  	  On	  this	  basis,	  I	  believe	  that	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument	  remains	  relevant	  in	  contemporary	  political	  contexts.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Except,	  as	  Locke	  notes,	  injury	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  others	  who	  have	  different	  religious	  beliefs.	  50	  Vernon,	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  xxix.	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1.5	  –	  Conclusion	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  identified	  Locke’s	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  and	  shown	  its	  unique	  connection	  to	  the	  social	  contract.	  	  Only	  the	  contractarian	  mandate	  argument	  provides	  support	  for	  both	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  civil	  interest	  claim.	  	  And	  though	  Locke	  has	  gone	  a	  long	  way	  towards	  establishing	  the	  mandate	  argument	  as	  strong	  grounds	  for	  the	  civil	  interest	  claim,	  and	  for	  toleration,	  we	  must	  ask	  whether	  Tuckness’	  line	  of	  argument,	  that	  we	  can	  conceive	  of	  compelling	  reasons	  for	  why	  parties	  to	  a	  social	  contract	  would	  consent	  to	  religious	  coercion,	  can	  be	  pushed	  even	  further.	  	  To	  fully	  answer	  this	  question	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  further	  expound	  the	  contractarian	  premise	  on	  which	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument	  rests.	  	  What,	  for	  example,	  justifies	  framing	  questions	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  social	  contract?	  	  And,	  how	  should	  we	  understand	  claims	  about	  political	  participants’	  consent?	  	  I	  take	  up	  these	  questions	  in	  the	  next	  two	  chapters	  by	  considering	  how	  Locke’s	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  fits	  into	  the	  broader	  tradition	  of	  social	  contract	  theory	  (Ch.	  2),	  and	  by	  formulating	  a	  social	  contract	  argument	  of	  my	  own	  centred	  on	  the	  Lockean	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  (Ch.	  3).	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2	  –	  Civil	  Interests	  and	  the	  History	  of	  the	  Social	  Contract	  	  
	  
2.1	  –	  Introduction	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  aim	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  social	  contract	  theories	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  can	  generally	  be	  interpreted	  in	  light	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests.	  	  I	  consider	  the	  well-­‐known	  social	  contract	  theories	  of	  Locke,	  Hobbes,	  and	  Kant,	  and	  identify	  an	  analogue	  to	  civil	  interests	  in	  each.	  	  	  Further,	  I	  consider	  how	  the	  version	  of	  civil	  interests	  in	  each	  theory	  defines	  and	  limits	  the	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  The	  utility	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  revealed	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  explain	  otherwise	  puzzling	  features	  of	  historical	  social	  contract	  theories.	  First	  I	  look	  at	  Locke’s	  fuller	  account	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  in	  his	  Second	  
Treatise.	  	  I	  endeavour	  to	  understand	  the	  social	  contract	  of	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  in	  terms	  of	  civil	  interests,	  and	  argue	  that	  this	  helps	  elucidate	  the	  contractarian	  line	  of	  argument	  in	  the	  Letters.	  	  I	  then	  impose	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Letters’	  mandate	  argument	  on	  the	  social	  contract	  theories	  of	  Hobbes	  and	  Kant.	  	  Doing	  so	  allows	  us	  to	  explain	  Hobbes’	  conflicting	  remarks	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  religious	  uniformity,	  and	  provides	  an	  interpretation	  of	  Kant’s	  notion	  of	  possible	  consent.	  	  	  
2.2	  –	  Locke’s	  Second	  Treatise	  and	  Civil	  Interests	  	  Given	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  is	  articulated	  by	  Locke	  in	  his	  Letters	  on	  toleration,	  a	  logical	  place	  to	  begin	  a	  broader	  investigation	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  civil	  interests	  and	  social	  contract	  theory	  is	  with	  Locke’s	  fuller	  account	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  and	  political	  legitimacy	  in	  his	  Two	  Treatises	  of	  Government.	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It	  has	  been	  noted	  by	  many	  of	  Locke’s	  commentators	  that,	  though	  his	  Two	  
Treatises	  and	  his	  Letter	  were	  published	  in	  the	  same	  year,	  and	  both	  address,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  limits	  of	  political	  authority,	  Locke	  seems	  to	  have	  presented	  the	  two	  works	  as	  entirely	  distinct	  from	  one	  another.	  	  The	  word	  “toleration”	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  Two	  Treatises,	  nor	  does	  the	  phrase	  “civil	  interests”.	  	  Conversely,	  the	  word	  “property”	  is	  mentioned	  only	  once	  in	  the	  Letters,	  and	  “state	  of	  nature”	  can	  be	  found	  just	  twice	  in	  the	  Third	  Letter.	  	  Waldron	  notes	  the	  peculiarity	  of	  toleration	  being	  completely	  absent	  from	  the	  Second	  Treatise,	  Locke’s	  major	  work	  on	  the	  function	  and	  limits	  of	  government.1	  	  Vernon	  suggests	  that	  while	  the	  two	  works	  deal	  with	  similar	  issues,	  Locke	  understandably	  had	  a	  different	  focus	  in	  each.	  	  The	  Second	  Treatise	  is	  directed	  primarily	  at	  the	  holders	  of	  political	  power	  while	  the	  Letter	  is	  directed	  at	  competing	  religious	  groups.2	  Wootton	  notes	  a	  “remarkable	  difference	  between	  the	  literature	  on	  A	  Letter	  
Concerning	  Toleration	  and	  that	  on	  the	  Second	  Treatise.”3	  	  That	  said,	  Wootton	  and	  others	  have	  worked	  to	  bridge	  this	  divide	  in	  Locke	  scholarship.	  	  James	  Tully	  suggests	  that	  reading	  the	  Letter	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  Two	  Treatises	  can	  illuminate	  contentious	  aspects	  of	  the	  latter.4	  	  He,	  for	  example,	  uses	  the	  Letter’s	  remarks	  about	  conscientious	  disobedience	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  Second	  Treatise’s	  right	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Waldron,	  Jeremy,	  “Locke:	  Toleration	  and	  the	  Rationality	  of	  Persecution,”	  Susan	  Mendus	  (ed.),	  Justifying	  Toleration,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1988),	  73.	  2	  Vernon,	  Richard,	  Introduction	  to	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  Richard	  Vernon	  (ed.),	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  xxxi.	  3	  Wootton,	  David,	  Introduction	  to	  John	  Locke:	  Political	  Writings,	  (Indianapolis,	  IN:	  Hackett,	  2003),	  94-­‐95.	  	  He	  attributes	  this,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  to	  the	  difficulty	  in	  pinning	  down	  the	  precise	  historical	  context	  and	  occasion	  of	  Locke	  writing	  the	  Letter.	  	  4	  Tully,	  James,	  An	  Approach	  to	  Political	  Philosophy:	  Locke	  in	  Contexts,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  3.	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revolution.5	  	  	  Wootton	  and	  Vernon	  both	  consider	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  contractarian	  arguments	  in	  the	  Letter	  and	  in	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  and	  note	  important	  similarities	  between	  the	  two.6	  	  A.	  John	  Simmons	  considers	  two	  possible	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Letter	  and	  ultimately	  argues	  for	  the	  interpretation	  that	  aligns	  best	  with	  the	  Lockean	  theory	  of	  rights	  he	  discerns	  in	  the	  Two	  Treatises.7	  In	  this	  section	  I	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  contractarian	  line	  of	  argument	  in	  the	  Letters	  and	  that	  of	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  specifically	  in	  light	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests.	  	  I	  look	  to	  Locke’s	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  in	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  to	  fill	  in	  the	  details	  of,	  and	  further	  our	  understanding	  of,	  the	  mandate	  argument.	  	  In	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  Locke	  describes	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  as	  a	  state	  of	  perfect	  freedom	  and	  equality	  in	  which	  persons	  are	  governed	  only	  by	  the	  law	  of	  nature.8	  	  The	  law	  of	  nature	  states	  that	  nobody	  may	  harm	  another	  in	  his	  life,	  health,	  liberty	  or	  possessions.	  	  Locke	  grounds	  this	  law	  of	  nature	  on	  the	  theological	  claim	  that,	  because	  all	  persons	  belong	  to	  God,	  in	  a	  literal	  sense	  are	  God’s	  property,	  no	  one	  may	  destroy	  himself	  or	  anyone	  else,	  or	  deprive	  others	  of	  their	  liberty,	  health,	  or	  possessions.9	  Persons	  are,	  therefore,	  free	  to	  live	  as	  they	  please	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nature,	  and	  to	  punish	  breaches	  of	  it.	  	  There	  are	  only	  two	  ways	  by	  which	  a	  person	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Tully,	  An	  Approach	  to	  Political	  Philosophy:	  Locke	  in	  Contexts,	  60-­‐62.	  6	  Vernon,	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  xvi,	  xx,	  xxvii-­‐xxviii.	  	  Vernon,	  The	  Career	  of	  Toleration:	  
John	  Locke,	  Jonas	  Proast,	  and	  After,	  (Montreal,	  QC:	  McGill	  Queen’s	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  32,	  40,	  44,	  69.	  	  Wootton,	  John	  Locke:	  Political	  Writings,	  103,	  113.	  7	  Simmons,	  A.	  John,	  Simmons,	  A.	  John,	  On	  the	  Edge	  of	  Anarchy,	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  128-­‐134.	  	  Simmons’	  two	  interpretations	  of	  the	  
Letter	  closely	  resemble	  two	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Letter	  I	  consider,	  note	  27	  below.	  8	  Locke,	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise	  of	  Government,	  C.	  B.	  Macpherson	  (ed.),	  (Indianapolis,	  IN:	  Hackett	  Publishing	  Company,	  1980,	  §4-­‐6.	  	  Hereafter	  cited	  as	  Second	  Treatise.	  9	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §6.	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may	  part,	  or	  be	  parted,	  with	  some	  or	  all	  of	  his	  natural	  liberty.	  	  First,	  one	  involuntarily	  forfeits	  his	  natural	  liberty	  by	  transgressing	  the	  law	  of	  nature	  and	  opening	  himself	  to	  punishment	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  others.	  	  Second,	  one	  may	  voluntarily	  consent	  to	  give	  up	  part	  of	  her	  natural	  liberty	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  realizing	  a	  benefit.	  Locke	  explains	  that	  although	  persons	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  possess	  their	  natural	  freedom,	  there	  are	  features	  of	  life	  outside	  of	  political	  society	  that	  make	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  their	  lives,	  liberties,	  and	  possessions	  “very	  uncertain,	  and	  constantly	  exposed	  to	  the	  invasion	  of	  others.”10	  	  First,	  there	  may	  be	  persons	  who	  transgress	  the	  law	  of	  nature	  and	  purposely	  inflict	  harm	  on	  others.	  	  Second,	  even	  the	  persons	  who	  desire	  to	  live	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nature	  will	  have	  difficulty	  living	  peaceably	  because	  they	  lack	  a	  clear	  and	  settled	  law,	  an	  impartial	  judge	  to	  resolve	  disagreements	  under	  the	  law,	  and	  the	  power	  to	  enforce	  the	  law.11	  	  These	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  motivate	  persons	  to	  unite	  in	  political	  society,	  as	  Locke	  writes,	  “for	  the	  mutual	  preservation	  of	  their	  lives,	  liberties	  and	  estates,	  which	  I	  call	  by	  the	  general	  name	  property.”12	  Locke	  proceeds	  to	  state	  clearly	  that,	  “The	  great	  and	  chief	  end,	  therefore,	  of	  men’s	  uniting	  into	  common-­‐wealths,	  and	  putting	  themselves	  under	  government,	  is	  
the	  preservation	  of	  their	  property.”13	  	  This	  closely	  resembles	  Locke’s	  claim	  in	  his	  
Letter	  that,	  “The	  commonwealth	  seems…	  to	  be	  a	  society	  of	  men	  constituted	  only	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §123.	  11	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §124-­‐126.	  12	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §123.	  13	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §124.	  	  Locke	  reiterates	  this	  claim	  several	  times	  throughout	  the	  Second	  Treatise.	  	  In	  sections	  94	  and	  171	  he	  makes	  the	  stronger	  claim	  that	  society	  “has	  no	  other	  end”	  but	  the	  preservation	  of	  persons’	  lives,	  liberties,	  and	  possessions.	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the	  procuring,	  preserving,	  and	  advancing	  their	  own	  civil	  interests.”14	  	  These	  are	  foundational	  statements	  of	  the	  ends	  of	  political	  society,	  and,	  importantly,	  the	  categories	  of	  property	  in	  the	  Second	  Treatise,	  and	  of	  civil	  interests	  in	  the	  Letters,	  designate	  almost	  the	  exact	  same	  things,	  namely,	  persons’	  lives,	  liberties,	  and	  possessions.15	  	  Calling	  these	  things	  property,	  however,	  as	  Locke	  does	  in	  the	  Second	  
Treatise,	  imbues	  them	  with	  additional	  meaning.	  	  That	  something	  is	  a	  person’s	  property	  entails	  that	  others	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  refrain	  from	  interfering	  with	  it,	  and	  that	  they	  wrong	  the	  owner	  if	  they	  do.	  	  Therefore,	  in	  calling	  these	  things	  persons’	  property,	  Locke	  builds	  in	  the	  constraints	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nature,	  that	  everyone	  is	  obligated	  to	  refrain	  from	  harming	  others	  in	  their	  lives,	  liberty,	  and	  possessions.	  	  Calling	  these	  things	  property	  makes	  clear	  that	  persons	  have	  substantive	  duties	  prior	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  that	  unites	  them	  in	  political	  society.	  	  	  Additionally	  identifying	  these	  things	  as	  property	  alludes	  to	  Locke’s	  underlying	  rationale	  for	  the	  law	  of	  nature.	  	  Persons’	  lives,	  liberty,	  and	  possessions	  are	  really	  God’s	  property,	  and	  they	  hold	  them	  in	  trust	  for	  God.16	  	  Persons	  therefore	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  preserve	  themselves	  and	  others.	  Conversely,	  relatively	  little	  seems	  to	  be	  built	  into	  the	  notion	  of	  civil	  interests.	  	  Though	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument	  refers	  to	  the	  social	  contract,	  and	  therefore	  presupposes	  persons’	  independence	  from	  natural	  authority,	  it	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Locke,	  John,	  A	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration,	  in	  David	  Wootton	  (ed.),	  John	  Locke:	  
Political	  Writings,	  (Indianapolis,	  IN:	  Hackett,	  2003),	  393.	  	  Hereafter	  cited	  as	  Letter.	  15	  Locke	  occasionally	  adds	  health,	  or	  indolency	  of	  body	  to	  the	  list.	  	  Tully	  notes	  the	  similarity	  in	  the	  categories	  of	  civil	  interests	  and	  of	  property	  in	  Locke’s	  broad	  sense,	  
An	  Approach	  to	  Political	  Philosophy:	  Locke	  in	  Contexts,	  59.	  16	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §6.	  	  Simmons	  argues	  for	  this	  understanding	  of	  persons’	  relationship	  with	  God,	  On	  the	  Edge	  of	  Anarchy,	  116.	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existence	  of	  substantive	  obligations	  prior	  to	  the	  social	  contract.17	  	  Instead,	  the	  language	  of	  civil	  interests	  invites	  us	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  unique	  set	  of	  benefits	  that	  persons	  aim	  to	  realize	  by	  associating	  in	  political	  society.	  Locke’s	  contractarian	  argument	  in	  the	  Letters	  proceeds	  by	  showing	  that,	  because	  persons	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  to	  forfeit	  the	  responsibility	  for	  particular	  things,	  namely,	  their	  civil	  interests,	  to	  civil	  government,	  the	  responsibility	  for	  all	  other	  things,	  in	  particular	  their	  salvation,	  falls	  outside	  of	  the	  mandate	  of	  civil	  government.	  	  With	  this	  structure	  in	  mind,	  we	  can	  look	  to	  the	  contractarian	  argument	  of	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  how	  the	  social	  contract	  limits	  legitimate	  political	  action.	  	  	  In	  the	  eleventh	  chapter	  of	  the	  Second	  Treatise,	  Locke	  examines	  the	  extent	  of	  legislative	  power.	  	  Locke	  identifies	  four	  ways	  in	  which	  conceiving	  of	  political	  society	  as	  arising	  out	  of	  a	  social	  contract	  limits	  the	  legislative	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  The	  grounds	  that	  Locke	  offers	  for	  these	  limits	  provides	  further	  insight	  into	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  social	  contract	  limits	  the	  legitimate	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  Locke	  argues	  that	  1)	  political	  authority	  cannot	  be	  absolute	  and	  arbitrary,	  2)	  civil	  government	  must	  rule	  by	  promulgated	  standing	  laws	  and	  not	  extemporary	  decrees,	  3)	  civil	  government	  cannot	  confiscate	  citizens’	  property	  without	  their	  consent,	  and	  4)	  the	  legislative	  power	  cannot	  be	  transferred.18	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  From	  this	  independence	  that	  the	  social	  contract	  presupposes	  we	  can	  infer	  a	  pre-­‐political	  obligation	  not	  to	  interfere	  with	  persons’	  independence.	  	  I	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  persons’	  independence	  in	  social	  contract	  arguments,	  and	  its	  implications	  at	  3.4,	  94	  below.	  	  	  18	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §135-­‐141	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First,	  Locke	  argues	  that	  political	  authority	  cannot	  be	  arbitrary	  because	  civil	  government	  can	  have	  only	  the	  power	  conferred	  on	  it	  by	  the	  persons	  contracting	  into	  political	  society,	  and	  persons	  do	  not	  have	  absolute	  arbitrary	  power	  over	  themselves.	  	  Again,	  Locke	  takes	  persons	  to	  hold	  their	  lives	  in	  trust	  for	  God	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  preserving	  themselves.19	  	  They	  do	  not	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  destroy	  themselves,	  and,	  accordingly,	  cannot	  confer	  any	  such	  power	  on	  civil	  government	  in	  entering	  political	  society.	  	  From	  this	  we	  can	  infer	  the	  general	  rule	  that	  civil	  government	  cannot	  exercise	  any	  powers	  that	  parties	  to	  a	  social	  contract	  are	  incapable	  of	  granting	  to	  it.20	  	  Second,	  civil	  government	  may	  not	  rule	  by	  ad	  hoc	  decrees.	  	  Any	  attempt	  to	  rule	  by	  ad	  hoc	  decrees	  would	  fail	  to	  remedy	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  that	  persons	  enter	  political	  society	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  remedying.	  	  Locke	  counts	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  established,	  known	  law	  to	  govern	  persons’	  conduct,	  and	  settle	  controversies	  between	  them,	  among	  the	  “inconveniences”	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature.21	  	  Given	  that	  persons	  enter	  political	  society	  and	  consent	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  civil	  government	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  preserving	  their	  property	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  where	  a	  government	  fails	  to	  remedy	  those	  shortcomings,	  we	  cannot	  infer	  persons’	  consent.	  	  Therefore	  civil	  government	  may	  not	  rule	  by	  extemporary	  decrees,	  and,	  in	  general,	  must	  be	  understood	  to	  endeavour	  to	  provide	  a	  remedy	  for	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature.	  	  It	  may	  not	  reiterate	  the	  problems	  that	  persons	  engage	  in	  political	  cooperation	  to	  avoid.22	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §6.	  	  Simmons,	  On	  the	  Edge	  of	  Anarchy,	  116.	  20	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §135	  21	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §124	  22	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §136	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Third,	  Locke	  argues	  that	  civil	  government	  may	  not	  take	  any	  part	  of	  persons’	  property	  without	  their	  consent.	  	  Persons	  enter	  into	  political	  society	  and	  subject	  themselves	  to	  political	  authority	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  protecting	  their	  property.	  	  It	  would	  be	  contradictory	  to	  the	  ends	  for	  which	  persons	  enter	  into	  political	  society	  for	  civil	  government	  to	  take	  some	  or	  all	  of	  persons’	  property	  arbitrarily,	  and	  therefore	  absurd	  to	  suppose	  that	  civil	  government	  could	  undertake	  such	  action	  legitimately.	  	  It	  will	  of	  course	  be	  necessary	  for	  civil	  government	  to	  collect	  taxes,	  and	  restrict	  citizens’	  liberties	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  state;	  however,	  when	  persons	  enter	  political	  society	  and	  consent	  to	  political	  authority,	  they	  must	  be	  understood	  to	  consent	  to	  the	  actions	  that	  are	  necessary	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  public	  good.	  	  Here	  Locke	  argues	  against	  arbitrary	  intrusions	  into	  persons’	  property,	  and,	  in	  general,	  against	  civil	  government	  acting	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  ends	  for	  which	  persons	  enter	  political	  society.	  	  	  	  Fourth,	  the	  legislative	  power	  may	  not	  transfer	  its	  power	  of	  making	  laws.	  	  In	  uniting	  in	  political	  society,	  Locke	  takes	  persons	  to	  confer	  the	  power	  to	  make	  laws	  on	  the	  legislative	  authority	  alone.	  	  Accordingly,	  it	  may	  not	  transfer	  that	  power	  to,	  in	  effect,	  make	  new	  lawmakers.	  	  Because	  civil	  government’s	  legislative	  authority	  arises	  from	  a	  “positive	  voluntary	  grant	  and	  institution”	  from	  the	  people,	  that	  authority	  cannot	  be	  anything	  other	  than	  what	  the	  people	  intended,	  and	  had	  the	  capacity,	  to	  do.	  	  And,	  according	  to	  Locke,	  the	  people	  could	  not	  grant	  the	  power	  to	  transfer	  legislative	  power.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  These	  four	  limits	  on	  the	  legitimate	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority	  show	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  social	  contract	  constrains	  the	  form	  and	  actions	  of	  civil	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government.	  	  From	  Locke’s	  stated	  limits	  we	  can	  draw	  out	  general	  principles.	  	  First,	  because	  civil	  government	  may	  legitimately	  exercise	  only	  the	  powers	  conferred	  on	  it	  by	  the	  people,	  it	  cannot	  have	  any	  powers	  that	  they	  are	  incapable	  of	  granting	  to	  it.	  	  Second,	  because	  persons	  enter	  political	  society	  to	  remedy	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  we	  must	  be	  able	  to	  regard	  legitimate	  political	  action	  as	  a	  remedy	  to	  those	  shortcomings,	  and	  legitimate	  exercises	  of	  political	  authority	  may	  never	  reiterate	  the	  problems	  that	  persons	  face	  outside	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  and	  enter	  political	  society	  to	  overcome.	  	  Third,	  civil	  government	  may	  not	  act	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  ends	  for	  which	  persons	  enter	  political	  society.	  	  Fourth,	  political	  authority	  may	  not	  extend	  farther	  than	  the	  people	  intend	  in	  granting	  authority	  to	  civil	  government.	  	  	  	   In	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  limits	  on	  exercises	  of	  political	  authority	  in	  the	  eleventh	  chapter	  of	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  Locke	  does	  not	  include	  the	  limit	  that	  preoccupies	  him	  in	  his	  Letters,	  namely,	  that	  civil	  government	  may	  not	  legitimately	  pursue	  substantive	  religious	  ends.	  	  The	  constraints	  he	  considers	  in	  the	  Second	  
Treatise	  are	  largely	  formal.	  	  They	  are	  limits	  on	  how	  political	  authority	  may	  be	  exercised	  rather	  than	  limits	  on	  what	  may	  be	  the	  legitimate	  objects	  of	  political	  action.	  	  The	  latter	  kind	  of	  limit	  is	  Locke’s	  concern	  in	  the	  Letters.	  	  There	  he	  argues	  why	  only	  the	  things	  he	  classifies	  as	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  are	  the	  legitimate	  objects	  of	  political	  action.	  	  However,	  I	  believe	  that	  we	  can	  generalize	  the	  arguments	  that	  Locke	  gives	  for	  limits	  on	  political	  action	  in	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  to	  the	  more	  substantive	  concerns	  of	  the	  Letters.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  we	  get	  a	  fuller	  account	  of	  how	  the	  social	  contract	  limits	  civil	  government	  to	  a	  concern	  for	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  and	  what	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  consist	  in.	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   Of	  the	  general	  principles	  I	  draw	  out	  of	  the	  limits	  for	  which	  Locke	  argues	  in	  the	  eleventh	  chapter	  of	  the	  Second	  Treatise,	  the	  first	  two	  provide	  complementary	  support	  for	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Letter’s	  mandate	  argument,	  and,	  consequently,	  to	  the	  Letter’s	  conclusion	  that	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  civil	  government	  is	  restricted	  to	  a	  concern	  for	  persons’	  civil	  interests.23	  	  The	  third	  general	  principle	  above	  is	  consonant	  with	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument;	  however,	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  additional	  grounds	  for,	  or	  further	  our	  understanding	  of,	  the	  mandate	  argument.	  	  Rather,	  in	  claiming	  that	  civil	  government	  may	  not	  act	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  ends	  for	  which	  persons	  enter	  political	  society,	  we	  just	  restate	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  Letter.	  	  Locke	  states	  clearly	  that	  the	  end	  for	  which	  persons	  enter	  political	  society	  is	  the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  their	  civil	  interests	  (Letter),	  or	  property	  (Second	  
Treatise).	  	  However,	  the	  main	  question	  of	  the	  Letter	  remains:	  what	  should	  count	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  and	  why?24	  	  Or,	  in	  other	  words,	  why	  should	  we	  include	  certain	  things,	  namely,	  persons’	  lives,	  liberties,	  and	  possessions,	  within	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction,	  and	  exclude	  other	  things,	  namely,	  persons’	  salvation?	  	   Likewise,	  the	  fourth	  general	  principle	  drawn	  out	  above	  does	  not	  provide	  additional	  grounds	  for,	  or	  further	  our	  understanding	  of,	  the	  mandate	  argument.	  	  While	  the	  mandate	  argument	  certainly	  presupposes	  that	  political	  authority	  may	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Locke,	  Letter,	  394	  24	  Recall	  that	  I	  interpret	  Locke’s	  statement	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  commonwealth	  and	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  to	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  true	  by	  definition	  that	  the	  end	  of	  political	  society	  is	  the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  The	  question	  of	  importance	  is	  which	  of	  persons’	  interests	  we	  should	  include	  among	  their	  civil	  interests	  in	  the	  proper	  jurisdiction	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  See	  1.3,	  10	  above.	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extend	  farther	  than	  the	  persons	  granting	  authority	  to	  civil	  government	  intend,	  again,	  the	  question	  here	  is	  what	  persons	  entering	  political	  society	  intend.	  	  	   Simmons	  recognizes	  that	  Locke	  puts	  forward	  versions	  of	  the	  first	  two	  principles	  as	  the	  grounds	  for	  his	  limits	  as	  well.	  	  In	  his	  summary	  of	  the	  limits	  on	  legislative	  power	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  eleventh	  chapter	  of	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  Locke	  writes:	  	   These	  are	  the	  bounds	  which	  the	  trust,	  that	  is	  put	  in	  them	  by	  society,	  and	  the	  law	  of	  God	  and	  nature,	  have	  set	  to	  the	  legislative	  power	  of	  every	  common-­‐wealth,	  in	  all	  forms	  of	  government.25	  	  So,	  civil	  government’s	  legislative	  power	  is	  constrained	  in	  principle	  by	  1)	  the	  content	  of	  the	  trust	  that	  persons	  grant	  it,	  and	  2)	  the	  law	  of	  God	  and	  nature.	  	  Taking	  them	  in	  reverse	  order,	  God’s	  law	  makes	  it	  such	  that	  persons	  have	  limited	  rights	  over	  themselves,	  which	  limits	  what	  they	  may	  transfer	  to	  political	  authority.	  	  This	  is	  the	  first	  principle	  I	  identify	  above.	  	  And,	  second,	  the	  legislative	  power	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  content	  of	  the	  grant	  of	  rights	  and	  powers	  from	  persons	  to	  political	  authority.	  	  Simmons	  notes	  that	  this	  principle	  provides	  the	  justification	  for	  Locke’s	  third	  limit.26	  	  As	  I	  note	  above,	  this	  principle,	  while	  integral	  to	  Locke’s	  social	  contract	  arguments,	  does	  not	  enrich	  our	  understanding	  of	  them.	  	  The	  second	  principle	  I	  identify	  above	  (drawn	  from	  Locke’s	  second	  stated	  limit),	  however,	  that	  civil	  government’s	  actions	  must	  remedy	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  takes	  us	  a	  step	  further	  in	  understanding	  the	  content	  of	  the	  trust	  granted	  to	  political	  authority.	  	  Therefore,	  in	  slight	  variation	  to	  Simmons’	  interpretation,	  I	  will	  consider	  the	  social	  contract	  argument	  of	  the	  Letters	  in	  light	  of	  the	  first	  two	  principles	  I	  identify	  above.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §142.	  26	  Simmons,	  On	  the	  Edge	  of	  Anarchy,	  62	  n.10.	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   These	  two	  general	  principles	  provide	  distinct	  answers	  for	  how	  we	  should	  understand	  what	  persons	  include	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  among	  their	  civil	  interests,	  and	  what	  they	  retain	  in	  their	  personal	  jurisdiction,	  upon	  entering	  political	  society.27	  	  The	  first	  principle	  states	  that	  civil	  government	  cannot	  possess	  any	  powers	  that	  persons	  are	  incapable	  of	  granting	  to	  it.	  	  For	  this	  principle	  to	  provide	  support	  for	  Locke’s	  contractarian	  case	  for	  toleration	  it	  must	  be	  impossible	  for	  individuals	  to	  transfer	  responsibility	  for	  their	  salvation	  to	  civil	  government.	  	  In	  the	  Second	  Treatise,	  Locke	  argues	  that	  political	  authority	  may	  not	  be	  absolute	  or	  arbitrary	  because	  persons	  have	  no	  such	  power	  over	  themselves,	  and,	  therefore,	  cannot	  transfer	  such	  power	  to	  civil	  government.	  	  Though	  persons	  certainly	  possess	  the	  power	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  salvation,	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  this	  power	  may	  not	  be	  transferred.	  	  If,	  as	  Locke	  seems	  to	  believe,	  the	  particulars	  of	  religion	  dictate	  that	  salvation	  requires	  that	  persons	  form	  sincere	  beliefs	  through	  personal	  reflection,	  it	  will	  be	  impossible	  for	  them	  to	  transfer	  the	  responsibility	  of	  their	  salvation	  to	  civil	  government	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  result,	  namely,	  their	  salvation.	  	   This	  is	  Richard	  Ashcraft’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Letter.28	  	  Ashcraft	  reads	  Locke	  as	  arguing	  that	  the	  responsibility	  of	  persons’	  salvation	  is	  inalienable	  because	  they	  have	  a	  duty,	  to	  God,	  to	  care	  for	  their	  own	  salvation.	  	  To	  support	  his	  claim,	  Ashcraft	  cites	  a	  passage	  in	  the	  Letter	  in	  which	  Locke	  states	  that	  one’s	  salvation	  depends	  upon,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  These	  map	  roughly	  onto	  Simmons’	  two	  possible	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Letter.	  	  Simmons,	  On	  the	  Edge	  of	  Anarchy,	  128-­‐134.	  	  Simmons	  favours	  the	  interpretation	  that	  corresponds	  to	  the	  second	  general	  principle	  I	  consider	  here	  primarily	  because	  it	  aligns	  with	  his	  conception	  of	  rights	  in	  Locke’s	  Second	  Treatise.	  	  	  28	  Ashcraft,	  Richard,	  Revolutionary	  Politics	  &	  Locke’s	  Two	  Treatises	  of	  Government,	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  498-­‐501	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“believing	  and	  doing	  things	  in	  this	  life,	  which	  are	  necessary	  to	  obtaining	  God’s	  favour,	  and	  are	  prescribed	  by	  God	  to	  that	  end.”	  	  And	  therefore,	  “the	  observance	  of	  these	  things	  is	  the	  highest	  obligation	  that	  lies	  upon	  mankind.”29	  	  Accordingly,	  persons’	  highest	  moral	  and	  religious	  duty,	  upon	  which	  their	  salvation	  depends,	  is	  to	  believe	  and	  do	  the	  things	  that	  they	  take	  to	  be	  favourable	  to	  God.	  	  This	  duty	  exemplifies	  the	  “direct	  obligatory	  tie”	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  God,30	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  responsibility	  for	  one’s	  salvation	  cannot	  be	  forfeited	  to	  civil	  government.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   While	  Ashcraft’s	  interpretation	  makes	  strong	  sense	  of	  Locke’s	  initial	  presentation	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument	  in	  the	  Letter,	  and	  he	  diligently	  cites	  earlier	  letters	  and	  manuscripts	  of	  Locke’s	  to	  show	  that	  this	  was	  a	  prevalent	  line	  of	  his	  thinking	  on	  toleration	  in	  the	  time	  leading	  up	  to	  his	  writing	  of	  the	  Letter,31	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  the	  strongest	  interpretation	  of	  mandate	  argument	  that	  is	  available	  to	  us.	  	  As	  I	  note	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  in	  searching	  for	  a	  general	  and	  enduring	  justification	  for	  the	  limits	  of	  political	  authority,	  we	  should	  avoid	  relying	  on	  a	  particular	  conception	  of	  religious	  truth	  or	  duty.32	  	  Further,	  when	  Locke	  revisits	  his	  mandate	  argument	  in	  the	  later	  Letters,	  his	  reliance	  on	  the	  particulars	  of	  religious	  beliefs	  fades.	  	  He	  focuses	  instead	  on	  the	  details	  of	  the	  situation	  facing	  persons	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  conceptions	  of	  religious	  truth.	  	  This	  approach	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  second	  general	  principle	  identified	  in	  the	  eleventh	  chapter	  of	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  above.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Locke,	  Letter,	  421.	  30	  Ashcraft,	  Revolutionary	  Politics	  &	  Locke’s	  Two	  Treatises	  of	  Government,	  500	  31	  Ashcraft,	  Revolutionary	  Politics	  &	  Locke’s	  Two	  Treatises	  of	  Government,	  493-­‐498	  32	  See	  1.4,	  24	  above.	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   The	  second	  general	  principle	  I	  identify	  above	  states	  that	  we	  must	  be	  able	  to	  regard	  political	  action	  as	  a	  remedy	  to	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature.	  	  Political	  action	  may	  never	  reiterate	  the	  problems	  that	  persons	  face	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  and	  that	  they	  enter	  political	  society	  to	  remedy.	  	  Taking	  this	  as	  a	  limiting	  principle	  on	  legitimate	  political	  authority,	  it	  aligns	  nicely	  with	  Locke’s	  reasoning	  in	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  the	  strongest	  statement	  of	  his	  mandate	  argument,	  and	  subsequently,	  his	  strongest	  argument	  for	  toleration.33	  	  There	  Locke	  argues	  that	  persons	  entering	  political	  society	  could	  make	  civil	  government	  responsible	  only	  for	  persons’	  “protection	  from	  such	  injuries	  from	  other	  men	  which	  they	  desiring	  to	  avoid,	  nothing	  but	  force	  could	  prevent	  or	  remedy;	  all	  things	  but	  this	  being	  as	  well	  
attainable	  by	  men	  living	  in	  neighbourhood	  without	  the	  bounds	  of	  a	  commonwealth”.34	  	  Political	  authority	  is	  created	  to	  remedy	  the	  problems	  that	  persons	  face	  in	  its	  absence.	  	  Where	  there	  is	  no	  problem	  to	  be	  remedied,	  or	  the	  problem	  is	  readily	  remedied	  outside	  of	  political	  society	  without	  the	  help	  of	  civil	  government,	  political	  action	  cannot	  be	  justified.	  	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  persons’	  interest	  in	  salvation,	  Locke	  writes:	  	  Now	  since	  no	  man	  or	  society	  of	  men	  can	  by	  their	  opinions	  in	  religion,	  or	  ways	  of	  worship,	  do	  any	  man	  who	  differed	  from	  them	  any	  injury,	  which	  he	  could	  not	  avoid	  or	  redress,	  if	  he	  desired	  it,	  without	  the	  help	  of	  force;	  the	  punishing	  an	  opinion	  in	  religion,	  or	  ways	  of	  worship	  by	  the	  force	  given	  the	  magistrate,	  could	  not	  be	  intended	  by	  those	  who	  constituted	  or	  entered	  into	  the	  commonwealth.35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Locke,	  Locke,	  A	  Third	  Letter	  for	  Toleration,	  in	  Richard	  Vernon	  (ed.),	  Locke	  on	  
Toleration,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  141.	  	  Hereafter	  cited	  as	  Third	  Letter.	  	  	  34	  Locke,	  Third	  Letter,	  141.	  	  Emphasis	  added.	  35	  Locke,	  Third	  Letter,	  141.	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Here	  Locke	  argues	  that	  securing	  one’s	  own	  salvation	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  that	  one	  faces	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature.	  	  Nobody	  can	  injure	  any	  other	  by	  believing	  in	  or	  practicing	  a	  different	  religion,	  and,	  therefore,	  persons	  would	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  confer	  the	  responsibility	  of	  promoting	  their	  salvation	  upon	  civil	  government.36	  	   Locke’s	  remarks	  in	  chapter	  nine	  of	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  help	  fill	  in	  this	  account	  of	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  that	  persons	  enter	  into	  political	  society	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  remedying.	  	  Again,	  the	  reason	  that	  persons	  enter	  political	  society	  and	  subject	  themselves	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  civil	  government	  is	  to	  solve	  urgent	  problems	  that	  they	  face	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature.	  	  Specifically,	  they	  aim	  to	  solve	  the	  problems	  caused	  by	  the	  insecurity	  of	  their	  lives,	  liberty,	  and	  possessions.	  	  These	  things	  are	  insecure	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  because	  the	  people	  lack	  a	  settled,	  known	  law	  to	  govern	  their	  conduct,	  an	  impartial	  judge	  to	  settle	  disputes,	  and	  the	  power	  to	  enforce	  the	  law.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  these	  things	  persons’	  lives,	  liberty,	  and	  possessions	  are	  “very	  uncertain,	  and	  constantly	  exposed	  to	  the	  invasion	  of	  others”.37	  	  	  So	  in	  the	  ninth	  chapter	  of	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  Locke	  gives	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  why	  life,	  liberty,	  and	  possessions	  do	  fall	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  civil	  government,	  and	  in	  the	  Third	  Letter	  we	  get	  a	  complementary	  account	  of	  why	  only	  those	  things	  fall	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  civil	  government.	  	  It	  is	  only	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  that	  suffer	  from	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature.	  	  Persons	  have	  no	  difficulty	  identifying	  and	  pursuing	  their	  favoured	  path	  to	  salvation	  outside	  of	  political	  society.	  	  Persons’	  pursuit	  of	  their	  salvation	  requires	  neither	  a	  uniform	  law,	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  See	  1.4,	  32	  above.	  	  	  37	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §123.	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common	  judge,	  nor	  an	  executive	  power.38	  	  As	  the	  second	  general	  principle	  drawn	  from	  chapter	  eleven	  of	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  makes	  clear,	  legitimate	  political	  action	  must	  represent	  a	  remedy	  to	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature.	  	  This	  helps	  elucidate	  Locke’s	  statement	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument	  in	  the	  Third	  Letter.	  	  We	  cannot	  understand	  persons’	  pursuit	  of	  their	  salvation	  as	  a	  problem	  in	  need	  of	  solving	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  and,	  therefore,	  we	  cannot	  count	  it	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  in	  the	  proper	  jurisdiction	  of	  civil	  government.	  	   Indeed,	  if	  persons	  lack	  anything	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  salvation,	  it	  is	  the	  liberty	  and	  security	  to	  believe	  in	  and	  practice	  the	  religion	  that	  they	  take	  to	  be	  true.	  	  In	  the	  Third	  Letter	  Locke	  writes,	  	  For	  force	  from	  a	  stronger	  hand	  to	  bring	  a	  man	  to	  a	  religion,	  which	  another	  thinks	  the	  true,	  being	  an	  injury	  which	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  everyone	  would	  avoid,	  protection	  from	  such	  injury	  is	  one	  of	  the	  ends	  of	  a	  commonwealth,	  and	  so	  every	  man	  has	  a	  right	  to	  toleration.39	  	  This	  statement	  makes	  clear	  that	  any	  attempt	  of	  civil	  government	  to	  enforce	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  true	  religion	  on	  a	  people	  would	  reiterate	  a	  problem	  that	  they	  do	  confront	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  namely,	  the	  threat	  of	  others	  attempting	  to	  coercively	  impose	  their	  religious	  beliefs	  or	  practices	  on	  them.	  	  Any	  attempt	  by	  civil	  government	  to	  coercively	  impose	  religious	  beliefs	  that	  all	  persons	  do	  not	  unanimously	  already	  believe,	  would	  be	  to	  reiterate	  a	  problem	  that	  persons	  specifically	  undertake	  to	  avoid	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Here	  I	  adopt	  Locke’s	  assumptions	  concerning	  the	  religious	  requirements	  for	  salvation	  to	  interpret	  his	  argument	  in	  the	  Letter.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  present	  a	  social	  contract	  argument	  abstracted	  from	  Locke’s	  religious	  assumptions.	  	  I	  think	  we	  could	  find	  resources	  in	  Locke’s	  work	  to	  construct	  an	  areligious	  argument.	  	  David	  Wootton	  agrees	  in	  his	  Introduction	  to	  John	  Locke:	  Political	  Writings,	  108.	  	  I	  draw	  on	  these	  resources	  in	  the	  following	  chapter,	  but	  my	  primary	  task	  at	  this	  point	  is	  interpretive.	  	  See	  3.4	  below.	  39	  Locke,	  Third	  Letter,	  141	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in	  entering	  society.	  	  Therefore,	  all	  persons	  could	  not	  consent	  to	  the	  imposition	  of	  religion,	  and,	  accordingly,	  the	  imposition	  of	  religion	  falls	  outside	  of	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction.	  	  	  	   So,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  contractarian	  reasoning	  in	  the	  Letters	  and	  the	  Second	  
Treatise	  is	  consonant.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  two	  arguments	  are	  identical.	  	  Importantly,	  as	  I	  note	  above,	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  Letter’s	  contractarian	  argument	  carries	  with	  it	  less	  substantial	  pre-­‐political	  commitments.40	  	  However,	  the	  social	  contract	  argument	  of	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  civil	  interests,	  and	  considering	  it	  in	  this	  light	  helps	  elucidate	  the	  contractarian	  line	  of	  argument	  in	  the	  Letters.	  	   In	  the	  following	  two	  sections	  I	  impose	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Letters’	  mandate	  argument	  on	  the	  social	  contract	  theories	  of	  Hobbes	  and	  Kant.	  	  I	  identify	  what	  each	  takes	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  to	  consist	  in	  and	  explore	  the	  implications	  of	  interpreting	  each	  theory	  in	  this	  light.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  importing	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  helps	  explain	  puzzling	  features	  of	  the	  theory	  and	  sharpens	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  legitimate	  political	  authority.	  	  	  
2.3	  –	  Hobbes	  and	  Civil	  Interests	  Hobbes	  describes	  the	  state	  of	  persons	  outside	  of	  political	  society	  as	  a	  state	  of	  war.	  	  Each	  individual,	  having	  an	  overarching	  concern	  for	  his	  safety	  and	  security,	  finds	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  See	  2.2,	  39-­‐41	  above,	  and	  4.4.4	  below.	  	  John	  Marshall	  notes	  the	  tension	  in	  the	  
Second	  Treatise	  between	  basing	  the	  social	  contract	  on	  persons’	  duties	  to	  God,	  and	  on	  their	  interest	  in	  preserving	  their	  rights.	  	  Marshall,	  John,	  John	  Locke:	  Resistance,	  
Religion,	  and	  Responsibility,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  292-­‐293.	  	  He	  does	  not	  explore	  the	  idea	  that	  Locke	  takes	  the	  latter	  approach	  in	  the	  Letters.	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himself	  vulnerable	  to	  violence,	  and	  to	  being	  deprived	  of	  the	  necessities	  of	  life	  by	  those	  equally	  concerned	  with	  their	  safety	  and	  security.41	  	  Even	  when	  fighting	  is	  absent,	  persons	  cannot	  be	  assured	  of	  the	  security	  of	  their	  lives	  for	  any	  extended	  period	  of	  time.42	  	  In	  addition	  to	  lacking	  personal	  security,	  persons	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  have	  no	  property,	  there	  is	  no	  trade	  or	  commerce,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  culture	  or	  arts.43	  	  In	  sum,	  Hobbes	  argues	  that	  outside	  of	  political	  society	  persons	  lack	  the	  security	  necessary	  to	  assure	  that	  they	  will	  be	  able	  to	  continue	  to	  live,	  and	  lack	  the	  means	  required	  to	  live	  well.	  	  	  As	  all	  persons	  find	  themselves	  similarly	  unable	  to	  secure	  themselves	  from	  the	  vulnerabilities	  they	  face	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  reason	  dictates	  that	  they	  endeavour	  to	  create	  a	  peaceful	  circumstance	  in	  which	  their	  lives	  will	  be	  secure.	  	  Hobbes	  argues	  that	  the	  only	  way	  of	  achieving	  this	  is	  for	  all	  individuals	  to	  unite	  to	  create	  political	  society	  and	  submit	  themselves	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  a	  sovereign.	  	  Hobbes	  writes,	  “The	  passions	  that	  incline	  men	  to	  peace,	  are	  fear	  of	  death;	  desire	  of	  such	  things	  as	  are	  necessary	  to	  commodious	  living;	  and	  a	  hope	  by	  their	  industry	  to	  obtain	  them”.44	  	  So,	  “The	  final	  cause,	  end	  or	  design,”	  of	  people	  creating	  political	  society	  and	  submitting	  themselves	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  a	  sovereign	  is,	  “the	  foresight	  of	  their	  own	  preservation,	  and	  of	  a	  more	  contented	  life	  thereby”.45	  	  	  So	  persons	  enter	  into	  political	  society	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  securing	  their	  lives	  against	  the	  threat	  of	  violence,	  and	  for	  securing	  the	  means	  of	  living	  well.	  	  Persons	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Hobbes,	  Thomas,	  Leviathan,	  J.	  C.	  A.	  Gaskin	  (ed.),	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  13:1-­‐8.	  42	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  13:8.	  43	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  13:9.	  44	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  13:14.	  45	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  17:1.	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have	  a	  strong	  interest	  in	  this	  security	  and	  cannot	  establish	  it	  but	  by	  entering	  political	  society.	  	  We	  may	  therefore	  say	  that,	  for	  Hobbes,	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  consist	  of	  their	  lives,	  personal	  security,	  and	  the	  means	  of	  achieving	  a	  decent	  life.	  	  These	  are	  the	  vital	  interests	  that	  persons	  outside	  of	  political	  society	  have,	  at	  best,	  precarious	  possession	  of,	  and	  that	  they	  unite	  in	  political	  cooperation	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  protecting	  and	  promoting.	  	  Hobbes	  further	  mentions	  certain	  things	  that	  persons	  lack	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  namely,	  trade	  and	  commerce,	  culture,	  and	  arts.	  	  We	  may	  reasonably	  infer	  that	  these	  are	  facets	  of	  a	  decent	  life	  that	  persons	  hope	  to	  attain	  in	  entering	  political	  society.	  	  However,	  Hobbes	  continually	  stresses	  that	  persons	  engage	  in	  political	  cooperation	  and	  submit	  themselves	  to	  political	  authority	  primarily	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  safety	  and	  personal	  security.46	  From	  these	  considerations,	  Hobbes	  argues	  for	  an	  absolute	  and	  indivisible	  sovereign.	  	  Only	  such	  a	  political	  authority	  can	  remedy	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  and	  effectively	  secure	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  Hobbes	  argues	  that	  in	  entering	  political	  society	  persons	  must	  authorize	  the	  sovereign	  to	  do	  whatever	  it	  thinks	  necessary	  for	  establishing	  peace	  and,	  consequently,	  every	  citizen’s	  security.	  Acknowledging	  the	  sovereign’s	  extensive	  powers,	  Hobbes	  considers	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  persons’	  liberty	  can	  arise.	  	  First,	  in	  every	  political	  society	  there	  are	  many	  aspects	  of	  life	  on	  which	  the	  civil	  law	  is	  silent.	  	  Persons	  are	  free	  to	  act	  as	  they	  please	  where	  no	  law	  applies	  to	  their	  intended	  action.	  	  This	  first	  sense	  of	  persons’	  liberty	  operates	  in	  the	  space	  in	  which	  the	  civil	  law	  happens	  to	  be	  absent.	  	  Hobbes	  suggests	  that	  many,	  relatively	  prominent,	  aspects	  of	  persons’	  daily	  lives	  exist	  in	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  13:14,	  17:1.	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space,	  namely,	  “the	  liberty	  to	  buy,	  and	  sell,	  and	  otherwise	  contract	  with	  one	  another;	  to	  choose	  their	  own	  abode,	  their	  own	  diet,	  their	  own	  trade	  of	  life,	  and	  institute	  their	  children	  as	  they	  themselves	  think	  fit;	  and	  the	  like.”47	  	  However,	  Hobbes	  makes	  clear	  that,	  though	  persons	  can	  normally	  expect	  to	  act	  freely	  in	  these	  areas	  of	  life,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  the	  sovereign’s	  power	  is	  in	  any	  way	  limited	  with	  respect	  to	  these	  things.	  	  Should	  the	  sovereign	  believe	  it	  necessary	  to	  impose	  laws	  in	  these	  areas	  of	  life	  for	  the	  safety	  and	  security	  of	  its	  subjects,	  it	  is	  entirely	  within	  its	  purview	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	  The	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  of	  the	  second	  kind	  of	  liberty	  that	  Hobbes	  considers,	  which	  he	  calls	  the	  “true	  liberty	  of	  a	  subject”.48	  	  Just	  as	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument	  shows	  how	  an	  argument	  for	  toleration	  can	  be	  drawn	  out	  of	  contractarian	  considerations,	  Hobbes	  discusses	  how	  certain	  limits	  to	  political	  authority,	  and	  conversely	  “liberties	  of	  subjects”,	  arise	  out	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  political	  society	  through	  the	  social	  contract.	  	  Hobbes	  considers	  what	  rights	  persons	  forfeit	  in	  entering	  political	  society,	  and	  conversely,	  what	  rights	  and	  liberties	  they	  retain	  even	  after	  entering	  political	  society.	  	  Hobbes	  suggests	  that	  we	  can	  derive	  which	  rights	  persons	  forfeit	  and	  which	  they	  retain	  by	  considering	  1)	  the	  act	  of	  contracting,	  and	  2)	  in	  Hobbes’	  words,	  “the	  end	  of	  the	  institution	  of	  sovereignty”.49	  	  First,	  in	  chapter	  14	  of	  Leviathan,	  speaking	  of	  contracts	  generally,	  Hobbes	  argues	  that	  certain	  rights	  cannot	  be	  forfeited	  or	  transferred	  in	  the	  act	  of	  contracting,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  that	  certain	  rights	  are	  inalienable.	  	  Hobbes	  argues	  that	  whenever	  one	  forfeits	  or	  transfers	  a	  right,	  one	  does	  so	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  realizing	  a	  benefit	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  21:6.	  48	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  21:10.	  49	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  21:10.	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oneself.	  	  Where	  it	  is	  conceptually	  impossible	  for	  one	  to	  realize	  a	  benefit	  in	  the	  act	  of	  contracting	  away	  a	  particular	  right,	  all	  persons	  retain	  that	  right	  indefinitely.	  	  For	  example,	  one	  can	  never	  be	  understood	  to	  forfeit	  the	  right	  to	  defend	  her	  life	  against	  an	  imminent	  threat.50	  	  Laying	  down	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐defence	  makes	  one	  utterly	  vulnerable	  to	  being	  killed,	  and	  a	  deceased	  person	  cannot	  realize	  any	  benefits	  as	  a	  party	  to	  a	  contract.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  incoherent	  to	  suppose	  that	  one	  could	  agree	  to	  forfeit	  her	  right	  to	  self-­‐defence.	  	  It	  is	  simply	  impossible	  to	  lay	  down	  this	  right	  and	  still	  realize	  a	  benefit	  to	  oneself.	  	  Hobbes	  argues	  that	  rights	  of	  this	  kind	  are	  persons’	  inalienable	  rights.	  	  	  So,	  in	  the	  political	  context,	  as	  in	  any	  other,	  we	  can	  never	  suppose	  that	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  forfeit	  their	  right	  to	  defend	  their	  lives	  and	  resist	  imminent	  violence,	  even	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  sovereign.	  	  On	  Hobbes’	  scheme,	  this	  is	  simply	  not	  a	  right	  that	  individuals	  can	  forfeit	  or	  transfer.51	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  second	  way	  of	  discerning	  which	  rights	  persons	  transfer	  and	  which	  they	  retain	  in	  entering	  political	  society	  is	  by	  considering	  the	  end	  of	  political	  society.	  	  Hobbes	  argues	  that	  the	  forfeiture	  of	  certain	  rights	  can	  never	  be	  justified	  given	  the	  ends	  for	  which	  persons	  engage	  in	  political	  cooperation.	  	  The	  sovereign	  may	  not	  act	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  end	  for	  which	  persons	  enter	  political	  society	  and	  submit	  themselves	  to	  the	  sovereign’s	  authority.52	  	  So,	  given	  that	  persons	  enter	  political	  society	  for	  “the	  peace	  of	  the	  subjects	  within	  themselves,	  and	  their	  defence	  against	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  14:8.	  51	  In	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  14:30,	  Hobbes	  additionally	  derives	  the	  freedom	  from	  self-­‐incrimination	  from	  these	  considerations.	  52	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  14:8,	  21:10.	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common	  enemy,”53	  the	  sovereign	  may	  not	  command	  a	  subject	  to	  kill	  or	  maim	  himself,	  to	  refrain	  from	  defending	  himself	  against	  injury,	  or	  to	  abstain	  from	  the	  use	  of	  the	  necessities	  of	  life.54	  	  Though	  the	  sovereign	  must	  be	  the	  ultimate	  judge	  of	  what	  actions	  are	  conducive	  to	  peace	  and	  the	  security	  of	  subjects,	  it	  can	  never	  be	  presumed	  that	  persons	  conferred	  on	  the	  sovereign	  the	  right	  to	  command	  subjects	  to	  do	  anything	  that	  immediately	  and	  directly	  undermines	  the	  security	  of	  their	  own	  lives.	  	  Killing	  oneself	  (or	  maiming	  oneself,	  or	  refraining	  from	  defending	  oneself,	  or	  depriving	  oneself	  of	  the	  necessities	  of	  life)	  stands	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  end	  for	  which	  persons	  enter	  political	  society	  and	  submit	  themselves	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  sovereign.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  can	  never	  be	  presumed	  that,	  in	  entering	  political	  society	  and	  submitting	  to	  political	  authority,	  persons	  forfeited	  their	  right	  to	  self-­‐defence,	  or	  their	  ability	  to	  pursue	  the	  necessities	  of	  life.	  Susanne	  Sreedhar	  stresses	  the	  importance	  of	  understanding	  Hobbes’	  right	  to	  self-­‐defence	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  social	  contract.55	  	  She	  argues	  against	  a	  “standard	  interpretation”	  of	  Hobbes	  on	  self-­‐defence	  that	  revolves	  around	  the	  extreme	  evil	  of	  death.	  	  Sreedhar	  argues	  that	  we	  should	  only	  regard	  the	  right	  of	  self-­‐defence	  as	  inalienable	  in	  the	  social	  contract.	  	  My	  interpretation	  of	  Hobbes’	  remarks	  above	  echo	  her	  “fidelity	  principle”	  which	  states	  that,	  “the	  transfer	  of	  a	  right	  has	  to	  be	  faithful	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  covenant,	  that	  is,	  one	  cannot	  transfer	  a	  right	  the	  transfer	  of	  which	  contradicts	  (or	  undermines)	  the	  purpose	  for	  which	  that	  right	  is	  transferred.”56	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  21:10.	  54	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  21:12.	  55	  Sreedhar,	  Susanne,	  “Defending	  the	  Hobbesian	  Right	  of	  Self-­‐Defense,”	  Political	  
Theory,	  Vol.	  36,	  No.	  6	  (Dec.,	  2008),	  pp.	  781-­‐802.	  	  	  56	  Sreedhar,	  “Defending	  the	  Hobbesian	  Right	  of	  Self-­‐Defence,”	  795.	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Importantly,	  Hobbes	  argues	  that	  political	  authority	  may	  legitimately	  command	  persons	  to	  perform	  dangerous	  tasks	  that	  will	  likely	  lead	  to	  their	  injury	  or	  death	  so	  long	  as	  the	  command	  intends	  to	  further	  the	  ends	  of	  political	  society.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  sovereign	  may	  legitimately	  oblige	  persons	  to	  fight	  in	  a	  war	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  their	  territory	  and,	  consequently,	  their	  society.	  	  Though	  they	  may	  likely	  be	  maimed	  or	  killed	  in	  carrying	  out	  the	  sovereign’s	  orders,	  so	  long	  as	  the	  orders	  are	  given	  for	  the	  sake	  furthering	  the	  ends	  of	  political	  society,	  namely,	  the	  protection	  of	  their	  lives,	  the	  sovereign’s	  actions	  are	  legitimate.	  	  Hobbes	  writes,	  “When	  therefore	  our	  refusal	  to	  obey,	  frustrates	  the	  end	  for	  which	  the	  sovereignty	  was	  ordained;	  then	  there	  is	  no	  liberty	  to	  refuse:	  otherwise	  there	  is.”57 Hobbes	  calls	  this	  second	  kind	  of	  liberty,	  which	  cannot	  be	  forfeited	  in	  contracting	  into	  political	  society,	  the	  “true	  liberty	  of	  a	  subject”	  because	  it	  may	  be	  exercised	  notwithstanding	  the	  commands	  of	  the	  sovereign.	  	  Here	  the	  subject’s	  liberty	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  silence	  of	  the	  civil	  laws,	  but	  exists	  in	  spite	  of	  them.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  liberty	  falls	  outside	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  sovereign.	  	  Political	  action	  that	  interferes	  with	  this	  liberty	  is	  illegitimate	  and	  may	  rightfully	  be	  opposed	  by	  subjects.	  	  	  So,	  the	  structure	  of	  Locke’s	  and	  Hobbes’	  contractarian	  arguments	  are	  similar.	  	  In	  both	  cases	  persons	  consent	  to	  participate	  in	  political	  society	  for	  a	  particular	  purpose,	  namely,	  the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  their	  civil	  interests.	  	  Persons’	  civil	  interests	  define	  and	  limit	  the	  mandate	  of	  political	  authority	  and	  conversely	  define	  the	  scope	  of,	  in	  Hobbes	  words,	  persons’	  true	  freedoms.	  	  The	  social	  contract	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  21:15.	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Locke	  envisions	  in	  the	  Letters	  places	  religious	  matters	  beyond	  the	  concern	  of	  civil	  government.	  	  While	  Hobbes	  places	  certain	  things,	  namely	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐defence	  and	  to	  pursue	  the	  necessities	  of	  life,	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  civil	  government,	  he	  does	  not	  similarly	  draw	  an	  argument	  for	  toleration	  out	  of	  his	  contractarian	  considerations.58	  	  Given	  the	  similarity	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  their	  arguments	  that	  I	  am	  suggesting,	  how	  can	  we	  account	  for	  the	  differences	  in	  their	  conclusions?	  One	  way	  of	  explaining	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  political	  societies	  that	  Locke	  and	  Hobbes	  envision	  is	  to	  point	  to	  their	  differing	  accounts	  of	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  Locke	  argues	  that	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  consist	  of	  their	  lives,	  liberty,	  personal	  security,	  and	  possessions.	  	  Persons	  enter	  into	  political	  society	  and	  submit	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  civil	  government	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  these	  things.	  	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  Locke’s	  case	  for	  toleration	  arises	  from	  contractarian	  considerations	  in	  two	  ways.	  	  First,	  religious	  salvation	  is	  not	  among	  the	  things	  that	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  entrust	  political	  authority	  to	  be	  responsible	  for.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  choosing	  one’s	  own	  religion	  and	  account	  of	  religious	  truth	  resembles	  what	  Hobbes	  calls	  a	  true	  liberty.	  	  I	  say	  these	  things	  resemble	  Hobbes’	  true	  liberties	  because,	  though	  their	  underlying	  reasoning	  is	  different,	  both	  Hobbes	  and	  Locke	  identify	  a	  class	  of	  things	  that	  fall	  outside	  of	  political	  authority’s	  jurisdiction	  owing	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  through	  which	  persons	  enter	  political	  society.	  	  These	  are	  the	  things	  that	  Hobbes	  calls	  the	  true	  liberties.	  	  Though	  Hobbes	  argues	  that	  persons	  cannot	  forfeit	  certain	  things	  to	  the	  sovereign,	  and	  the	  modality	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  At	  least	  Hobbes	  does	  not	  explicitly	  draw	  an	  argument	  for	  toleration	  out	  of	  his	  contractarian	  considerations.	  	  Below	  I	  draw	  out	  an	  argument	  for	  limited	  toleration	  in	  Hobbes	  analogous	  to	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument.	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of	  Locke’s	  contractarian	  claims	  are	  less	  obvious,59	  for	  both,	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  whatever	  the	  social	  contract	  determines	  lies	  outside	  of	  political	  authority’s	  jurisdiction,	  remains	  the	  responsibility	  of	  each	  individual.	  	  Locke’s	  first	  contractarian	  argument	  for	  toleration	  is	  that	  the	  liberty	  to	  choose	  and	  cultivate	  one’s	  own	  religious	  beliefs	  lies	  outside	  the	  mandate	  of	  political	  authority	  and	  therefore	  remains	  with	  individuals	  after	  entering	  political	  society.	  	  	  The	  second	  way	  in	  which	  Locke	  envisions	  toleration	  arising	  from	  the	  social	  contract	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Third	  Letter	  where	  he	  briefly	  considers	  the	  possibility	  that	  religious	  freedom	  is	  among	  the	  freedoms	  that	  persons	  participate	  in	  political	  society	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  protecting.	  	  He	  writes:	  	  …	  force	  from	  a	  stronger	  hand	  to	  bring	  a	  man	  to	  a	  religion,	  which	  another	  thinks	  the	  true,	  being	  an	  injury	  which	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  everyone	  would	  avoid,	  protection	  from	  such	  injury	  is	  one	  of	  the	  ends	  of	  a	  commonwealth,	  and	  so	  everyman	  has	  a	  right	  to	  toleration.60	  	  	  	  Here	  Locke	  argues	  that	  the	  freedom	  from	  persons	  who	  threaten	  to	  forcefully	  interfere	  in	  others’	  religious	  lives,	  and	  consequently	  the	  freedom	  to	  believe	  in	  and	  practice	  a	  religion	  of	  one’s	  choosing,	  are	  among	  the	  freedoms	  that	  persons	  enter	  into	  political	  society	  to	  protect.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  for	  Locke,	  freedom	  of	  religion	  ought	  to	  be	  counted	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  Civil	  government,	  therefore,	  has	  a	  positive	  role	  to	  play	  in	  establishing	  and	  protecting	  persons’	  religious	  freedom.	  	  Notice	  that,	  envisioned	  in	  this	  manner,	  religious	  freedom	  is	  really	  just	  a	  subspecies	  of	  a	  more	  general	  freedom	  to	  live	  the	  life	  of	  one’s	  choosing,	  free	  from	  the	  unjustified	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Locke	  variously	  specifies	  persons’	  consent	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  they	  possibly	  could	  consent	  to,	  and	  what	  they	  hypothetically	  would	  consent	  to.	  	  See	  3.3,	  especially	  85,	  87-­‐88	  below.	  60	  Locke,	  Third	  Letter,	  141.	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interference	  from	  others.	  	  Throughout	  the	  Letters	  Locke	  includes	  liberty	  among	  citizens’	  civil	  interests,	  and	  in	  the	  Third	  Letter	  he	  explicitly	  makes	  the	  case	  for	  religious	  liberty.	  	  Once	  one	  understands	  the	  grounds	  for	  including	  liberty	  as	  a	  civil	  interest,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  that	  religious	  freedom	  is	  encompassed	  in	  this	  more	  general	  liberty.	  	  Persons	  enter	  into	  political	  society	  to,	  inter	  alia,	  establish	  the	  conditions	  necessary	  for	  living	  a	  life	  of	  their	  choosing,	  free	  from	  unjustified	  interference	  from	  others.	  	  Surely	  freedom	  to	  make	  religious	  decisions	  for	  oneself	  is	  a	  subspecies	  of	  this	  freedom.	  	  This	  religious	  freedom,	  however,	  is	  not	  unlimited	  for	  Locke.	  	  That	  is,	  we	  can	  justify	  interference	  with	  persons’	  religious	  liberty	  in	  some	  cases.	  	  The	  protection	  of	  persons’	  religious	  liberty,	  and	  all	  other	  liberties,	  must	  be	  balanced	  against	  the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  persons’	  other	  civil	  interests.	  	  Locke	  makes	  clear	  that	  in	  some	  circumstances	  persons’	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  a	  secure	  society	  outweighs	  certain	  persons’	  religious	  freedom.	  	  For	  example,	  where	  one’s	  religion	  makes	  him	  loyal	  to	  a	  foreign	  government,	  as	  Locke	  supposed	  of	  Muslims	  (and,	  it	  is	  commonly	  assumed,	  Catholics	  on	  similar	  grounds),61	  persons’	  interest	  in	  the	  protection	  of	  society	  will	  undoubtedly	  outweigh	  certain	  individuals’	  freedom	  to	  practice	  religions	  that	  pose	  the	  threat.	  	  To	  say	  that	  something	  is	  a	  civil	  interest	  is	  to	  say	  that	  civil	  government	  may	  legitimately	  act	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  protecting	  or	  promoting	  that	  thing.	  	  If	  persons	  have	  multiple	  civil	  interests,	  as	  Locke	  supposed	  they	  do,	  concern	  for	  these	  interests	  will	  inevitably	  have	  to	  be	  balanced	  against	  one	  another.	  	  This	  balancing	  will	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  Locke,	  Letter,	  426.	  	  Wootton,	  John	  Locke:	  Political	  Writings,	  35.	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have	  different	  results	  in	  different	  contexts.	  	  We	  can	  understand	  this	  balancing	  as	  the	  practice	  of	  politics.	  	  	  	  In	  contrast,	  for	  Hobbes,	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  consist	  almost	  entirely	  in	  the	  protection	  of	  their	  lives	  and	  their	  personal	  security.	  	  He	  continually	  states	  that	  the	  end	  of	  political	  cooperation	  is	  to	  establish	  a	  peaceful	  condition	  in	  which	  persons’	  lives	  and	  persons	  are	  secure.62	  	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  seems	  natural	  to	  infer	  that	  whatever	  policy	  on	  religion	  is	  most	  conducive	  to	  securing	  peace	  between	  citizens	  is	  the	  one	  that	  Hobbes	  would	  prefer.	  If	  a	  policy	  of	  religious	  uniformity	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  secure	  peace,	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  implemented.	  	  If	  a	  policy	  of	  toleration	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  secure	  peace,	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  preferred.	  	  If	  persons’	  interest	  in	  political	  participation	  consists	  entirely	  in	  their	  personal	  security,	  civil	  government	  is	  justified	  in	  implementing	  whatever	  policy	  will	  establish	  the	  conditions	  of	  peace.	  	  	  This	  naturally	  inferred	  view	  paints	  Hobbes	  as	  largely	  indifferent	  to	  toleration	  as	  matter	  of	  political	  concern	  in	  itself.	  	  Further,	  it	  is	  the	  view	  of	  Hobbes	  on	  toleration	  that	  most	  commentators	  assume	  to	  be	  the	  default	  understanding	  of	  his	  position.	  	  Alan	  Ryan	  suggests	  that	  the	  “obvious	  interpretation”	  of	  Hobbes	  is	  as	  a	  “simple	  enemy	  to	  toleration”.63	  	  In	  arguing	  for	  a	  view	  of	  Hobbes	  as	  a	  tentative	  defender	  of	  toleration,	  he	  suggests	  that	  Hobbes’	  position	  on	  toleration	  is	  “less	  ignominious	  than	  we	  tend	  to	  think.”64	  	  J	  Judd	  Owen	  calls	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Hobbes	  as	  indifferent,	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  17:1,	  18:8,	  21:10.	  	  	  63	  Ryan,	  Alan,	  “A	  More	  Tolerant	  Hobbes?”	  Susan	  Mendus	  (ed.),	  Justifying	  Toleration:	  
Conceptual	  and	  Historical	  Perspectives,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1988,	  37-­‐60),	  43.	  64	  Ryan,	  Alan,	  “A	  More	  Tolerant	  Hobbes?”	  39.	  	  Emphasis	  added.	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even	  hostile	  to	  toleration	  the	  “typical	  view”.65	  	  Edwin	  Curley,	  in	  adjudicating	  between	  different	  interpretations	  of	  toleration	  in	  Leviathan	  suggests	  that	  Hobbes	  is	  “more	  favourable	  to	  toleration	  than	  it	  might	  appear”.66	  	  Though	  commentators	  typically	  argue	  that	  Hobbes’	  views	  on	  toleration	  are	  more	  nuanced	  than	  we	  commonly	  suppose,	  whether	  they	  take	  Hobbes	  to	  ultimately	  be	  a	  friend	  or	  foe	  of	  toleration,	  they	  seem	  agree	  that	  we	  commonly	  suppose	  him	  to	  be	  indifferent	  to	  toleration	  on	  its	  own	  terms,	  and	  pragmatic	  about	  it	  in	  practice.	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  reading	  of	  Hobbes	  on	  toleration	  is	  bolstered	  by	  the	  seemingly	  contradictory	  claims	  in	  Leviathan	  about	  religious	  belief	  and	  practice.	  	  Hobbes	  seems	  to	  praise,	  and	  at	  the	  very	  least	  acknowledges	  the	  success	  of,	  the	  tolerant	  policies	  of	  the	  Romans	  whereby	  all	  religions	  were	  tolerated	  unless	  they	  contained	  elements	  that	  put	  them	  at	  odds	  with	  civil	  society	  and	  political	  authority.	  	  Hobbes	  writes	  that	  only	  Jews	  were	  not	  tolerated	  because	  they	  “thought	  it	  unlawful	  to	  acknowledge	  subjection	  to	  any	  mortal	  king	  or	  state	  whatsoever.”67	  	  Though	  not	  universally	  tolerant,	  Hobbes’	  remarks	  here	  are	  very	  similar	  in	  tone	  and	  spirit	  to	  Locke’s	  limits	  on	  toleration	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Catholics	  and	  Muslims.68	  	  Toleration	  ought	  to	  be	  implemented	  except	  where	  doing	  so	  is	  subversive	  to	  the	  political	  order	  as	  such.	  	  	  	  In	  opposition	  to	  his	  sympathetic	  remarks	  about	  historical	  policies	  of	  toleration,	  Hobbes	  affirms	  that	  the	  Sovereign	  possesses	  the	  authority	  to	  determine	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  Judd,	  “The	  Tolerant	  Leviathan:	  Hobbes	  and	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  Paradox	  of	  Liberalism,”	  
Polity,	  Vol.	  37,	  No.	  1,	  (January	  2005),	  130-­‐148,	  130.	  66	  Curley,	  Edwin,	  “Hobbes	  and	  the	  Cause	  of	  Religious	  Toleration,”	  Patricia	  Springborg	  (ed.),	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Hobbes’	  Leviathan,	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  325.	  	  Emphasis	  added.	  67	  Hobbes,	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  12:21.	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whether	  opinions	  and	  doctrines	  are	  averse	  to	  civil	  peace.69	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  appears	  to	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  strong,	  principled	  claim	  to	  religious	  freedom.	  	  Further,	  Hobbes	  explicitly	  advocates	  for	  uniformity	  of	  public	  worship.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  to	  understand	  the	  commonwealth	  as	  a	  single	  unified	  entity	  it	  must	  worship	  God	  publicly	  with	  a	  single	  voice.70	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Hobbes	  takes	  uniformity	  of	  public	  worship	  to	  be	  necessary	  for,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  public	  cohesion	  and	  civil	  peace.	  	  Hobbes’	  remarks	  additionally	  suggest	  that	  uniformity	  of	  public	  worship	  might	  be	  necessary	  for	  conceiving	  of	  a	  people	  as	  united	  in	  political	  society	  at	  all.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  These	  and	  other	  conflicting	  remarks	  by	  Hobbes’	  on	  toleration	  and	  liberty	  of	  conscience	  invite	  conflicting	  accounts	  of	  Hobbes’	  account	  of	  toleration	  and	  its	  limits.	  	  Alan	  Ryan,	  for	  one,	  takes	  Hobbes	  to	  be	  a	  tentative	  defender	  of	  toleration.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  Hobbes’	  requirement	  of	  uniformity	  in	  pubic	  worship	  is	  merely	  a	  “police	  matter”.71	  	  Uniformity	  in	  outward	  religious	  practice	  ought	  to	  be	  favoured	  only	  so	  far	  as	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  maintaining	  peace	  and	  security.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  religious	  belief	  is	  a	  private	  matter	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  left	  to	  each	  individual	  so	  long	  as	  they	  obey	  the	  law.72	  	  Johan	  Traleau	  argues	  against	  Ryan’s	  account	  of	  Hobbes	  attempting	  to	  show	  that	  by	  “conscience,”	  Hobbes	  ambiguously	  meant	  both	  a	  private	  individual	  thing	  immune	  from	  the	  outward	  force	  of	  the	  sovereign,	  and	  a	  public	  social	  phenomenon	  subject	  to	  the	  law.73	  	  Traleau	  explains	  away	  the	  notion	  of	  conscience	  as	  a	  private	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	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  Ryan,	  “A	  More	  Tolerant	  Hobbes?”	  45,	  50.	  	  Curley,	  “Hobbes	  and	  the	  Cause	  of	  Religious	  Toleration,”	  310-­‐311.	  73	  Traleau,	  Johan,	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personal	  endeavour,	  and,	  therefore,	  argues	  that	  Hobbes	  does	  not	  advocate	  for	  the	  freedom	  of	  conscience	  that	  commentators	  like	  Ryan	  suppose.	  	  I	  believe	  that	  we	  can	  make	  the	  best	  sense	  of	  Hobbes’	  varied	  claims	  on	  toleration	  in	  Leviathan	  by	  considering	  his	  main	  political	  argument	  in	  light	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests.	  	  By	  focusing	  on	  civil	  interests	  in	  Hobbes’	  account	  of	  political	  association,	  we	  clarify	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  political	  authority	  may	  interfere	  in	  the	  religious	  lives	  of	  persons.	  	  Like	  Locke,	  Hobbes	  does	  not	  take	  religious	  salvation	  as	  an	  end	  of	  political	  cooperation,	  and	  therefore	  would	  not	  include	  it	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  Therefore,	  we	  may	  infer	  a	  limited	  case	  for	  toleration	  in	  Hobbes	  contractarian	  argument	  that	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  first	  of	  Locke’s.	  	  If	  religious	  salvation	  is	  not	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  civil	  government	  may	  not	  enforce	  a	  particular	  account	  of	  religious	  truth,	  or	  demand	  conformity	  of	  religious	  belief.	  	  It	  would	  be	  illegitimate	  for	  the	  Sovereign	  to	  act	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  persons’	  salvation	  because	  salvation	  is	  not	  among	  their	  civil	  interests.	  	  	  This	  amounts	  to	  toleration	  of	  privately	  held	  religious	  beliefs.	  	  If	  the	  sovereign	  may	  not	  act	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  citizens’	  salvation,	  each	  citizen	  is	  left	  to	  pursue	  her	  conception	  of	  religious	  truth	  alone,	  or	  in	  concert	  with	  others	  of	  her	  choosing.	  	  	  	  	  What	  then	  should	  we	  make	  of	  Hobbes’	  intolerant	  remarks?	  	  Despite	  this	  similarity	  in	  what	  they	  exclude	  from	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  Hobbes	  and	  Locke	  disagree	  about	  what	  things	  we	  should	  include	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  Hobbes,	  unlike	  Locke,	  does	  not	  recognize	  religious	  freedom,	  or	  freedom	  of	  any	  kind,	  as	  a	  civil	  interest.	  	  Again,	  for	  Hobbes,	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  are	  their	  lives	  and	  personal	  security.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Hobbes’	  sovereign	  has	  no	  positive	  role	  to	  play	  in	  
	   66	  
securing	  the	  religious	  freedom	  of	  citizens.	  	  Here	  Hobbes’	  ultimate	  concern	  for	  peace	  and	  security	  take	  over.	  	  If	  uniformity	  of	  public	  worship	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  cohesion	  of	  political	  society,	  as	  Hobbes	  supposed	  it	  was,	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  implemented.	  	  Providing	  that	  such	  a	  policy	  was	  enacted	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  peace	  and	  personal	  security,	  and	  was	  necessary	  for	  that	  end,	  it	  falls	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  and,	  therefore,	  ought	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  legitimate	  undertaking	  of	  the	  sovereign.	  	  For	  Hobbes,	  there	  are	  no	  countervailing	  considerations	  of	  citizens’	  freedoms,	  religious	  or	  otherwise,	  as	  there	  are	  for	  Locke.	  This	  reading	  of	  Hobbes	  on	  toleration	  aligns	  best	  with	  Ryan’s	  account	  of	  Hobbes	  as	  more	  tolerant	  than	  is	  commonly	  assumed,	  though	  only	  cautiously	  so.74	  	  However,	  Ryan	  concludes	  that,	  for	  Hobbes,	  "Toleration	  is	  not	  argued	  for	  on	  principle,	  but	  as	  a	  utilitarian	  measure;	  if	  toleration	  is	  unsafe,	  it	  must	  be	  dropped	  –	  public	  order	  trumps	  any	  notion	  of	  a	  right	  to	  free	  speech.”75	  	  While	  for	  Hobbes	  it	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  toleration	  ought	  to	  be	  limited	  by	  the	  requirements	  of	  public	  safety,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  it	  makes	  his	  toleration	  unprincipled.	  	  My	  analysis	  of	  Hobbes’	  social	  contract	  in	  light	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  Hobbesian	  account	  of	  toleration	  principled	  in	  a	  surprisingly	  similar	  way	  to	  Locke’s.	  	  For	  both,	  the	  pursuit	  of	  religious	  truth	  falls	  outside	  of	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  civil	  government,	  and	  for	  both,	  religious	  expression	  can	  only	  be	  limited	  for	  prudential	  reasons	  in	  the	  pursuit	  civil	  government’s	  proper	  end	  of	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  Their	  accounts	  of	  toleration	  diverge	  where	  their	  accounts	  of	  civil	  interests	  diverge.	  	  Having	  an	  overarching	  concern	  with	  peace	  and	  security,	  Hobbes	  allows	  for	  great	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Ryan,	  “A	  More	  Tolerant	  Hobbes?”	  	  	  75	  Ryan,	  “A	  More	  Tolerant	  Hobbes?”	  58.	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intrusions	  into	  other	  aspects	  of	  persons’	  lives	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  securing	  that	  end.	  	  Locke	  additionally	  includes	  persons’	  liberty	  among	  their	  civil	  interests	  and,	  therefore,	  requires	  that	  civil	  government	  take	  a	  more	  balanced	  approach	  in	  pursuing	  its	  proper	  ends.	  	  	  	  	  
2.4	  –	  Kant	  and	  Civil	  Interests	  	  	  For	  Hobbes,	  as	  with	  Locke	  in	  his	  Letters,	  identifying	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  is	  relatively	  straightforward.	  	  Identify	  the	  end	  of	  political	  cooperation	  by	  considering	  the	  factors	  that	  motivate	  persons	  to	  enter	  political	  society	  and	  you	  will	  have	  indentified	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  The	  process	  is	  not	  as	  straightforward	  when	  considering	  Kant’s	  social	  contract	  theory.	  	  Kant	  does	  not	  contemplate	  the	  factors	  that	  would	  motivate	  persons	  to	  create	  political	  society	  and	  submit	  to	  political	  authority.	  	  Rather,	  he	  endeavours	  to	  explicate	  the	  conditions	  on	  which	  political	  society	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  “rightful	  condition”,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  persons	  would	  ever	  feel	  motivated	  to	  enter	  it.	  	  	  	   That	  said,	  Kant’s	  political	  theory	  is	  not	  immune	  to	  analysis	  in	  terms	  of	  civil	  interests.	  	  Kant	  relies	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  to	  limit	  the	  legitimate	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  implicitly	  acknowledges	  a	  domain	  of	  civil	  interests.	  	  	   Though	  Kant’s	  project	  is	  importantly	  different	  than	  earlier	  social	  contract	  theories,	  his	  language	  occasionally	  obscures	  that	  fact.	  	  At	  several	  points	  in	  Kant’s	  major	  political	  works,	  he	  writes	  of	  persons’	  interest	  in	  entering	  political	  society	  in	  terms	  similar	  to	  Hobbes	  and	  Locke.	  	  In	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying	  Kant	  describes	  the	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civil	  condition	  as	  a	  distinctive	  kind	  of	  social	  contract,	  all	  of	  which	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  “The	  union	  of	  many	  for	  some	  (common)	  end	  (that	  all	  of	  them	  have)…”76	  	  In	  the	  
Doctrine	  of	  Right	  he	  writes,	  “Because	  of	  its	  form,	  by	  which	  all	  are	  united	  through	  their	  common	  interest	  in	  being	  in	  a	  rightful	  condition,	  a	  state	  is	  called	  a	  
commonwealth.”77	  	  In	  these	  passages,	  Kant,	  in	  the	  same	  vein	  as	  Hobbes	  and	  Locke,	  seems	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  we	  can	  regard	  persons	  as	  having	  an	  interest	  in	  entering	  political	  society,	  and	  that	  the	  end	  of	  political	  society	  is	  furthering	  those	  interests	  that	  persons	  share.	  	  Specifically,	  Kant	  insinuates	  that	  persons	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  being	  in	  a	  rightful	  condition,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  having	  their	  rights	  secured.78	  	   However,	  Kant	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  the	  civil	  condition	  is	  unique	  among	  social	  contracts	  owing	  to	  the	  “principle	  of	  its	  institution”.	  	  For	  Kant,	  the	  civil	  condition	  does	  not	  aim	  at	  securing	  some	  contingent	  end	  that	  persons	  happen	  to	  share.	  	  Rather,	  entering	  it	  is	  “the	  unconditional	  and	  first	  duty	  in	  any	  external	  relation	  of	  people	  in	  general,	  who	  cannot	  help	  mutually	  affecting	  one	  another…”79	  	  For	  Kant,	  every	  person	  has	  an	  innate	  right	  to	  freedom	  from	  the	  imposition	  of	  others’	  wills.	  	  Further,	  it	  is	  only	  in	  the	  civil	  condition	  that	  persons	  can	  interact	  with	  one	  another	  in	  a	  way	  that	  respects	  their	  freedom.	  	  So,	  persons	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  enter	  the	  civil	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Kant,	  Immanuel,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying:	  That	  may	  be	  correct	  in	  theory,	  but	  it	  is	  of	  no	  use	  in	  practice,	  in	  Mary	  J.	  Gregor	  (ed.),	  Immanuel	  Kant:	  Practical	  Philosophy,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  8:289.	  	  Hereafter	  cited	  as	  On	  the	  
Common	  Saying.	  	  77	  Kant,	  Immanuel,	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,	  in	  Mary	  J.	  Gregor	  (ed.),	  Immanuel	  
Kant:	  Practical	  Philosophy,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  6:311.	  78	  I	  return	  to	  Kant’s	  reliance	  on	  the	  language	  of	  interests	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  this	  section.	  79	  Kant,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:289.	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condition	  because	  it	  is	  the	  only	  way	  for	  them	  to	  interact	  with	  others	  in	  a	  way	  that	  respects	  everyone’s	  innate	  freedom	  to	  be	  independent	  of	  other’s	  wills.80	  	   So,	  we	  cannot	  identify	  civil	  interests	  in	  Kant’s	  system	  by	  indentifying	  persons’	  motivations	  for	  entering	  political	  society.	  	  However,	  the	  reasoning	  that	  underlies	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  Kant’s	  theory	  illuminates	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  civil	  interest	  analysis	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  it.	  	  Moving	  past	  the	  supposed	  fact	  of	  persons’	  motivation	  to	  enter	  political	  society,	  we	  can	  consider	  the	  grounds	  of	  that	  motivation	  in	  the	  social	  contract	  theories	  we	  have	  considered	  so	  far.	  	  I,	  following	  Locke,	  suggested	  that	  we	  can	  identify	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  by	  identifying	  those	  interests	  that	  require	  protection	  outside	  of	  political	  society,	  and	  that	  only	  political	  authority	  can	  secure	  for	  them.	  	  Here	  we	  find	  an	  analogue	  in	  Kant’s	  political	  philosophy.	  For	  Kant,	  persons	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  enter	  the	  civil	  condition	  because	  it	  is	  the	  only	  condition	  in	  which	  persons	  are	  able	  to	  interact	  with	  each	  other	  on	  terms	  of	  equal	  freedom.	  	  That	  is,	  Kant	  maintains	  that	  persons	  are	  obligated	  to	  uphold	  their	  own	  freedom,	  and	  not	  interfere	  with	  the	  freedom	  of	  others,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  only	  possible	  when	  acting	  by	  way	  of	  political	  institutions	  in	  the	  civil	  condition.	  	  So	  persons	  are	  obligated	  to	  protect	  and	  promote	  their	  innate	  freedom	  to	  be	  independent	  of	  others’	  choices,	  but	  they	  cannot	  do	  so	  outside	  of	  political	  society.	  	  Only	  in	  the	  civil	  condition	  can	  persons’	  freedom	  be	  secure.	  	  We	  may	  therefore	  identify	  persons’	  civil	  interest	  as	  their	  freedom.	  To	  draw	  out	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  civil	  condition	  as	  a	  system	  of	  equal	  freedom	  Kant	  appeals	  to	  “the	  idea	  of	  the	  original	  contract”.81	  	  For	  persons	  to	  interact	  with	  one	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Kant,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:289.	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another	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  all	  remain	  free	  from	  each	  other’s	  wills,	  we	  must	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  the	  conditions	  governing	  their	  interactions	  as	  authorized	  by	  them	  all	  with	  a	  united	  will.	  	  Insofar	  as	  the	  conditions	  of	  political	  cooperation	  are	  authorized	  by	  the	  united	  will	  of	  all,	  persons	  can	  understand	  themselves	  as	  subject	  to	  others’	  wills	  only	  on	  reciprocal	  terms,	  and,	  therefore,	  equally	  free.82	  	  Further,	  each	  person	  can	  be	  understood	  to	  authorize	  political	  authority	  in	  that	  each	  person’s	  own	  will	  is	  united	  with	  all	  others	  in	  its	  rightful	  exercise.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  way	  that	  Kant	  understands	  the	  rightful	  condition	  through	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  social	  contract.	  Kant	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  original	  contract	  is	  “only	  an	  idea	  of	  reason”.83	  	  That	  is,	  he	  explicitly	  rejects	  the	  idea	  that	  anything	  resembling	  a	  historical	  social	  contract	  ever	  existed,	  or	  that	  a	  historical	  social	  contract	  could	  carry	  any	  significance	  for	  existing	  political	  societies.	  	  Instead,	  Kant	  envisions	  the	  original	  contract	  only	  as	  an	  idea,	  but	  one	  with	  real	  implications	  for	  the	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  original	  contract	  serves	  to	  limit	  political	  authority	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  its	  rightful	  exercise.	  	  Kant	  writes,	  “Properly	  speaking,	  the	  original	  contract	  is	  only	  the	  idea	  of	  [the	  act	  by	  which	  a	  people	  forms	  itself	  into	  a	  state],	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  alone	  we	  can	  think	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  state.”84	  	  For	  the	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  right,	  we	  must	  be	  able	  to	  regard	  it	  as	  emanating	  from	  the	  united	  will	  of	  all.	  	  Or,	  in	  other	  words,	  for	  political	  action	  to	  be	  legitimate	  it	  must	  be	  possible	  to	  regard	  it	  as	  the	  object	  of	  consent	  for	  the	  people	  engaging	  in	  political	  cooperation.	  	  Therefore,	  for	  Kant,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  original	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Kant,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:297,	  Kant,	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,	  6:315-­‐316.	  82	  Kant,	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,	  6:315-­‐316.	  	  	  83	  Kant,	  Immanuel,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:297.	  84	  Kant,	  Immanuel,	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,	  6:316.	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contract	  is	  a	  limiting	  idea.	  	  It	  does	  not	  create	  obligations	  for	  persons	  subject	  to	  political	  authority	  the	  way	  we	  often	  suppose	  social	  contracts	  do;	  rather,	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  test	  by	  which	  we	  can	  identify	  legitimate	  political	  action.	  	  If	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  regard	  a	  political	  action	  as	  emanating	  from	  the	  united	  will	  of	  all,	  we	  ought	  to	  regard	  it	  as	  legitimate.	  	  If	  we	  cannot	  regard	  it	  as	  emanating	  from	  the	  people’s	  united	  will,	  we	  ought	  to	  regard	  it	  as	  illegitimate.	  	  	  Though	  Kant	  makes	  clear	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  original	  contract,	  his	  application	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  possible	  consent	  as	  a	  limiting	  condition	  on	  political	  action	  is	  obscure.	  	  Kant	  gives	  three	  examples	  of	  particular	  political	  actions	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  original	  contract	  rules	  out;	  however,	  he	  does	  not	  make	  clear	  what,	  in	  general,	  makes	  it	  impossible	  for	  a	  people	  to	  consent	  to	  a	  given	  action.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  can	  help	  us	  draw	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  original	  contract	  and	  the	  application	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  possible	  consent	  as	  a	  test	  for	  legitimacy.	  	  	  I	  contend	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  the	  test	  for	  whether	  all	  persons	  could	  consent	  to	  a	  political	  action	  as	  whether	  that	  action	  conflicts	  with	  or	  undermines	  their	  civil	  interests.85	  	  The	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  civil	  interests	  are	  the	  ends	  for	  which	  persons	  organize	  in	  political	  society.86	  	  If	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  the	  civil	  condition	  as	  emanating	  from	  an	  original	  contract	  in	  which	  persons’	  wills	  are	  united,	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  persons	  will	  the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  their	  civil	  interests.	  	  To	  suppose	  that	  a	  people	  could	  consent	  to	  the	  subversion	  of	  their	  civil	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Kant,	  of	  course,	  does	  not	  use	  the	  language	  of	  “civil	  interests”.	  	  	  86	  Again,	  Kant	  does	  not	  conceive	  of	  political	  cooperation	  as	  means	  to	  some	  contingent	  end.	  	  But	  he	  writes	  of	  the	  “…	  end	  for	  which	  the	  civil	  constitution	  is	  established…”	  in	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:298.	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interests	  is	  to	  suppose	  a	  contradiction	  in	  their	  united	  will.87	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  all	  persons	  to	  consent	  to	  any	  political	  action	  that	  subverts	  or	  undermines	  the	  protection	  or	  promotion	  of	  their	  civil	  interests.	  	  In	  Kant’s	  political	  system,	  this	  means	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  persons	  to	  consent	  to	  the	  subversion	  of	  their	  freedom	  understood	  as	  their	  mutual	  independence	  from	  each	  other’s	  wills.	  	   Of	  course,	  Kant	  did	  not	  write	  using	  the	  language	  of	  civil	  interests.	  	  However,	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  interpretation	  of	  Kant’s	  notion	  of	  possible	  consent	  is	  implicit	  in	  his	  remarks	  on	  the	  topic.	  	  In	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying	  Kant	  argues	  that	  legislation	  directed	  at	  promoting	  persons’	  happiness	  “is	  not	  done	  as	  the	  end	  for	  which	  a	  civil	  constitution	  is	  established	  but	  merely	  as	  means	  for	  securing	  a	  rightful	  condition…”88	  	  It	  can	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  debate	  whether	  such	  legislation	  is	  enacted	  prudently;	  however,	  Kant	  argues	  that	  one	  can	  infallibly	  discern	  whether	  a	  law	  conforms	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  right	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  original	  contract.	  	  Kant	  writes,	  “For,	  provided	  it	  is	  not	  self-­‐contradictory	  that	  an	  entire	  people	  should	  agree	  to	  such	  a	  law,	  however	  bitter	  they	  might	  find	  it,	  the	  law	  is	  in	  conformity	  with	  right.”89	  	  	  My	  analysis	  of	  Kant’s	  notion	  of	  possible	  consent	  in	  terms	  of	  civil	  interests	  illuminates	  wherein	  the	  contradiction	  lies.	  	  Because	  the	  civil	  condition	  is	  established	  for	  the	  end	  of	  protecting	  persons’	  freedom,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  their	  civil	  interest	  consists	  in	  their	  freedom,	  they	  must	  be	  understood	  to	  will	  the	  protection	  of	  their	  freedom.90	  	  To	  suppose	  they	  will	  the	  subversion	  of	  their	  freedom	  would	  be	  to	  suppose	  a	  contradiction	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  This	  makes	  sense	  of	  Kant’s	  claim	  that	  where	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  a	  people	  to	  consent	  to	  a	  political	  action,	  it	  is	  self-­‐contradictory,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:299.	  	  	  88	  Kant,	  Immanuel,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:298.	  89	  Kant,	  Immanuel,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:299.	  90	  Ripstein,	  Arthur,	  Force	  and	  Freedom:	  Kant’s	  Legal	  and	  Political	  Philosophy,	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  26.	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people’s	  united	  will.	  	  If	  ever	  we	  discover	  that	  enacting	  a	  law	  supposes	  a	  contradiction	  in	  the	  people’s	  united	  will,	  specifically,	  that	  they	  do	  and	  do	  not	  will	  the	  protection	  of	  their	  freedom,	  the	  law	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  right.91	  	  	  	  	  	  Of	  Kant’s	  examples	  of	  things	  to	  which	  a	  people	  could	  not	  consent,	  the	  best	  illustration	  of	  understanding	  possible	  consent	  in	  terms	  of	  civil	  interests	  comes	  where	  Kant	  considers	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  class	  of	  hereditary	  nobility.	  	  Kant	  says	  that	  an	  entire	  people	  could	  not	  consent	  to	  such	  a	  permanent	  class	  system	  because	  it	  would	  be	  tantamount	  to	  them	  throwing	  away	  their	  freedom.92	  	  By	  this	  Kant	  means	  that,	  in	  a	  hereditary	  class	  system,	  in	  which	  persons	  of	  a	  lower	  class	  could	  not	  attain	  a	  higher	  rank	  though	  any	  action	  of	  their	  own,	  persons	  of	  lower	  classes	  would	  be	  perpetually	  subject	  to	  the	  wills	  of	  higher-­‐class	  individuals	  in	  that	  their	  capacity	  to	  improve	  their	  lot	  in	  life	  would	  be	  arbitrarily	  restricted	  by	  higher-­‐class	  persons	  who	  would	  not	  be	  reciprocally	  constrained.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  they	  would	  be	  unfree.93	  	  I	  am	  suggesting	  that	  we	  can	  further	  explain	  the	  impossibility	  of	  persons	  consenting	  to	  throwing	  away	  their	  freedom	  by	  realizing	  that	  the	  establishment	  and	  protection	  of	  persons’	  freedom	  is	  the	  end	  of	  political	  association.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  For	  Kant,	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  consist	  in	  the	  establishment	  and	  protection	  of	  their	  freedom.	  	  For	  persons	  to	  throw	  their	  freedom	  away	  is	  to	  act	  in	  contradiction	  to	  the	  end	  for	  which	  they	  associate	  in	  political	  society.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  a	  people	  to	  consent	  to	  throwing	  away	  their	  freedom,	  and,	  accordingly,	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  a	  people	  to	  consent	  to	  a	  system	  of	  hereditary	  nobility.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  This	  echoes	  Sreedhar’s	  “fidelity	  principle”	  in	  Hobbes’	  social	  contract,	  “Defending	  the	  Hobbesian	  Right	  of	  Self-­‐Defense,”	  795.	  	  See	  2.3,	  57	  above.	  92	  Kant,	  Immanuel,	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,	  6:329.	  93	  Kant,	  Immanuel,	  On	  The	  Common	  Saying,	  8:293.	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Along	  similar	  lines,	  Kant	  considers	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  tax	  on	  a	  people	  to	  fund	  a	  war.	  	  He	  raises	  this	  example	  in	  the	  course	  of	  explaining	  the	  standard	  of	  possible	  consent	  as	  the	  application	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  original	  contract.	  	  Kant	  argues	  that	  if	  the	  tax	  is	  applied	  consistently	  to	  all	  persons,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  war	  is	  unpopular,	  and,	  consequently,	  the	  people	  would	  not	  consent	  to	  the	  tax	  if	  consulted,	  the	  law	  implementing	  the	  tax	  is	  legitimate	  because	  the	  people	  could	  consent	  to	  it.	  	  Conversely,	  if	  the	  tax	  were	  applied	  inconsistently	  to	  persons	  of	  the	  same	  rank,	  that	  is,	  imposed	  on	  some	  and	  not	  others,	  “it	  is	  easily	  seen	  that	  a	  whole	  people	  could	  not	  agree	  to	  a	  law	  of	  this	  kind…”94	  	  This	  is	  all	  Kant	  says	  about	  the	  war	  tax.	  	  Accordingly,	  despite	  Kant’s	  reassurance,	  very	  little	  is	  “easily	  seen”	  in	  this	  example.	  	  However,	  as	  in	  the	  previous	  case	  of	  the	  hereditary	  class	  system,	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  helps	  make	  sense	  of	  Kant’s	  claims	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  people’s	  consent.	  	  If	  the	  war	  tax	  is	  applied	  uniformly,	  though	  the	  war	  may	  be	  unpopular,	  it	  does	  not	  undermine	  any	  person’s	  freedom.	  	  If,	  however,	  the	  tax	  is	  applied	  inconsistently,	  the	  persons	  who	  fund	  the	  war	  are	  bound	  to	  support	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  commonwealth	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  not	  reciprocated	  by	  those	  exempt	  from	  the	  tax.	  	  The	  taxpayers	  find	  themselves	  subject	  to	  the	  will	  of	  those	  on	  behalf	  of	  whom	  political	  action	  is	  taken,	  and	  cannot	  understand	  themselves	  as	  part	  of	  that	  class	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  similarly	  bind	  those	  exempt	  from	  paying	  the	  tax.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  payers	  of	  an	  inconsistently	  applied	  tax	  find	  their	  freedom	  subverted.	  	  Again,	  because	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  consist	  of	  their	  freedom,	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Kant,	  Immanuel,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:298,	  footnote.	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persons	  to	  consent	  to	  the	  subversion	  of	  their	  freedom;	  accordingly,	  a	  whole	  people	  could	  not	  consent	  to	  an	  inconsistently	  applied	  tax.	  	  	  	  	  Kant’s	  third	  example	  of	  a	  political	  action	  to	  which	  a	  people	  could	  not	  possibly	  consent	  is	  that	  of	  coerced	  religious	  conformity.95	  	  Jonathan	  Peterson	  carefully	  considers	  Kant’s	  formulation	  of	  the	  “binding	  religious	  creed”	  example	  as	  he	  presents	  it	  in	  the	  short	  essay	  An	  Answer	  to	  the	  Question:	  What	  is	  Enlightenment.96	  	  Peterson’s	  analysis	  of	  Kant’s	  claims	  regarding	  possible	  consent	  in	  the	  case	  of	  binding	  religious	  creed	  aligns	  with	  my	  interpretation	  of	  Kant	  on	  possible	  consent	  in	  light	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests.	  	  Peterson	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  a	  people	  to	  consent	  to	  the	  institution	  of	  a	  religious	  association	  that	  is	  permanent,	  unalterable,	  and	  not	  to	  be	  doubted	  publicly	  because	  it	  stands	  in	  contradiction	  to	  the	  end	  for	  which	  persons	  unite	  politically.	  	  Peterson,	  in	  effect,	  builds	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  into	  Kant’s	  conception	  of	  a	  people.	  	  He	  writes,	  “The	  content	  of	  the	  Kantian	  concept	  of	  a	  people	  comes,	  in	  my	  view,	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  rightful	  political	  society	  is	  oriented	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  securing	  the	  independence	  of	  all	  its	  members.”97	  	  He	  then	  explains	  the	  impossibility	  of	  a	  people	  consenting	  to	  a	  binding	  religious	  creed	  by	  showing	  that	  it	  contradicts	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  people	  so	  conceived.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  for	  a	  people	  united	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  securing	  the	  independence	  of	  all	  its	  members	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  ruler	  as	  carrying	  out	  their	  commission,	  they	  must	  will	  what	  Kant	  calls	  the	  freedom	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Interestingly,	  Kant	  talks	  about	  toleration	  in	  similar	  terms	  to	  Locke	  in,	  The	  
Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,	  (6:368).	  96	  Kant	  also	  briefly	  considers	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  binding	  religious	  association	  at	  the	  end	  of	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying	  (8:304-­‐8:305),	  and	  in	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals	  (6:327).	  97	  Peterson,	  Jonathan,	  “Enlightenment	  and	  Freedom”	  Journal	  for	  the	  History	  of	  
Philosophy,	  Vol.	  46,	  No.	  2,	  April	  2008,	  pp.	  223-­‐244.	  239	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public	  reason.98	  	  By	  this	  he	  means	  the	  freedom	  to	  reason	  in	  one’s	  own	  name,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  reason	  such	  that	  one	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  another.99	  	  The	  freedom	  of	  public	  reason	  stands	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  binding	  religious	  creed;	  therefore,	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  a	  people	  to	  consent	  to	  a	  binding	  religious	  creed.	  Here	  we	  see	  that,	  though	  the	  case	  of	  the	  binding	  religious	  creed	  requires	  the	  additional	  idea	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  public	  reason	  (on	  Peterson’s	  analysis	  at	  least),	  as	  with	  the	  case	  of	  a	  class	  of	  hereditary	  nobility,	  and	  the	  unevenly	  applied	  war	  tax,	  the	  impossibility	  of	  a	  people’s	  consent	  is	  established	  by	  establishing	  a	  contradiction	  between	  the	  proposed	  political	  action	  and	  the	  people’s	  civil	  interest	  in	  establishing	  the	  conditions	  of	  their	  freedom.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Here	  Kant,	  like	  Locke,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  Hobbes,	  draws	  an	  argument	  for	  religious	  toleration	  out	  of	  contractarian	  considerations.	  	  In	  all	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  theories	  considered	  thus	  far,	  coercively	  enforcing	  a	  religion	  on	  a	  people	  runs	  afoul	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  which	  establishes	  the	  conditions	  of	  political	  association	  and	  from	  which	  civil	  government	  receives	  its	  authority.	  	  Though	  the	  underlying	  reasoning	  of	  each	  social	  contract	  theorist	  varies,	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  social	  contract	  in	  terms	  of	  civil	  interests,	  the	  feature	  that	  the	  coercive	  enforcement	  of	  religion	  will	  be	  rendered	  illegitimate	  is	  common	  to	  them	  all.	  	  So	  Kant’s	  social	  contract	  theory,	  like	  Hobbes’	  and	  Locke’s,	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  light	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests.	  	  Further,	  applying	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  to	  Kant’s	  political	  theory	  provides	  an	  interpretation	  of	  a	  key	  feature	  of	  his	  system	  that	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  Peterson,	  “Enlightenment	  and	  Freedom,”	  243.	  99	  Peterson,	  “Enlightenment	  and	  Freedom,”	  228.	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is	  bound	  to	  strike	  readers	  as	  mysterious.	  	  Kant	  stresses	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  original	  contract	  is,	  “the	  touchstone	  of	  any	  public	  law’s	  conformity	  with	  right.”100	  	  From	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  original	  contract	  he	  argues	  that	  for	  political	  action	  to	  be	  legitimate,	  it	  must	  be	  a	  possible	  object	  of	  a	  people’s	  consent.	  	  Further,	  Kant	  provides	  examples	  of	  political	  actions	  that	  fail	  the	  test	  of	  possible	  consent.	  	  However,	  the	  underlying	  grounds	  for	  discerning	  whether	  some	  political	  action	  could	  be	  the	  object	  of	  a	  people’s	  consent	  remains	  mysterious	  in	  Kant’s	  text.	  	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  Kant’s	  notion	  of	  possible	  consent	  in	  terms	  of	  civil	  interests.	  	  Because	  persons	  in	  the	  civil	  condition	  must	  be	  understood	  to	  will	  the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  their	  civil	  interests,	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  them	  to	  will	  the	  subversion	  of	  their	  civil	  interests	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  On	  Kant’s	  political	  system	  we	  can	  understand	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  to	  consist	  in	  their	  freedom	  or	  independence	  from	  others.	  	  We	  can	  therefore	  infer	  as	  a	  general	  rule	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  all	  persons	  to	  consent	  to	  anything	  that	  undermines	  their	  freedom.	  	  	  Despite	  the	  similarities	  noted	  above,	  I	  will	  add	  a	  final	  word	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Locke	  and	  Kant	  differ	  that	  I	  touched	  on	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  this	  section.	  	  When	  Locke	  writes	  of	  persons’	  interests,	  he	  invites	  us	  to	  think	  of	  interests	  that	  persons	  actually	  have	  and	  that	  they	  want	  to	  protect.	  	  It	  is	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  protecting	  these	  interests,	  which	  they	  all	  share,	  that	  Locke	  envisions	  persons	  entering	  political	  society.	  	  Kant,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  argues	  that	  these	  kinds	  of	  interests,	  or,	  “the	  end	  that	  all	  [persons]	  naturally	  have	  (their	  aim	  of	  happiness),”	  cannot	  play	  a	  role	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Kant,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:297.	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justifying	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  civil	  condition.101	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Kant	  defines	  happiness	  broadly	  as	  “any	  empirical	  ends”.102	  	  Kant	  would	  therefore	  take	  issue	  with	  Locke’s	  attempt	  to	  justify	  political	  society	  by	  appealing	  to	  a	  set	  of	  persons’	  contingent	  interests.	  	  I,	  however,	  am	  not	  convinced	  that	  Kant’s	  argument	  reaches	  as	  far	  as	  he	  intends.	  	  Kant’s	  reason	  for	  excluding	  consideration	  of	  empirical	  ends	  from	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  civil	  condition	  is	  that,	  “since	  people	  differ	  in	  their	  thinking	  about	  happiness	  and	  how	  each	  would	  have	  it	  constituted,	  their	  wills	  with	  respect	  to	  it	  cannot	  be	  brought	  under	  any	  common	  principle	  and	  so	  under	  any	  external	  law	  harmonizing	  with	  everyone’s	  freedom.”103	  	  The	  problem	  with	  Kant’s	  claim	  here	  is	  that	  it	  excludes	  only	  the	  narrower,	  more	  common	  sense	  of	  “happiness”	  from	  the	  determining	  grounds	  of	  the	  civil	  condition.	  	  I	  do	  not	  see	  why	  no	  empirical	  ends	  can	  be	  brought	  under	  a	  common	  principle	  and	  serve	  as	  justification	  for	  establishing	  the	  civil	  condition.	  	  In	  fact,	  we	  can	  regard	  this	  possibility	  as	  one	  of	  Locke’s	  main	  claims	  in	  his	  exchange	  with	  Proast.	  	  Some	  interests	  are	  held	  in	  common	  and	  can	  be	  the	  object	  of	  common	  principles;	  among	  these	  are	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  Other	  interests	  cannot,	  for	  example,	  persons’	  salvation,	  or,	  as	  Kant	  suggests,	  their	  happiness	  narrowly	  construed.	  	  I	  therefore	  do	  not	  take	  Kant’s	  argument	  against	  appealing	  to	  empirical	  ends	  in	  the	  determining	  grounds	  of	  the	  civil	  condition	  to	  be	  devastating	  to	  Locke’s	  account	  of	  civil	  interests	  in	  justifying	  political	  society.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  Kant,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:289-­‐290.	  102	  Kant,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:290.	  103	  Kant,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:290.	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As	  I	  note	  above,	  Kant	  occasionally	  writes	  in	  terms	  of	  interests.	  	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  because	  he	  was	  trying	  to	  situate	  his	  system	  in	  the	  social	  contract	  tradition	  but	  did	  not	  yet	  have	  the	  vocabulary	  to	  express	  his	  theory’s	  new	  and	  distinctive	  features.104	  	  I,	  however,	  am	  tempted	  to	  believe	  it	  is	  because	  talking	  in	  terms	  of	  interests,	  as	  Locke	  does,	  is	  unavoidable.	  	  In	  thinking	  about	  the	  justification	  of	  actual	  political	  societies,	  we	  cannot	  help	  but	  think	  about	  the	  interests	  that	  political	  societies	  actually	  serve.	  	  	  	  
2.5	  –	  Conclusion	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  endeavoured	  to	  show	  that	  historical	  social	  contract	  theories	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  light	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests,	  and,	  further,	  that	  this	  analysis	  elucidates	  how	  the	  social	  contract	  limits	  the	  legitimate	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  	  	   This	  discussion	  introduces	  a	  host	  of	  questions	  about	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  understand	  the	  social	  contract.	  	  In	  the	  following	  chapter	  I	  justify	  my	  appeal	  to	  the	  social	  contract,	  and	  explain	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  its	  relevant	  aspects	  for	  my	  argument.	  	  Additionally,	  I	  argue	  directly	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  in	  social	  contract	  theory,	  and	  present	  a	  contemporary	  account	  of	  civil	  interests.	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  Ernest	  Weinrib	  suggested	  this	  reading	  when	  asked	  during	  a	  seminar	  on	  Kant’s	  legal	  philosophy	  in	  the	  Faculty	  of	  Law,	  University	  of	  Western	  Ontario,	  March	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3	  –	  The	  Social	  Contract	  and	  Civil	  Interests	  
3.1	  –	  Introduction	  Having	  identified	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  in	  Locke’s	  Letters,	  and	  argued	  for	  its	  significance	  in	  historical	  social	  contract	  theories,	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  address	  several	  issues	  regarding	  civil	  interests	  and	  social	  contract	  theory	  head	  on.	  	  Any	  argument	  that	  appeals	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  to	  draw	  political	  conclusions	  must	  justify	  such	  an	  appeal,	  specify	  how	  the	  social	  contract	  is	  to	  be	  understood,	  and	  explain	  its	  relevance	  to	  actual	  political	  circumstances.	  	  In	  the	  first	  half	  of	  this	  chapter	  (3.2-­‐3.3)	  I	  argue	  for	  the	  significance	  of	  social	  contract	  theory,	  and	  explain	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  its	  relevant	  aspects	  for	  my	  argument.	  	  In	  the	  latter	  half	  (3.4),	  I	  present	  my	  account	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  for	  the	  purpose	  identifying	  the	  legitimate	  object	  of	  political	  action	  –	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  	  	  
3.2	  –	  Hume’s	  Criticism	  I	  begin	  by	  considering	  David	  Hume’s	  powerful	  criticism	  of	  social	  contract	  theory	  that	  the	  social	  contract	  is	  a	  fiction	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  the	  source	  of	  compelling	  political	  conclusions.	  	  I	  confront	  Hume’s	  criticism,	  as	  all	  social	  contract	  theories	  must,	  and	  consider	  the	  responses	  that	  we	  can	  offer	  on	  behalf	  of	  Hobbes,	  Locke,	  and	  Kant.	  	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  use	  Hume’s	  criticism	  as	  a	  departure	  point	  for	  understanding	  the	  various	  ways	  of	  specifying	  the	  details	  of	  the	  social	  contract,	  and	  for	  specifying	  the	  details	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  on	  which	  I	  rely	  for	  articulating	  my	  conception	  of	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	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In	  his	  essay	  “On	  the	  Original	  Contract,”	  Hume	  argues	  that	  the	  social	  contract	  is	  a	  fiction.1	  	  He	  argues	  that	  persons	  who	  find	  themselves	  in	  political	  society,	  and	  subject	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  civil	  government,	  were	  not	  parties	  to	  a	  historical	  social	  contract.	  	  Further,	  if	  an	  actual	  social	  contract	  existed	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  past,	  we	  should	  not	  regard	  persons	  as	  bound	  by	  the	  agreements	  of	  their	  ancestors.	  	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  and	  some	  extant	  civil	  governments	  are	  legitimate,	  then	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  those	  governments,	  and	  persons’	  political	  obligations,	  cannot	  be	  grounded	  in	  their	  consent.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  criticism	  runs,	  we	  should	  not	  appeal	  to	  an	  obviously	  fictional	  social	  contract	  to	  draw	  political	  conclusions.	  	   	  	  	   Hobbes,	  Locke,	  and	  Kant	  all	  respond	  to	  these	  challenges	  in	  the	  course	  of	  articulating	  their	  versions	  of	  the	  social	  contract.	  	  Hobbes	  responds	  directly	  to	  the	  concern	  that	  persons	  never	  found	  themselves	  in	  a	  pre-­‐political	  state	  of	  nature	  like	  the	  one	  he	  describes.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  we	  can	  imagine	  what	  life	  would	  be	  like	  outside	  of	  political	  society	  and	  free	  from	  political	  authority.2	  	  If	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  that	  Hobbes	  envisions,	  and	  upon	  which	  his	  account	  of	  political	  authority	  is	  based,	  is	  hypothetical	  in	  this	  way,	  we	  may	  infer	  that	  his	  social	  contract	  is	  hypothetical	  as	  well.	  	  This	  approach	  answers	  the	  criticism	  that	  the	  social	  contract	  is	  a	  fiction	  by	  arguing	  that	  persons	  need	  not	  actually	  be	  parties	  to	  a	  social	  contract	  to	  establish	  their	  political	  obligations	  and	  the	  conditions	  of	  political	  authority’s	  legitimacy	  so	  long	  as	  we	  can	  know	  what	  things	  would	  be	  like	  in	  a	  state	  of	  nature	  and	  what	  would	  motivate	  persons	  to	  enter	  political	  society.	  	  	  From	  these	  considerations	  we	  can	  deduce	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Hume,	  David,	  Of	  the	  Original	  Contract,	  in	  Henry	  D.	  Aiken	  (ed.),	  Hume’s	  Moral	  and	  
Political	  Philosophy,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Hafner	  Press,	  1948).	  2	  Hobbes,	  Thomas,	  Leviathan,	  J.	  C.	  A.	  Gaskin	  (ed.),	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  13:11.	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need	  for	  political	  authority,	  and	  the	  form	  that	  it	  ought	  to	  take,	  without	  requiring	  that	  persons	  suffer	  through	  the	  miseries	  of	  actually	  living	  in	  a	  pre-­‐political	  state	  of	  nature.	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Locke,	  in	  the	  Second	  Treatise,	  appears	  less	  willing	  to	  accept	  the	  initial	  premise	  of	  the	  criticism	  that	  the	  social	  contract	  is	  a	  fiction.3	  	  Locke	  tells	  the	  story	  of	  persons	  moving	  from	  a	  familial	  association	  to	  a	  political	  society	  and	  reaffirms	  that	  only	  their	  own	  consent	  could	  legitimize	  their	  political	  ruler’s	  authority	  and	  bind	  them	  to	  obey	  it.4	  	  Not	  only	  does	  Locke	  claim	  that	  persons’	  routinely	  express	  their	  consent	  to	  enter	  political	  society,	  but	  he	  argues	  that	  only	  a	  person’s	  express	  consent	  can	  make	  her	  a	  full	  member	  of	  a	  political	  society.5	  	  Locke	  explains	  the	  obligations	  that	  all	  persons	  possess	  to	  obey	  the	  law,	  even	  in	  case	  they	  have	  not	  expressly	  consented	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  civil	  government,	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  tacit	  consent.	  	  For	  as	  long	  as	  they	  reside	  within	  a	  given	  territory,	  and	  benefit,	  however	  little,	  from	  the	  existence	  of	  political	  society,	  we	  may	  suppose	  that	  they	  implicitly	  consent	  to	  obey	  its	  laws.6	  	  However,	  to	  enjoy	  the	  full	  privileges	  of	  political	  society,	  for	  example	  voting	  in	  elections,	  and	  have	  the	  full	  duties	  of	  a	  citizen,	  for	  example	  to	  defend	  the	  territory	  from	  outside	  force,	  Locke	  requires	  express	  consent.	  	  This	  response	  undercuts	  Hume’s	  criticisms	  by	  challenging	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  consent	  upon	  which	  social	  contract	  theories	  rely	  is	  fictional.	  	  However,	  as	  A.	  John	  Simmons	  argues,	  requiring	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise	  of	  Government,	  C.	  B.	  Macpherson	  (ed.),	  (Indianapolis,	  IN:	  Hackett	  Publishing	  Company,	  1980,	  Chapter	  8.	  	  Hereafter	  cited	  as	  Second	  Treatise.	  4	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §106.	  5	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §117-­‐§119.	  	  Locke	  claims	  that	  persons’	  typically	  fail	  to	  notice	  others’	  expressions	  of	  consent	  to	  enter	  political	  society	  as	  full	  members.	  	  Accordingly,	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  act	  suffices	  to	  express	  one’s	  consent.	  	  	  6	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §119.	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express	  consent	  leads	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  “societies	  that	  refuse	  to	  permit	  or	  fail	  to	  facilitate	  free	  choice	  of	  political	  allegiance	  are	  simply	  illegitimate,	  however	  many	  such	  societies	  might	  actually	  exist.”7	  	  	  Kant,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  fully	  concedes	  that	  no	  historical	  social	  contract	  need	  exist,	  nor	  must	  persons	  actually	  consent	  to	  civil	  government’s	  authority	  to	  legitimize	  it.	  	  However,	  Kant	  maintains	  that	  the	  social	  contract	  plays	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  discussions	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  nonetheless.	  	  He	  refers	  to	  the	  “original	  contract”	  as	  “an	  idea	  of	  reason,”	  but	  an	  idea	  with	  “undoubted	  practical	  reality”.8	  	  So	  though	  Kant	  envisions	  the	  social	  contract	  as	  purely	  notional,	  he	  takes	  it	  to	  impose	  real	  restrictions	  on	  the	  permissible	  actions	  of	  government.	  	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  original	  contract	  limits	  the	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority	  such	  that	  its	  actions	  must	  be	  a	  possible	  object	  of	  all	  persons’	  consent.9	  	  
3.3	  –	  Rawls’	  Classification	  of	  Social	  Contract	  Theories	  John	  Rawls,	  in	  his	  Lectures	  on	  the	  History	  of	  Political	  Philosophy,	  presents	  a	  series	  of	  distinctions	  that	  help	  us	  understand	  and	  contrast	  the	  various	  ways	  social	  contract	  theorists	  respond	  to	  Hume’s	  criticism,	  and	  define	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  social	  contract.	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  use	  Rawls’	  categories	  to	  run	  through	  the	  specifications	  of	  Hobbes’,	  Locke’s,	  and	  Kant’s	  social	  contracts	  as	  a	  prelude	  to	  defining	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Simmons,	  A.	  John,	  On	  the	  Edge	  of	  Anarchy,	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  79.	  8	  Kant,	  Immanuel,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying:	  That	  may	  be	  correct	  in	  theory,	  but	  it	  is	  of	  no	  use	  in	  practice,	  in	  Mary	  J.	  Gregor	  (ed.),	  Immanuel	  Kant:	  Practical	  Philosophy,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  8:297.	  	  Hereafter	  cited	  as	  On	  the	  
Common	  Saying.	  9	  See	  2.4,	  71-­‐73	  above.	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contract	  on	  which	  I	  rely	  to	  define	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  Exploring	  historical	  social	  contracts	  in	  light	  of	  Rawls’	  categories	  helps	  us	  think	  clearly	  about	  what	  the	  social	  contract	  is,	  and	  how	  it	  functions	  to	  generate	  political	  conclusions.	  	  	  	  Rawls	  presents	  four	  sets	  of	  distinctions	  according	  to	  which	  any	  specification	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  is	  classifiable.	  	  First,	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  social	  contract	  as	  either	  actual,	  or	  non-­‐historical.	  	  Second,	  the	  content	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  can	  be	  determined	  either	  by	  an	  actual	  expression	  of	  consent,	  by	  analysis	  of	  the	  situation	  facing	  the	  parties,	  or	  by	  some	  combination	  of	  the	  two.	  	  Third,	  of	  social	  contracts	  determined	  by	  analysis,	  that	  analysis	  can	  appeal	  either	  to	  hypothetical	  consent	  (what	  persons	  would/would	  not	  consent	  to),	  or	  possible	  consent	  (what	  they	  
could/could	  not	  consent	  to).	  	  Fourth,	  and	  finally,	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  social	  contract	  as	  establishing	  either	  persons’	  political	  obligations	  (their	  duties	  to	  obey	  the	  law),	  or	  the	  conditions	  of	  civil	  government’s	  legitimacy	  (the	  conditions	  of	  a	  government’s	  rightful	  authority),	  or	  both.10	  So,	  we	  can,	  for	  example,	  understand	  Hobbes’	  social	  contract	  as	  1)	  non-­‐historical,11	  2)	  in	  which	  the	  content	  is	  determined	  by	  analysis,	  (informed	  by	  his	  understanding	  of	  persons’	  natural	  freedom	  and	  equality,	  the	  right	  of	  nature,	  and	  the	  miserable	  state	  of	  things	  that	  would	  follow),	  3)	  determined	  specifically	  by	  what	  persons	  would	  consent	  to	  (namely,	  any	  sovereign	  authority	  that	  establishes	  peace	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Rawls,	  John,	  Lectures	  on	  the	  History	  of	  Political	  Philosophy,	  Samuel	  Freeman	  (ed.),	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  14-­‐15.	  	  11	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  13:11.	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and	  the	  security	  of	  persons’	  lives),12	  and	  4)	  as	  establishing	  both	  persons’	  political	  obligations,	  and	  the	  sovereign’s	  legitimacy.13	  We	  can	  understand	  Locke’s	  social	  contract,	  as	  envisioned	  in	  the	  Second	  
Treatise,	  as	  1)	  actual,	  2)	  in	  which	  the	  content	  is	  determined	  largely	  by	  analysis	  (though,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  requirement	  of	  actual	  consent,	  whether	  express	  or	  tacit,	  also	  determined	  to	  some	  extent	  by	  the	  act	  of	  consenting).	  	  3)	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  content	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  is	  determined	  by	  analysis,	  Locke	  writes	  both	  of	  what	  persons	  could/could	  not	  consent	  to	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  absolute	  arbitrary	  power),14	  and	  what	  they	  would/would	  not	  consent	  to	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  extemporary	  decrees).15	  	  And,	  4)	  Locke	  takes	  the	  social	  contract	  to	  establish	  both	  persons’	  political	  obligations,	  and	  civil	  government’s	  legitimacy.16	  	  	  Here	  we	  see	  a	  tension	  between	  actual	  consent	  and	  the	  task	  of	  determining	  the	  content	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  by	  analysis.	  	  If	  to	  establish	  political	  authority’s	  legitimacy,	  or	  persons’	  political	  obligations,	  we	  require	  their	  express	  consent,	  then	  the	  obligations	  and	  conditions	  of	  legitimacy	  that	  flow	  from	  that	  consent,	  must	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  content	  of	  their	  actual	  expression	  of	  consent.	  	  However,	  there	  remains	  a	  place	  for	  determining	  the	  content	  of	  persons’	  consent	  by	  analysis.	  	  Actual	  expressions	  of	  consent	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  idea	  of	  possible	  consent.	  	  The	  notion	  of	  possibility	  that	  pertains	  to	  persons’	  consent	  is	  different	  than	  the	  most	  common	  notion	  of	  possibility	  in	  regular	  discourse.	  	  When	  we	  say	  that	  one	  cannot	  consent	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  13:11,	  18:13.	  	  Also,	  see	  3.2,	  81-­‐82	  above.	  	  13	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  18:3,	  18:6,	  18:7,	  29:23.	  14	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §135.	  15	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §137.	  	  16	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §119.	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something,	  we	  do	  not	  mean	  “cannot”	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  when	  we	  say	  a	  human	  cannot	  fly	  unaided.	  	  When	  considering	  persons’	  consent,	  we	  are	  not	  concerned	  with	  some	  physical	  possibility	  that	  would	  prevent	  them	  from	  uttering	  the	  words	  that	  would	  normally	  signal	  their	  consent.	  	  Rather,	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  what	  persons	  
can	  or	  cannot	  consent	  to	  in	  light	  of	  some	  abstract	  feature	  of	  themselves,	  or	  the	  object	  of	  their	  consent,	  that	  would	  limit	  the	  normative	  force	  of	  the	  words	  that	  would	  otherwise	  signal	  their	  consent.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  Locke’s	  case,	  persons,	  understood	  as	  God’s	  property,	  cannot	  consent	  to	  absolute	  and	  arbitrary	  rule	  over	  their	  lives	  because	  they	  do	  not	  possess	  the	  normative	  power	  to	  alienate	  their	  lives	  in	  this	  way.17	  	  And	  for	  Kant,	  as	  I	  argue	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  persons	  engaged	  in	  political	  cooperation	  to	  secure	  the	  conditions	  of	  their	  freedom	  cannot	  consent	  to	  subversions	  of	  that	  freedom.18	  	  Here	  we	  see	  a	  place	  for	  analysis	  in	  determining	  the	  content	  of	  consent,	  even	  where	  actual	  consent	  is	  required.	  	  Analysis	  can	  determine	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  attempts	  at	  actual	  consent	  are	  defective.	  	  That	  is,	  analysis	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  and	  their	  circumstances	  can	  reveal	  instances	  in	  which	  actual	  expressions	  of	  consent	  fail	  to	  be	  the	  legitimizing	  force	  we	  normally	  expect.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Finally,	  we	  can	  understand	  Kant’s	  social	  contract	  as	  1)	  non-­‐historical,	  2)	  determined	  entirely	  by	  analysis,	  3)	  determined	  specifically	  by	  what	  a	  people	  
could/could	  not	  consent	  to,	  and	  4)	  to	  establish	  conditions	  of	  political	  authority’s	  legitimacy.19	  	  Regarding	  the	  fourth	  category,	  it	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  Kant’s	  social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §135.	  	  Also,	  see	  2.2,	  42	  above.	  18	  See	  2.4,	  71-­‐72	  above.	  19	  Kant,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:297.	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contract	  has	  a	  narrower	  focus	  than	  Hobbes’	  or	  Locke’s.	  	  Every	  time	  Kant	  speaks	  of	  the	  “original	  contract,”	  he	  directs	  its	  implications	  to	  civil	  government	  alone.	  	  He	  writes	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  social	  contract,	  “involves	  an	  obligation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  constituting	  authority…”20	  that	  its	  purpose	  is	  to	  “bind	  every	  legislator…”21	  and	  that	  it	  is	  the	  idea	  “in	  terms	  of	  which	  alone	  we	  can	  think	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  state.”22	  	  Kant’s	  more	  limited	  construal	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  follows	  as	  least	  partially	  from	  his	  specification	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  in	  the	  other	  three	  categories.	  	  A	  non-­‐historical	  social	  contract	  focused	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  persons’	  consent,	  while	  suitable	  for	  defining	  the	  limits	  of	  political	  authority’s	  rightful	  exercise,	  seems	  insufficient	  for	  establishing	  strong	  obligations	  on	  the	  part	  of	  persons	  subject	  to	  political	  authority.	  	  That	  independent	  persons	  could	  not	  consent	  to	  something	  is	  a	  strong	  reason	  against	  imposing	  it	  on	  them.	  	  However,	  that	  they	  merely	  could	  consent	  to	  something	  provides	  weak	  support	  for	  obliging	  them	  to	  do	  it.	  	  For	  Kant,	  that	  all	  persons’	  could	  consent	  to	  some	  action	  provides	  a	  test	  for	  legitimacy	  by	  showing	  that	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  their	  freedom.	  	  Now,	  what	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  to	  which	  Locke	  appeals	  in	  the	  Letters?	  	  And	  how	  should	  we	  understand	  the	  Lockean	  social	  contract,	  centred	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests,	  from	  which	  I	  wish	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  regarding	  the	  legitimate	  jurisdiction	  of	  civil	  government	  in	  contemporary	  political	  societies?	  	  	  	   Locke,	  not	  surprisingly,	  says	  much	  less	  about	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Kant,	  Kant,	  Immanuel,	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,	  in	  Mary	  J.	  Gregor	  (ed.),	  
Immanuel	  Kant:	  Practical	  Philosophy,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  6:340.	  21	  Kant,	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying,	  8:297.	  22	  Kant,	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,	  6:315.	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contract	  relied	  upon	  by	  his	  mandate	  argument	  in	  the	  Letters	  than	  he	  does	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  of	  the	  Second	  Treatise.	  	  However,	  we	  can	  infer	  specifics	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  he	  envisions	  from	  his	  various	  statements	  of	  the	  mandate	  argument	  in	  the	  
Letters.	  	  In	  the	  first	  Letter	  Locke	  writes	  that	  the	  “care	  of	  souls”	  cannot	  be	  conferred	  on	  the	  magistrate.23	  	  In	  the	  second	  and	  third	  Letters	  Locke	  writes	  of	  what	  we	  “can	  in	  reason	  suppose”	  persons	  to	  consent	  to.24	  	  And,	  also	  in	  the	  third	  Letter,	  he	  writes	  both	  that	  punishing	  minority	  religious	  opinions	  “could	  not	  be	  intended	  by	  those	  who	  constituted	  or	  entered	  into	  the	  commonwealth,”	  and	  that	  persons	  moving	  from	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  to	  political	  society	  would	  avoid	  certain	  injuries.25	  	  	  Here	  we	  see	  that	  in	  the	  Letters,	  as	  in	  the	  Second	  Treatise,	  Locke	  variously	  specifies	  persons’	  consent	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  they	  hypothetically	  would	  or	  would	  not	  consent	  to,	  and	  of	  what	  they	  possibly	  could	  or	  could	  not	  consent	  to.	  	  The	  main	  difference	  between	  the	  conception	  of	  consent	  argued	  for	  in	  the	  Second	  Treatise,	  and	  that	  inferred	  from	  Locke’s	  remarks	  in	  the	  Letters	  is	  that,	  in	  the	  Letters,	  he	  does	  not	  make	  a	  case	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  actual	  express	  consent.	  	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  social	  contract	  of	  the	  Letters	  as	  non-­‐historical,	  the	  content	  of	  which	  is	  determined	  entirely	  by	  analysis.	  	  That	  analysis	  consists	  of	  examining	  the	  relevant	  features	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  and	  their	  pre-­‐political	  circumstance	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Locke,	  John,	  A	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration,	  in	  David	  Wootton	  (ed.),	  John	  Locke:	  
Political	  Writings,	  (Indianapolis,	  IN:	  Hackett,	  2003),	  394.	  	  Hereafter	  cited	  as	  Letter.	  24	  Locke,	  Locke,	  John,	  A	  Second	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration,	  in	  Richard	  Vernon	  (ed.),	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  104-­‐105.	  	  Hereafter	  cited	  as	  Second	  Letter.	  	  Emphasis	  added.	  25	  Locke,	  A	  Third	  Letter	  for	  Toleration,	  in	  Richard	  Vernon	  (ed.),	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  141.	  	  Hereafter	  cited	  as	  Third	  
Letter.	  	  Emphasis	  added.	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determine	  what	  they	  would,	  and	  could	  consent	  to	  upon	  entering	  political	  society	  and	  subjecting	  themselves	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  civil	  government.26	  	  	  The	  most	  salient	  feature	  of	  persons’	  pre-­‐political	  circumstance,	  implicit	  in	  the	  premise	  of	  social	  contract	  theory,	  we	  may	  call	  persons’	  independence.	  	  By	  independence	  I	  mean	  that	  no	  person	  is	  naturally	  subject	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  another.27	  	  No	  authority	  is	  self-­‐evident,	  and	  all	  authority	  requires	  justification.	  	  I	  take	  this	  to	  be	  the	  conceptual	  starting	  point	  of	  liberal	  political	  theory.	  	  Locke	  and	  Kant	  each	  provide	  a	  clear	  statement	  of	  this	  idea.	  	  Locke	  writes	  that	  persons	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  are	  in,	  “a	  state	  of	  perfect	  freedom	  to	  order	  their	  actions…	  without	  asking	  leave,	  or	  depending	  upon	  the	  will	  of	  any	  other	  man.”28	  	  Kant	  writes	  that,	  “Freedom	  (independence	  from	  being	  constrained	  by	  another’s	  choice),	  insofar	  as	  it	  an	  coexist	  with	  the	  freedom	  of	  every	  other	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  universal	  law,	  is	  the	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  I	  specify	  what	  I	  take	  these	  features	  to	  be	  below.	  	  I	  employ	  the	  notions	  of	  both	  hypothetical,	  and	  possible	  consent.	  27	  Independence	  can	  alternatively	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  natural	  freedom.	  	  Specifically	  the	  freedom	  from	  any	  unjustified	  authority.	  	  As	  I	  proceed,	  I	  will	  employ	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  the	  less	  loaded	  term:	  independence.	  	  Also,	  the	  core	  case	  here	  is	  adults	  with	  full	  capacities.	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  parents,	  children,	  and	  the	  state	  is	  a	  complicated	  one	  that	  I	  cannot	  adequately	  deal	  with	  here.	  	  As	  a	  brief	  aside,	  I	  will	  say	  that	  I	  agree	  in	  large	  part	  with	  Locke’s	  account	  of	  parents’	  responsibility	  for	  children	  in	  the	  Second	  Treatise,	  Chapter	  VI.	  	  Locke	  writes	  that,	  “every	  man’s	  children	  [are]	  by	  nature	  as	  free	  as	  himself”	  (§73).	  	  Parents’	  de	  facto	  authority	  over	  children	  must	  be	  directed	  toward	  the	  children’s	  safety,	  health,	  and	  development,	  and	  should	  last	  only	  until	  children	  are	  able	  to	  care	  for	  themselves.	  	  This	  authority	  includes	  responsibility	  for	  helping	  children	  develop	  life	  plans	  and	  values.	  	  I	  do	  not	  suppose	  this	  responsibility	  emanates	  from	  a	  right	  belonging	  to	  parents	  to	  pass	  on	  their	  values,	  but	  from	  nobody	  other	  than	  parents	  being	  better	  suited	  or	  positioned	  to	  aid	  children	  in	  this	  aspect	  of	  their	  development.	  	  Educators	  will	  also	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  this.	  	  So	  we	  should	  not	  understand	  parent’s	  responsibility	  for	  their	  children	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  natural	  authority	  that	  conflicts	  with	  persons’	  independence.	  	  Where	  biological	  parents	  do	  not	  exercise	  their	  responsibility	  in	  the	  service	  of	  children’s	  safety,	  health,	  and	  development,	  they	  ought	  to	  lose	  their	  opportunity	  to	  care	  for	  children	  to	  these	  ends.	  28	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §4.	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original	  right	  belonging	  to	  every	  man	  by	  virtue	  of	  his	  humanity.”29	  	  The	  appeal	  of	  social	  contract	  theory	  is	  that	  it	  explains	  how	  political	  authority	  is	  consistent	  with	  persons’	  independence.	  	  The	  only	  justifiable	  way	  for	  one	  person	  to	  become	  subject	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  another,	  is	  by	  her	  own	  consent.	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  only	  way	  for	  persons	  to	  justifiably	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  civil	  government	  is	  by	  their	  own	  consent.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  persons’	  consent	  legitimizes	  political	  authority.	  Social	  contract	  theory	  can	  begin	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  persons’	  independence	  and	  legitimate	  political	  authority	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  actual	  consent.	  	  Independently	  of	  whether	  persons	  actually	  consent	  to	  some	  existing	  political	  authority,	  we	  can	  ask	  what	  political	  authority	  must	  be	  like	  to	  be	  worthy	  of,	  or	  capable	  of	  receiving	  persons’	  consent	  in	  light	  of	  their	  independence,	  and	  various	  other	  aspects	  of	  their	  pre-­‐political	  circumstance.	  	  So	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  actual	  consent	  we	  can	  still	  appeal	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  to	  generate	  significant	  conclusions	  about	  the	  permissible	  extent	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  If,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  
legitimate,	  political	  authority	  must	  conform	  to	  the	  conditions	  that	  emerge	  from	  analyzing	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  and	  the	  object	  of	  their	  agreement,	  certain	  forms	  of	  political	  authority	  will	  be	  ruled	  out,	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  civil	  government	  will	  be	  limited	  in	  particular	  ways.	  	  	  In	  specifying	  the	  details	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  on	  which	  I	  rely	  as	  I	  proceed,	  I	  draw	  on	  the	  historical	  social	  contract	  theories	  I	  have	  discussed.	  	  I	  draw	  most	  heavily	  on	  Locke’s	  social	  contract	  argument	  in	  his	  Letters	  in	  that	  I	  too	  employ	  the	  social	  contract	  to	  identify	  the	  civil	  interests	  that	  persons	  enter	  political	  society	  to	  protect	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Kant,	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,	  6:237.	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and	  promote,	  and	  that	  therefore	  form	  the	  proper	  object	  of	  political	  authority’s	  concern.	  	  I	  additionally	  draw	  on	  Kant’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  as	  an	  idea	  with	  practical	  implications	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  political	  authority’s	  legitimate	  exercise.	  	  So,	  with	  this	  in	  mind,	  the	  social	  contract	  on	  which	  I	  rely	  as	  I	  proceed	  is	  on	  Rawls’	  categories,	  1)	  non-­‐historical,	  2)	  determined	  by	  analysis,	  3)	  specifically	  determined	  by	  what	  individuals	  would	  propose,	  and	  all	  persons	  could	  agree	  to,	  in	  light	  of	  their	  independence	  and	  pre-­‐political	  circumstances,	  and	  4)	  to	  establish	  some	  necessary	  conditions	  of	  political	  authority’s	  legitimacy.	  	  I	  further	  explain	  these	  details	  and	  present	  my	  social	  contract	  argument	  for	  defining	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  	  
3.4	  –	  Civil	  Interests	  and	  the	  Social	  Contract	  Taking	  the	  fourth	  point	  first,	  Locke’s	  argument	  in	  the	  Letters,	  and	  my	  argument	  here,	  aim	  to	  show	  that	  the	  social	  contract	  can	  determine	  what	  things	  political	  authority	  may	  legitimately	  concern	  itself	  with,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  which	  of	  persons’	  interests	  fall	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  Whatever	  else	  the	  social	  contract	  can	  be	  used	  to	  show,	  I,	  following	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument	  in	  the	  Letters,	  invoke	  it	  to	  determine	  the	  legitimate	  objects	  of	  political	  action	  –	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  This	  represents	  one	  dimension	  of	  political	  legitimacy.	  	  To	  be	  legitimate,	  I	  presume	  that	  civil	  government	  must	  additionally,	  say,	  adopt	  democratic	  institutions,	  and	  fulfil	  several	  other	  requirements.	  	  These	  considerations,	  however,	  fall	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  my	  argument	  here.	  	  Therefore,	  conforming	  to	  the	  conditions	  identified	  by	  my	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contractarian	  argument	  is	  necessary,	  though	  not	  sufficient,	  for	  establishing	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  political	  authority.	  I	  envision	  the	  social	  contract	  as	  non-­‐historical,	  the	  content	  of	  which	  can	  be	  determined	  by	  analysis.	  	  Though	  express	  historical	  consent	  may	  be	  necessary	  for,	  say,	  fully	  establishing	  persons’	  political	  obligations,	  and	  morally	  obligating	  persons	  to	  obey	  all	  laws	  emanating	  from	  a	  political	  authority,	  or	  participate	  in	  the	  political	  process,	  I	  leave	  aside	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  any	  historical	  social	  contract	  sufficient	  for	  this	  purpose	  actually	  exists.	  	  However,	  by	  analyzing	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  and	  the	  parties,	  we	  can	  determine	  some	  limits	  on	  the	  legitimate	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority	  that	  would	  make	  it	  worthy	  of	  persons’	  consent,	  or	  capable	  of	  being	  the	  object	  of	  persons’	  agreement.	  	  	  	  	  I	  propose	  to	  understand	  persons’	  pre-­‐political	  circumstances	  as	  a	  variation	  of	  the	  “circumstances	  of	  politics”	  as	  described	  by	  Jeremy	  Waldron	  in	  Law	  and	  
Disagreement.	  	  Waldron,	  drawing	  on	  Rawls	  who	  draws	  on	  Hume,	  explains	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics	  as	  the	  circumstances	  that	  render	  political	  action	  both	  necessary	  and	  possible.30	  	  Broadening	  the	  notion	  to	  consider,	  not	  some	  particular	  political	  act,	  but,	  rather,	  political	  action	  in	  general,	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics	  as	  a	  non-­‐historical,	  pre-­‐political	  situation	  in	  response	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Waldron’s	  discussion	  focuses	  specifically	  on	  the	  political	  act	  of	  protecting	  individual	  and	  minority	  rights.	  	  He	  enumerates	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics	  as	  “the	  felt	  need	  among	  the	  members	  of	  a	  certain	  group	  for	  a	  common	  framework	  or	  decision	  or	  course	  of	  action	  on	  some	  matter,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  disagreement	  about	  what	  that	  framework,	  decision	  or	  action	  should	  be...”	  Waldron,	  Jeremy,	  Law	  and	  
Disagreement,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  102	  (Rawls,	  John,	  A	  
Theory	  of	  Justice:	  revised	  edition,	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  109-­‐112,	  draws	  on	  Hume,	  David,	  A	  Treatise	  of	  Human	  Nature,	  in	  Henry	  D.	  Aiken	  (ed.),	  Hume’s	  Moral	  and	  Political	  Philosophy,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Hafner	  Press,	  1948),	  bk.	  III,	  pt.	  II,	  sec.	  ii,	  to	  identify	  the	  “circumstances	  of	  justice”).	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which	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  establish	  the	  conditions	  of	  political	  society	  and	  political	  authority.	  	  Political	  action,	  and	  subsequently	  political	  society	  and	  authority,	  is	  necessary	  where	  persons	  face	  problems	  that	  they	  cannot	  remedy	  outside	  of	  political	  society.	  	  And	  political	  action	  is	  possible	  when	  it	  respects	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  persons	  subject	  to	  it	  by	  being	  a	  possible	  object	  of	  agreement	  among	  them.	  	  That	  is,	  political	  society	  and	  political	  authority	  would	  not	  be	  necessary	  if	  persons	  would	  not	  face	  problems	  outside	  of	  political	  society,	  or	  would	  be	  able	  to	  remedy	  the	  problems	  they	  faced	  without	  the	  help	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  And	  political	  society	  would	  not	  be	  possible,	  in	  light	  of	  persons’	  independence,	  if	  persons	  could	  not	  all	  agree	  on	  a	  common	  framework	  to	  remedy	  those	  problems.	  	  By	  regarding	  an	  exposition	  of	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics,	  we	  get	  an	  account	  of	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  that	  arises	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  unique	  problems	  that	  political	  society	  and	  political	  authority	  aim	  to	  remedy.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics,	  we	  can	  determine	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  through	  a	  two-­‐stage	  process.	  	  The	  first	  stage	  responds	  to	  the	  necessity	  of	  political	  cooperation	  in	  light	  of	  the	  problems	  persons	  would	  face	  outside	  of	  political	  society.	  	  The	  second	  stage	  accounts	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  political	  cooperation	  in	  light	  of	  persons’	  independence.	  	  In	  the	  first	  stage,	  we	  identify	  the	  interests	  that	  persons	  in	  a	  pre-­‐political	  circumstance	  would	  propose	  to	  include	  in	  political	  authority’s	  jurisdiction.	  	  In	  the	  second	  stage	  we	  identify,	  of	  the	  interests	  that	  persons	  would	  propose	  to	  include,	  the	  interests	  that	  all	  persons	  could	  agree	  to	  include	  in	  political	  authority’s	  jurisdiction.	  	  So	  (in	  the	  second	  stage),	  the	  possibility	  of	  all	  persons’	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agreement	  functions	  to	  narrow	  down	  the	  array	  of	  interests	  that	  persons	  (in	  the	  first	  stage)	  would	  have	  reason	  to	  seek	  to	  advance	  through	  political	  cooperation.	  	  	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  section	  I	  run	  through	  the	  two-­‐stage	  process	  to	  identify	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  persons	  would	  propose	  to	  include	  in	  political	  authority’s	  jurisdiction	  the	  interests	  that	  are	  insecure	  outside	  of	  political	  society,	  and	  that	  they	  could	  not	  secure	  without	  the	  coercive	  force	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  The	  first	  stage	  reveals	  that	  persons	  would	  propose	  to	  include	  in	  political	  authority’s	  jurisdiction	  responsibility	  for	  their	  lives,	  liberty,	  and,	  potentially,	  substantive	  aspects	  of	  their	  life	  plans	  and	  values.	  	  And,	  of	  those,	  all	  persons	  could	  
agree	  upon	  including	  anything	  that	  does	  not	  obligate	  some	  persons	  to	  subordinate	  their	  aims	  and	  interests	  to	  those	  of	  others	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  political	  cooperation.	  	  The	  second	  stage	  identifies	  persons’	  lives	  and	  liberty	  as	  their	  civil	  interests.	  	  
First	  Stage:	  	  To	  arrive	  at	  a	  set	  of	  interests	  that	  persons	  would	  propose	  to	  include	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction,	  we	  must	  consider	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  and	  their	  pre-­‐political	  circumstances.	  	  I	  conceive	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  1)	  as	  independent,	  and	  2)	  as	  possessing	  a	  desired	  life	  plan,	  or	  set	  of	  life	  values	  according	  to	  which	  they	  wish	  to	  live.	  	  First,	  persons’	  independence	  consists	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  natural	  authority	  over	  them.	  	  Persons	  have	  no	  obligations	  to	  live	  according	  to	  the	  dictates	  of	  another	  prior	  to	  agreeing	  to,	  say,	  by	  entering	  political	  society	  and	  subjecting	  themselves	  to	  political	  authority.	  	  Second,	  I	  suppose	  that	  persons	  have	  a	  life	  plan	  or	  set	  of	  values	  according	  to	  which	  they	  desire	  to	  live.	  	  Persons	  may	  formulate	  their	  life	  plan	  and	  values	  from	  religious	  or	  moral	  teachings,	  from	  a	  comprehensive	  conception	  of	  the	  good,	  from	  examples	  they	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observe,	  or	  from	  anywhere	  else.	  	  	  I	  do	  not	  suppose	  persons’	  life	  plans	  and	  values	  to	  necessarily	  be	  comprehensive,	  or	  fully	  developed	  or	  realizable	  outside	  of	  society,	  or	  in	  isolation.	  	  I	  merely	  suppose	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  to	  have	  some	  desired	  life	  plan,	  or,	  at	  least,	  anticipate	  that	  persons	  in	  political	  society	  will	  desire	  to	  live	  a	  life	  of	  their	  choosing.	  	  I	  contend	  that	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  would	  propose	  to	  include	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  interests	  that	  1)	  require	  security,	  but	  2)	  would	  be	  insecure	  outside	  of	  political	  society,	  and	  3)	  which	  the	  coercive	  force	  of	  political	  authority	  can	  best	  or	  most	  effectively	  secure.31	  	  This	  characterization	  of	  the	  parties’	  motivations	  rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  persons	  would	  only	  abridge	  their	  independence	  from	  authority	  to	  better	  their	  circumstances,	  and,	  accordingly,	  that	  they	  would	  not	  subject	  themselves	  to	  political	  authority,	  and	  open	  themselves	  to	  its	  coercive	  power,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  remedying	  any	  problem	  that	  could	  be	  remedied	  without	  making	  them	  vulnerable	  in	  this,	  or	  some	  similar	  way.	  	  On	  this	  analysis,	  persons	  would	  propose	  including	  their	  lives	  and	  liberty,	  among	  their	  civil	  interests.	  	  Additionally,	  some	  persons	  would	  be	  motivated	  to	  include	  the	  substance	  of	  a	  life	  plan	  or	  life	  values.	  	  I	  explain	  the	  inclusion	  of	  each	  of	  these	  things	  in	  turn.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  One	  could	  make	  the	  anarchic	  argument	  that	  persons	  would	  not	  face	  significant	  threats	  to	  their	  vital	  interests	  outside	  of	  political	  society,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  threats	  that	  they	  could	  not	  remedy	  without	  the	  help	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  My	  argument	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  pre-­‐empt	  such	  an	  argument,	  or,	  accordingly,	  to	  legitimize	  any	  extant	  political	  authorities,	  or	  political	  authority	  in	  general.	  	  Rather,	  as	  I	  note	  above,	  I	  aim	  to	  articulate	  necessary	  conditions	  of	  political	  authority’s	  legitimate	  exercise	  such	  that	  if	  we	  are	  to	  regard	  it	  as	  legitimate,	  we	  must	  understand	  it	  as	  the	  best	  response	  to	  particular	  problems	  that	  persons	  would	  face	  in	  its	  absence.	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Persons’	  lives,	  and	  their	  continued	  interest	  in	  staying	  alive,	  are	  supremely	  important	  to	  them,	  and	  require	  protection.	  	  And,	  as	  Hobbes	  and	  Locke	  explain,	  persons’	  lives	  would	  be	  insecure	  outside	  of	  political	  society.32	  	  By	  insecure,	  neither	  Hobbes	  nor	  Locke	  necessarily	  means	  that	  persons	  would	  constantly	  face	  imminent,	  life	  threatening	  dangers	  outside	  of	  political	  society.	  	  Rather,	  persons’	  lives	  would	  be	  insecure	  in	  that	  they	  would	  lack	  assurance	  that	  others	  would	  not	  take	  their	  life	  if	  others	  thought	  it	  necessary	  or	  advantageous	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  their	  ends.	  	  Further,	  the	  coercive	  power	  of	  civil	  government	  can	  secure	  persons’	  lives	  from	  the	  vulnerability	  they	  would	  face	  outside	  of	  political	  society.	  	  It	  does	  this	  by	  providing	  a	  sufficient	  disincentive	  to	  taking	  others’	  lives,	  through	  law	  enforcement	  and	  punishment,	  to	  provide	  persons	  with	  reasonable	  assurance	  that	  others	  will	  not	  try	  to	  kill	  them.	  	  Finally,	  outside	  of	  political	  society,	  persons	  lack	  the	  means	  to	  secure	  their	  lives.	  	  Short	  of	  establishing	  political	  society,	  persons	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  a	  broad	  plan	  for	  security,	  nor	  would	  they	  possess	  the	  force	  necessary	  to	  secure	  their	  lives.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  persons’	  liberty.	  	  By	  liberty	  I	  mean	  persons’	  freedom	  to	  live	  according	  to	  their	  desired	  life	  plans,	  and	  free	  from	  unjustified	  interference	  by	  others.	  	  I	  suppose	  that	  all	  persons’	  have	  a	  strong	  interest	  in	  freely	  pursuing	  a	  life	  plan	  of	  their	  choosing,	  and	  not	  living	  according	  to	  a	  life	  plan	  imposed	  on	  them	  by	  others.33	  	  Further,	  this	  interest	  would	  be	  insecure	  outside	  of	  political	  society.	  	  As	  with	  their	  lives,	  persons	  would	  have	  no	  assurance	  that	  others	  would	  refrain	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan,	  13:8.	  	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §123.	  33	  Of	  course,	  “pursuing	  a	  life	  plan	  of	  one’s	  choosing”	  does	  not	  require	  that	  persons	  pursue	  their	  life	  plans	  in	  isolation.	  	  Rather,	  the	  liberty	  to	  live	  as	  one	  wills	  creates	  the	  space	  to	  cooperate	  with	  others	  freely.	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interfering	  with	  their	  liberty	  whenever	  it	  proved	  advantageous.	  	  Persons’	  concern	  for	  the	  persistent	  vulnerability	  of	  their	  lives	  and	  liberty	  would	  further	  subvert	  their	  liberty	  as	  they	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  devote	  an	  inordinate	  amount	  of	  their	  time	  and	  resources	  to	  attempting	  to	  secure	  these	  vital	  interests.	  	  Finally,	  the	  coercive	  force	  of	  civil	  government	  can	  secure	  persons’	  liberty.	  	  By	  establishing	  and	  enforcing	  acceptable	  standards	  of	  conduct,	  civil	  government	  can	  secure	  persons’	  liberty	  to	  live	  as	  they	  choose	  to	  the	  greatest	  extent	  possible.	  	  	   We	  can	  consider	  the	  claim	  that	  persons	  would	  propose	  to	  include	  their	  lives	  and	  liberty	  as	  civil	  interests	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  in	  the	  language	  of	  Locke’s	  Second	  Treatise.	  	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  suggested	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  insecurity	  of	  certain	  of	  persons’	  interests,	  and	  civil	  government’s	  capacity	  to	  secure	  them,	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  Locke	  calls	  the	  “inconveniences”	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature.34	  	  Again,	  Locke	  argues	  that	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  that	  motivate	  persons	  to	  enter	  political	  society,	  consist	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  settled,	  known	  law,	  an	  impartial	  judge	  to	  settle	  disputes	  under	  the	  law,	  and	  the	  power	  to	  execute	  the	  law.	  	  I	  suggested	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  classification	  of	  certain	  interests	  as	  civil	  interests	  by	  considering	  which	  interests	  would	  suffer	  because	  of	  these	  shortcomings,	  and	  could	  subsequently	  be	  secured	  by	  civil	  government	  by	  remedying	  the	  shortcomings.35	  	  Persons’	  lives	  and	  liberty	  are	  two	  such	  interests.	  	  They	  suffer	  from	  the	  lack	  a	  settled	  law	  by	  which	  they	  can	  be	  secured.	  	  Even	  if	  persons	  in	  a	  state	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise,	  §127.	  	  Also,	  see	  2.2,	  50	  above.	  	  Locke	  also	  refers	  to	  these	  “inconveniences”	  as	  “things	  wanting”	  (§124)	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature.	  	  He	  writes	  that,	  though	  persons	  have	  rights	  in	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  those	  rights	  is	  “very	  unsafe,	  very	  unsecure”	  (§123).	  35	  See	  2.2,	  50	  above.	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of	  nature	  take	  themselves	  to	  possess	  obligations	  to	  refrain	  from	  interfering	  with	  others’	  lives	  and	  liberty,	  as	  Locke	  supposes	  they	  do	  in	  the	  Second	  Treatise,	  and	  execute	  their	  life	  plans	  in	  good	  faith,	  without	  clearly	  articulated	  standards	  of	  conduct,	  they	  should	  expect	  their	  actions	  to	  negatively	  affect	  each	  other,	  and	  leave	  their	  lives	  and	  liberty	  vulnerable.	  	  It	  seems	  inevitable	  that	  persons	  would	  make	  conflicting	  claims	  on	  common	  space,	  on	  common	  things,	  and	  on	  each	  other.	  	  Additionally,	  persons’	  lives	  and	  liberty	  would	  suffer	  from	  the	  insecurity	  of	  not	  having	  a	  method	  by	  which	  to	  settle	  disputes	  with	  respect	  to	  laws	  governing	  acceptable	  conduct.	  	  And,	  finally,	  persons’	  lives	  and	  liberty	  would	  be	  insecure	  without	  an	  executive	  power	  to	  enforce	  the	  law.	  	  The	  power	  to	  enforce	  the	  laws	  provides	  a	  disincentive	  for	  breaking	  the	  law,	  and,	  accordingly,	  provides	  the	  requisite	  assurance	  that	  others	  will	  abide	  by	  the	  law.	  	  By	  recognizing	  these	  shortcomings,	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  political	  cooperation	  and	  civil	  government	  to	  remedy	  them,	  persons	  would	  be	  motivated	  to	  propose	  their	  lives	  and	  liberty	  for	  inclusion	  among	  their	  civil	  interests.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  lives	  and	  liberty,	  some	  persons	  may	  propose	  to	  include	  substantive	  aspects	  of	  their	  life	  plans	  or	  values	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction.	  	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  that	  some	  persons	  would	  be	  motivated	  to	  include	  their	  interest	  in	  living	  a	  particular	  way	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  sanctioning	  civil	  government	  to	  coerce	  persons	  to	  live	  in	  that	  way.	  	  They	  would	  be	  motivated	  to	  do	  so	  in	  two	  possible	  circumstances.	  	  First,	  persons	  may	  propose	  to	  include	  substantive	  aspects	  of	  their	  life	  plans	  if	  they	  were	  convinced	  of	  its	  truth	  or	  value,	  and	  either	  it	  required	  the	  cooperation	  of	  others	  who	  would	  not	  otherwise	  willingly	  cooperate,	  or	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they	  desired	  others’	  conformity	  for	  paternalistic	  reasons.	  	  Perhaps	  my	  conception	  of	  moral	  or	  religious	  enlightenment	  is	  best	  achieved	  acting	  in	  concert	  with	  my	  entire	  community	  though	  others	  in	  my	  community	  disagree.	  	  Or,	  perhaps	  I	  genuinely	  believe	  that	  others’	  lives	  would	  be	  better	  if	  they	  conformed	  to	  my	  set	  of	  life	  values.	  	  Second,	  persons	  may	  propose	  to	  include	  substantive	  aspects	  of	  some	  unknown	  life	  plan	  or	  values	  if	  they	  were	  convinced	  that	  a	  true	  or	  valuable	  set	  of	  life	  values	  exists,	  but	  were	  either	  ignorant	  of	  them,	  or	  unmotivated	  to	  adhere	  to	  them	  left	  to	  their	  own	  devices,	  and	  that	  civil	  government	  would	  have	  privileged	  access	  to	  them.36	  	  In	  both	  of	  these	  circumstances	  persons	  would	  have	  a	  strong	  interest	  in	  establishing	  and/or	  pursuing	  particular	  life	  plans	  in	  that	  they	  take	  it	  to	  be	  true	  or	  valuable.	  	  Further,	  that	  interest	  would	  be	  insecure,	  or	  at	  least	  unfulfilled,	  outside	  of	  political	  society.	  	  Persons	  in	  the	  first	  case	  would	  lack	  the	  authority,	  and	  likely	  the	  force,	  to	  compel	  others	  to	  conform,	  and	  persons	  in	  the	  second	  case	  would	  lack	  the	  knowledge	  or	  motivation	  necessary	  to	  conform	  themselves.	  	  Finally,	  civil	  government	  could	  secure	  this	  interest	  by	  compelling	  all	  persons	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  life	  plan	  that	  is	  perceived	  as	  true	  or	  valuable.	  	  This	  could	  involve	  coercing	  behaviour,	  and,	  as	  Proast	  and	  Waldron	  point	  out,	  promoting	  the	  preferred	  ideas	  and	  values,	  and	  suppressing	  others.37	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  A	  third	  possibility	  exists,	  that	  persons	  would	  propose	  to	  include	  substantive	  aspects	  of	  a	  life	  plan	  or	  life	  values	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  if	  they	  believe	  it	  necessary	  for	  the	  mere	  existence	  of	  society	  that	  persons	  share	  parts	  of	  a	  life	  plan	  or	  life	  values.	  	  I	  consider	  this	  possibility	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	  when	  I	  argue	  against	  the	  political	  legitimacy	  of	  legal	  moralism.	  37	  Proast,	  Jonas,	  The	  Argument	  of	  the	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration,	  Briefly	  Considered	  and	  Answered,	  in	  Richard	  Vernon	  (ed.),	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  56.	  	  Waldron,	  Jeremy,	  “Locke:	  Toleration	  and	  the	  Rationality	  of	  Persecution,”	  Susan	  Mendus	  (ed.),	  Justifying	  Toleration,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1988),	  81.	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What	  is	  ruled	  out	  for	  inclusion	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interest	  by	  this	  first	  stage	  of	  analysis?	  	  Persons	  would	  not	  propose	  to	  include	  interests	  that	  are	  secure	  even	  outside	  of	  political	  society,	  or	  interests	  that,	  though	  they	  may	  be	  insecure,	  the	  coercive	  force	  of	  civil	  government	  could	  not	  secure	  for	  them.	  	  Locke	  rules	  out	  persons’	  salvation	  for	  reasons	  included	  in	  this	  stage	  of	  the	  analysis.	  	  In	  the	  third	  
Letter,	  Locke	  argues	  that	  persons	  do	  not	  injure	  each	  other	  by	  professing	  opposing	  religious	  beliefs	  or	  undertaking	  different	  religious	  practices.	  	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  persons	  can	  easily	  remedy	  any	  perceived	  injury	  from	  others’	  beliefs	  by	  simply	  ignoring	  them	  or	  reaffirming	  their	  own.38	  	  While	  we	  may	  rule	  out	  persons’	  salvation	  and	  their	  private	  religious	  belief	  at	  this	  stage	  as	  Locke	  does,39	  we	  cannot	  rule	  out	  including	  substantive	  aspects	  of	  religion	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction,	  thereby	  sanctioning	  the	  enforcement	  of	  religious	  conformity,	  altogether.	  	  Understanding	  religion	  as	  a	  component	  of	  persons’	  life	  plans	  and	  values,	  there	  are	  circumstances	  in	  which	  persons	  could	  have	  a	  strong	  interest	  in	  uniformity	  that	  cannot	  be	  remedied	  outside	  of	  political	  society.	  	  As	  I	  note	  above,	  persons	  may	  require	  uncooperative	  others	  to	  play	  a	  part	  in	  their	  life	  plans,	  or	  perhaps	  may	  wish	  to	  have	  a	  life	  plan	  imposed	  on	  them	  from	  without.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Locke’s	  argument	  here	  relies	  on	  the	  assumptions	  that	  salvation	  requires	  only	  holding	  the	  correct	  beliefs,	  and	  that	  one	  cannot	  alter	  others’	  inward	  beliefs	  by	  force	  alone.	  	  Further,	  this	  argument	  relies	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  motivation	  for	  including	  religious	  interests	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  is	  to	  promote	  religious	  truth	  and	  persons’	  salvation.	  	  If	  the	  motivation	  is	  other	  than	  a	  genuine	  concern	  for	  persons’	  salvation,	  then	  religious	  interests	  will	  not	  be	  ruled	  out	  at	  this	  stage	  of	  the	  analysis.	  Rather,	  they	  ought	  to	  be	  regarded	  on	  par	  with	  how	  I	  envision	  life	  plans	  and	  values.	  	  I	  rule	  out	  their	  inclusion	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  in	  the	  next	  stage	  of	  the	  analysis.	  	  39	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  argue	  that	  Hobbes	  does	  this	  too.	  	  See	  2.3,	  65	  above.	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So,	  relating	  back	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics,	  at	  this	  first	  stage	  of	  analysis	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  will	  not	  include	  any	  interests	  for	  which	  political	  society	  and	  authority	  are	  not	  necessary	  to	  protect	  or	  promote.	  	  Given	  the	  assumption	  that	  persons	  would	  only	  circumscribe	  their	  independence	  to	  realize	  a	  benefit,	  it	  is	  unreasonable	  to	  suppose	  that	  persons	  would	  open	  themselves	  to	  coercion	  and	  punishment	  if	  it	  was	  not	  necessary	  for	  their	  purposes,	  or	  if	  it	  would	  be	  ineffective	  in	  achieving	  their	  ends.	  	  
Second	  Stage:	  The	  second	  stage	  of	  determining	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  requires	  that	  we	  determine	  which,	  of	  the	  interests	  that	  persons	  would	  propose	  to	  include	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction,	  all	  persons	  could	  agree	  upon	  including.	  	  This	  stage	  of	  the	  analysis	  bridges	  the	  gap	  between	  persons’	  independence	  and	  legitimate	  political	  authority.	  	  Insofar	  as	  all	  persons	  can	  agree	  or	  consent	  to	  some	  aspect	  of	  political	  authority,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  interests	  that	  fall	  within	  its	  jurisdiction,	  we	  can	  understand	  that	  authority	  as	  consistent	  with	  persons’	  independence,	  and	  therefore	  legitimate.	  	  I	  contend	  that,	  of	  the	  interests	  that	  persons	  would	  propose	  to	  include	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction,	  all	  persons	  could	  agree	  to	  include	  only	  their	  lives	  and	  liberty.	  	  These	  are	  the	  only	  interests	  that	  all	  persons	  share,	  and	  that	  all	  persons	  could	  agree	  to	  include	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  such	  that	  no	  persons	  would	  be	  obligated	  to	  subordinate	  her	  interests	  and	  ends	  to	  those	  of	  others	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  political	  participation.	  	  All	  persons	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  living,	  and	  living	  in	  a	  manner	  of	  their	  choosing.	  	  And,	  including	  life	  and	  liberty	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  can	  secure	  these	  interests	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  not	  make	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subordinating	  anyone’s	  interests	  to	  others	  a	  condition	  of	  political	  participation	  by	  establishing	  a	  system	  of	  equal	  protection.	  What	  is	  ruled	  out	  by	  the	  requirement	  that	  all	  persons	  agree	  upon	  the	  interests	  that	  they	  will	  include	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction?	  	  Persons	  could	  not	  agree	  to	  include	  interests	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  where	  such	  agreement	  would	  either	  be	  oppressive,	  in	  that	  it	  would	  subvert	  some	  persons’	  independence	  by	  making	  it	  a	  condition	  of	  their	  participation	  in	  political	  society	  that	  they	  subordinate	  their	  aims	  and	  interests	  to	  those	  of	  others,	  or	  superfluous,	  in	  that	  the	  unanimity	  required	  to	  render	  its	  inclusion	  legitimate,	  would	  undermine	  the	  reason	  for	  proposing	  to	  include	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place.40	  	  	  Therefore,	  we	  can	  rule	  out	  the	  inclusion	  of	  substantive	  life	  plans	  and	  values	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  If	  those	  proposing	  to	  include	  substantive	  aspects	  of	  life	  plans	  or	  values	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  do	  so	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  coercing	  acquiescence	  in	  unwilling	  persons,	  agreement	  would	  require	  subordinating	  the	  ends	  of	  those	  unwilling	  participants	  to	  others,	  and	  is	  therefore	  ruled	  out.	  	  Any	  political	  action	  that	  supposes	  agreement	  to	  include	  the	  substance	  of	  life	  plans	  or	  values	  on	  these	  grounds	  would	  be	  oppressive	  in	  that	  it	  undermines	  some	  persons’	  independence.	  	  Alternatively,	  if	  everyone	  agrees	  to	  include	  the	  substance	  of	  a	  life	  plan	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction,	  the	  perceived	  necessity	  of	  including	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place	  is	  eliminated.	  	  The	  unanimity	  that	  would	  be	  required	  to	  make	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  life	  plan	  among	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  legitimate	  would	  render	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  The	  language	  of	  “oppressive”	  and	  “superfluous”	  comes	  from	  Wootton’s	  interpretation	  of	  Locke’s	  mandate	  argument	  in	  Wootton,	  David,	  Introduction	  to	  John	  
Locke:	  Political	  Writings,	  (Indianapolis,	  IN:	  Hackett,	  2003),	  100.	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agreement	  superfluous.	  	  If	  everyone	  agreed	  on	  the	  particulars	  of	  a	  life	  plan,	  nobody	  would	  propose	  to	  commission	  civil	  government	  to	  enforce	  uniformity	  of	  their	  life	  plan	  on	  others	  who	  would	  not	  willingly	  conform.	  	  A	  lack	  of	  conformity	  would	  not	  be	  a	  shortcoming	  of	  persons’	  pre-­‐political	  circumstances.	  	  One	  might	  respond	  by	  arguing	  that	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  for	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  to	  agree	  to	  include	  substantive	  life	  values	  that	  they	  are	  ignorant	  of,	  or	  unmotivated	  by,	  and	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  civil	  government	  has	  superior	  knowledge	  of.	  	  While	  it	  is	  certainly	  possible	  to	  imagine	  such	  a	  scenario,	  relying	  on	  it	  to	  justify	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  political	  action	  aimed	  at	  promoting	  substantive	  life	  values	  requires	  adopting	  multiple	  unacceptable	  assumptions.	  	  First	  it	  supposes	  that	  we	  can	  identify	  a	  feature	  of	  political	  authority	  that	  makes	  it	  better	  suited	  to	  identify	  good	  life	  plans	  for	  persons	  than	  persons	  themselves.	  	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  what	  feature	  this	  could	  be,	  and,	  accordingly,	  it	  seems	  unreasonable	  to	  suppose	  that	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  generally	  recognize	  one.	  	  Second,	  this	  sketch	  of	  persons’	  motivations	  in	  participating	  in	  political	  society	  ignores	  the	  fact	  of	  diversity	  of	  persons’	  life	  plans	  and	  values	  that	  we	  commonly	  observe	  in	  pluralistic	  societies.	  	  If	  we	  can	  observe	  a	  diversity	  of	  life	  plans	  and	  values,	  it	  would	  be	  unreasonable	  to	  suppose	  uniformity	  among	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract,	  and	  an	  agreement	  to	  coercively	  enforce	  its	  substance.	  	  I	  take	  these	  assumptions	  to	  fall	  into	  Locke’s	  category	  of	  things	  that	  “nobody	  can	  in	  reason	  suppose”	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract.41	  	  	  	  Further,	  supposing	  unanimity	  in	  persons	  agreeing	  to	  precommit	  themselves	  to	  adhere	  to	  life	  plans	  and	  values	  that,	  left	  alone,	  they	  would	  be	  unmotivated	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Locke,	  Second	  Letter,	  105	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adhere	  to,	  rests	  on	  a	  problematic	  understanding	  of	  the	  social	  contract.	  	  It	  supposes	  that	  the	  social	  contract	  is	  a	  temporal	  event	  at	  which	  persons	  can	  commit	  themselves	  to	  something,	  and	  then	  step	  back	  and	  have	  it	  enforced.	  	  Instead,	  insofar	  as	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  identifying	  necessary	  conditions	  of	  political	  legitimacy,	  we	  ought	  to	  understand	  the	  social	  contract	  as	  reason-­‐revealing42	  for	  us,	  theorizing	  about	  the	  limits	  of	  political	  authority,	  right	  now	  and	  always.	  	  The	  social	  contract,	  therefore,	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  precommitment	  of	  any	  kind.	  	  Agreement	  on	  the	  ends	  of	  political	  cooperation	  cannot	  be	  supposed	  at	  some	  prior	  time.	  	  They	  must	  be	  the	  possible	  objects	  of	  persons’	  agreement	  always.	  	  Here	  the	  superfluity	  of	  an	  agreement	  to	  enforce	  a	  life	  plan	  or	  life	  values	  becomes	  apparent.	  	  The	  unanimity	  necessary	  to	  enforce	  substantive	  life	  plans	  and	  values	  in	  a	  non-­‐oppressive	  way	  cannot	  always	  be	  supposed	  to	  have	  happened	  at	  an	  earlier	  time.	  	  There	  was	  no	  earlier	  time,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  actual	  social	  contract.	  	  We	  must	  be	  able	  to	  affirm	  the	  reasons	  revealed	  to	  us	  by	  the	  social	  contract	  at	  all	  times.	  	  	  	  	  So,	  civil	  interests	  are	  the	  things	  that	  fall	  within	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  and,	  therefore,	  are	  the	  legitimate	  objects	  of	  political	  action.	  	  Persons’	  civil	  interests	  consist	  of	  only	  the	  interests	  that	  parties	  to	  a	  social	  contract	  would	  propose,	  and	  that	  they	  could	  all	  agree	  to	  include	  given	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics.	  	  This	  means	  that	  only	  certain	  justifications	  of	  law	  or	  other	  political	  action	  are	  legitimate,	  namely,	  those	  that	  protect	  and	  promote	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  –	  their	  lives	  and	  liberty.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  “reason-­‐revealing”	  language	  comes	  from,	  Lessnoff,	  Michael,	  Social	  Contract,	  (London:	  Macmillan,	  1986),	  cited	  in	  D'Agostino,	  Fred,	  Gaus,	  Gerald	  and	  Thrasher,	  John,	  "Contemporary	  Approaches	  to	  the	  Social	  Contract,"	  Edward	  N.	  Zalta	  (ed.),	  The	  
Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy,	  (Spring	  2014	  Edition),	  accessed	  at	  plato.stanford.edu	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One	  may	  object	  that	  this	  analysis	  of	  civil	  interests,	  and,	  subsequently,	  of	  legitimate	  political	  action,	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  minimal,	  austere	  conception	  of	  political	  society.	  	  If	  this	  is	  the	  only	  acceptable	  justification	  for	  political	  action,	  it	  might	  seem	  as	  though	  a	  lot,	  too	  much,	  will	  be	  ruled	  out.	  	  After	  all,	  Locke	  additionally	  included	  persons’	  health,	  physical	  integrity,	  and	  outward	  possessions	  among	  their	  civil	  interests.	  	  The	  prima	  facie	  austerity	  of	  my	  analysis	  is	  mitigated	  when	  we	  recognize	  that	  to	  argue	  that	  political	  authority	  may	  only	  legitimately	  act	  to	  protect	  and	  promote	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  is	  just	  to	  say	  that,	  to	  be	  legitimate,	  political	  action	  must	  be	  deployed	  in	  the	  service	  of	  these	  interests,	  even	  if	  indirectly.	  	  To	  effectively	  secure	  persons’	  lives	  and	  liberty,	  civil	  government	  is	  additionally	  justified	  in	  acting	  to	  establish	  and	  maintain	  the	  means	  for	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  The	  means	  for	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  fall	  into	  two	  categories.43	  	  First,	  we	  can	  identify	  the	  means	  necessary	  for	  protecting	  persons’	  civil	  interests.44	  	  Second,	  we	  can	  identify	  means	  that,	  though	  not	  necessary,	  can	  reasonably	  be	  justified	  in	  promoting	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  In	  the	  first	  category	  we	  can	  include	  public	  institutions	  without	  which	  we	  cannot	  conceive	  of	  a	  political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  The	  boundaries	  of	  these	  categories	  will	  be	  imprecise,	  and	  we	  should	  expect	  them	  to	  be	  the	  source	  of	  genuine	  political	  disagreement.	  44	  Kant	  acknowledges	  this	  category	  in	  On	  The	  Common	  Saying,	  8:298.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  achieving	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  material	  prosperity	  is	  a	  “means	  for	  securing	  a	  rightful	  
condition,”	  and	  is	  required	  “to	  make	  it	  exist	  as	  a	  commonwealth.”	  	  Additionally,	  Hobbes	  argues	  in	  chapter	  18	  of	  Leviathan	  that	  the	  rights	  he	  enumerates	  make	  up	  “the	  essence	  of	  sovereignty,”	  without	  which	  we	  cannot	  conceptualize	  a	  political	  society	  constituted	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  securing	  persons’	  lives.	  	  Without,	  for	  example,	  a	  well	  maintained	  militia	  to	  enforce	  the	  sovereign’s	  commands,	  there	  cannot	  exist	  a	  sovereign	  qua	  maintainer	  of	  “peace	  and	  justice,	  the	  end	  for	  which	  all	  commonwealths	  are	  instituted.”	  Leviathan,	  18:16,	  14:21.	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society	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  persons’	  lives	  and	  liberty.	  	  Here,	  for	  example,	  we	  can	  include	  a	  legislative	  body,	  and	  a	  system	  of	  law	  enforcement.	  	  Without	  a	  legislative	  body	  making	  laws	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  persons’	  lives	  and	  liberty,	  and	  a	  system	  for	  enforcing	  those	  laws,	  a	  political	  society	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  persons’	  lives	  and	  liberty	  cannot	  exist.	  	  Therefore,	  we	  ought	  to	  regard	  political	  action	  aimed	  at	  maintaining	  these	  institutions	  as	  legitimate.	  	  Though	  not	  directly	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  such	  political	  action	  indirectly	  serves	  the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  by	  maintaining	  the	  institutions	  necessary	  for	  that	  end.45	  In	  the	  second	  category	  we	  can	  include	  things	  that,	  though	  not	  necessary	  for	  securing	  persons	  civil	  interests,	  we	  can	  reasonably	  justify	  as	  means	  for	  promoting	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  For	  example,	  political	  action	  may	  legitimately	  support	  the	  arts,	  sports	  and	  recreation,	  or	  cultural	  and	  religious	  events	  if	  the	  purpose	  of	  that	  support	  is	  to	  enhance	  persons’	  liberty	  to	  live	  lives	  of	  their	  choosing	  by	  partaking	  in	  these	  endeavours.	  	  However,	  political	  action	  supporting	  these	  things	  is	  not	  legitimate	  if	  they	  are	  envisioned	  as	  necessary	  parts	  of	  valuable	  life	  plans.	  	  To	  ensure	  that	  political	  action	  supporting	  any	  of	  these	  things	  is	  undertaken	  in	  the	  service	  of	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  it	  should	  not	  favour	  any	  particular	  life	  plan	  over	  others,	  but,	  rather,	  support	  them	  equally,	  or	  at	  least	  offer	  fair	  access	  for	  support	  to	  all	  persons’	  endeavours.	  	  If,	  for	  example,	  public	  funds	  are	  used	  to	  build	  community	  sports	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Several	  additional	  institutions	  fall	  into	  this	  category,	  for	  example,	  a	  defence	  force,	  a	  property	  regime,	  and,	  perhaps,	  a	  health	  care	  system.	  	  Enumerating	  the	  means	  of	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  is	  a	  substantial	  task	  on	  its	  own,	  and	  a	  worthy	  topic	  for	  future	  study.	  	  Here	  I	  offer	  these	  examples	  by	  way	  of	  explaining	  the	  category.	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facilities,	  comparable	  funds	  should	  be	  available	  for	  community	  arts	  projects,	  and	  other	  endeavours	  that	  similarly	  aim	  to	  foster	  persons’	  liberty	  to	  live	  as	  they	  desire.	  	  
3.5	  –	  Conclusion	  	  My	  positive	  argument	  in	  this	  chapter	  consists	  of	  two	  claims.	  	  First,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  consist	  of	  their	  lives	  and	  liberty.	  	  These	  are	  the	  vital	  interests	  that,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics,	  persons	  would	  propose	  to	  include,	  and	  could	  all	  agree	  to	  include	  in	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction.	  	  Legitimate	  political	  action	  may	  be	  justified	  only	  in	  the	  service	  of	  these	  ends.	  	  	  The	  second	  claim	  is	  broader	  and	  concerns	  the	  approach	  of	  this	  entire	  work.	  	  I	  contend	  that	  political	  authority	  may	  only	  justify	  its	  actions	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  ends	  that	  arise	  out	  of	  the	  particular	  kind	  of	  enterprise	  that	  political	  cooperation	  is.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests,	  as	  the	  interests	  that	  persons	  enter	  political	  society	  and	  submit	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  civil	  government	  to	  protect	  and	  promote,	  constrains	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  political	  action,	  however	  one	  specifies	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  Whatever	  one	  takes	  to	  be	  the	  salient	  features	  of	  persons	  and	  their	  pre-­‐political	  circumstances,	  and,	  subsequently,	  however	  one	  specifies	  the	  civil	  interests	  that	  result,	  political	  authority	  may	  only	  legitimately	  appeal	  to	  values	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  political	  cooperation	  among	  independent	  persons,	  and	  the	  particular	  problems,	  whatever	  one	  takes	  them	  to	  be,	  that	  political	  cooperation	  aims	  to	  remedy.	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4	  –	  Against	  Legal	  Moralism	  	  
4.1	  –	  Introduction	  	   	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  argue	  against	  the	  criminal	  law	  theory	  known	  as	  legal	  moralism.	  	  Legal	  moralism	  holds	  that	  the	  immorality	  of	  some	  conduct	  is	  a	  salient,	  often	  sufficient,	  reason	  for	  criminalizing	  it.	  	  H.L.A.	  Hart	  famously	  identified	  two	  versions	  of	  legal	  moralism,	  what	  I	  call	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  and	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism,1	  and	  argued	  against	  both.	  	  I	  adopt	  Hart’s	  classification	  but	  argue	  against	  each	  along	  a	  different	  dimension.	  	  In	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  chapter	  (4.3),	  I	  argue	  that	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  is	  conceptually	  untenable.	  	  That	  is,	  there	  is	  no	  space	  for	  a	  coherent	  account	  of	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  between	  a	  liberal	  political	  account	  of	  political	  action,	  and	  the	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralist	  account	  of	  criminalization.	  	  In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  chapter	  (4.4),	  I	  draw	  on	  the	  contractarian	  argument	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter	  to	  argue	  that	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  provides	  a	  politically	  illegitimate	  justification	  for	  criminalization	  and	  criminal	  law	  in	  general.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.2	  –	  Instrumental	  and	  Non-­Instrumental	  Legal	  Moralism	  
	  In	  its	  most	  basic	  and	  weakest	  form,	  legal	  moralism	  is	  the	  thesis	  that	  the	  immorality	  of	  some	  conduct	  is	  a	  salient	  reason	  for	  criminalizing	  it.	  	  Legal	  moralists	  may	  disagree	  about	  what	  immorality	  consists	  in,	  how	  strong	  a	  reason	  in	  favour	  of	  criminalization	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Hart	  terms	  the	  two	  versions	  of	  legal	  moralism:	  moderate	  and	  extreme	  legal	  moralism	  in	  Hart,	  H.L.A.	  Law,	  Liberty,	  and	  Morality,	  (Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1963),	  48.	  	  I	  use	  the	  terms	  instrumental	  and	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  respectively	  to	  reflect	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  versions	  of	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  that	  I	  consider	  are	  not	  extreme.	  	  Rather,	  they	  are	  plausible	  and	  widely	  embraced	  by	  criminal	  law	  theorists.	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immorality	  counts	  for,	  and	  whether	  there	  are	  countervailing	  reasons	  that	  ought	  to	  constrain	  the	  legal	  enforcement	  of	  morality,	  but	  all	  agree	  that	  immorality	  provides	  a	  good,	  often	  sufficient,	  reason	  in	  favour	  of	  criminalization.	  In	  Law,	  Liberty,	  and	  Morality,	  Hart	  identifies	  what	  I	  call	  an	  instrumental	  and	  a	  non-­‐instrumental	  version	  of	  legal	  moralism.2	  	  The	  instrumental	  thesis	  casts	  a	  shared	  morality	  as	  the	  cement	  that	  holds	  society	  together.3	  	  Without	  a	  shared	  morality,	  society	  would	  disintegrate,	  and,	  therefore,	  societies	  are	  justified	  in	  legally	  enforcing	  their	  morals	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  preserving	  their	  integrity	  and	  their	  continued	  existence.	  	  Just	  as	  governments	  may	  legitimately	  protect	  their	  societies	  from	  internal	  and	  external	  enemies	  that	  seek	  to	  destroy	  them	  through	  violence,	  so	  may	  they	  protect	  their	  societies	  from	  the	  acts	  that	  subvert	  and	  erode	  the	  shared	  morality	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  continued	  existence	  of	  their	  societies.	  	  	  In	  arguing	  against	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism,	  my	  primary	  target	  is	  Lord	  Patrick	  Devlin.4	  	  Devlin	  developed	  the	  instrumental	  thesis	  in	  response	  to	  the	  1957	  publication	  of	  the	  Wolfenden	  Report	  on	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  prostitution	  and	  homosexuality	  in	  England.5	  	  The	  Report	  recommended	  that	  homosexuality	  be	  legalized,	  and	  that,	  while	  the	  public	  nuisance	  that	  prostitution	  occasions	  ought	  to	  be	  suppressed,	  the	  practice	  itself	  should	  be	  legalized	  as	  well.	  	  The	  guiding	  principle	  of	  the	  report,	  at	  which	  Devlin	  took	  direct	  aim	  in	  developing	  his	  instrumental	  legal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Hart,	  Law,	  Liberty,	  and	  Morality,	  48.	  3	  Hart,	  Law,	  Liberty,	  and	  Morality,	  48.	  4	  Though,	  as	  I	  consider	  in	  the	  following	  section,	  Devlin’s	  legal	  moralism	  is	  ambiguous	  between	  the	  two	  variations.	  5	  Report	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Homosexual	  Offences	  and	  Prostitution	  (Cmnd247),	  1957,	  paragraph	  61.	  	  Hereafter	  cited	  as	  Wolfenden	  Report.	  	  Devlin,	  Patrick,	  The	  
Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1975),	  3.	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moralism,	  states	  that,	  “…	  there	  must	  remain	  a	  realm	  of	  private	  morality	  and	  immorality	  which	  is,	  in	  brief	  and	  crude	  terms,	  not	  the	  law’s	  business.”6	  	  The	  Report	  takes	  the	  function	  of	  the	  criminal	  law	  to	  consist	  in	  the	  preservation	  of	  public	  order	  and	  decency,	  and	  to	  protect	  citizens	  from	  injury	  and	  offence.7	  	  It	  argues	  that	  the	  law	  should	  not	  interfere	  with	  persons’	  private	  lives	  any	  further	  than	  is	  necessary	  to	  fulfil	  its	  purpose.8	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  morality	  that	  instrumental	  legal	  moralists	  seek	  to	  enforce	  is	  the	  morality	  of	  the	  community,	  or,	  perhaps,	  what	  is	  more	  appropriately	  called	  the	  community’s	  morals.9	  	  Presumably,	  for	  morality	  to	  play	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  maintaining	  the	  integrity	  of	  a	  society,	  it	  must	  be	  the	  actual	  morals	  of	  the	  society	  that	  do	  the	  work	  of	  keeping	  society	  intact.	  	  The	  instrumental	  thesis	  would	  seem	  mysterious	  and	  entirely	  implausible	  if	  the	  morals	  to	  be	  enforced	  were	  some	  metaphysically	  true	  standards	  of	  morality	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  society	  did	  not	  actually	  believe	  to	  be	  true.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  non-­‐instrumental	  thesis	  contends	  that	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morality	  is	  justified	  on	  grounds	  other	  than	  that	  it	  preserves	  the	  shared	  moral	  code	  that	  preserves	  society.	  	  Non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralists	  often	  contend	  that	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morality	  is	  intrinsically	  valuable,	  or	  that	  it	  plays	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  criminal	  justice.	  	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  all	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralists	  take	  moral	  wrongdoing	  to	  be	  the	  proper	  object	  of	  criminal	  sanctions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Devlin,	  Patrick,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  3.	  7	  Wolfenden	  Report,	  paragraph	  13.	  8	  Wolfenden	  Report,	  paragraph	  14.	  9	  Nathan	  Brett	  pointed	  this	  out	  in	  a	  commentary	  of	  a	  paper	  that	  informs	  this	  chapter	  at	  the	  annual	  meeting	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Philosophical	  Association	  at	  the	  University	  of	  New	  Brunswick,	  Fredericton,	  May	  2011.	  	  Hart	  and	  Devlin	  use	  both	  terms.	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owing	  to	  some	  feature	  of	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system,	  though	  they	  disagree	  about	  what	  feature	  that	  is.	  Hart	  traces	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  as	  far	  back	  as	  Plato’s	  and	  Aristotle’s	  respective	  arguments	  for	  including	  the	  promotion	  of	  moral	  virtue	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state.10	  	  Additionally,	  he	  argues	  against	  James	  Fitzjames	  Stephen’s	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  at	  various	  points	  throughout	  Law,	  Liberty,	  and	  
Morality.11	  	  After	  falling	  out	  of	  favour	  for	  several	  years,	  owing	  in	  large	  part	  to	  Hart’s	  forceful	  criticisms,	  a	  new	  school	  of	  legal	  moralism	  has	  emerged.	  	  Michael	  Moore	  and	  Antony	  Duff	  place	  moral	  wrongdoing	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  their	  conceptions	  of	  the	  criminal	  law.	  	  Further,	  both	  take	  moral	  wrongdoing	  to	  be	  the	  proper	  object	  of	  criminal	  sanctions	  without	  any	  appeal	  to	  the	  role	  morality	  plays	  in	  preserving	  the	  integrity	  of	  society.	  	  Because	  of	  their	  prominence	  in	  contemporary	  criminal	  law	  theory,	  Moore	  and	  Duff’s	  new	  legal	  moralism	  will	  serve	  as	  my	  exemplars	  of	  the	  non-­‐instrumental	  thesis.12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Proponents	  of	  the	  non-­‐instrumental	  thesis	  are	  less	  committed	  to	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	  morality	  than	  instrumental	  legal	  moralists.	  	  Particular	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralists	  may,	  like	  their	  instrumental	  counterparts,	  hold	  that	  the	  relevant	  sense	  of	  morality	  for	  their	  theory	  consists	  in	  the	  community’s	  morals,	  whatever	  they	  happen	  to	  be.	  	  A	  commitment	  to	  enforcing	  community	  morals	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Hart,	  H.L.A.	  “Social	  Solidarity	  and	  the	  Enforcement	  of	  Morality”	  The	  University	  of	  
Chicago	  Law	  Review.	  Vol.	  35,	  No.	  1	  (Autumn	  1967),	  1-­‐13.	  11	  Hart,	  Law,	  Liberty,	  and	  Morality.	  12	  Malcolm	  Thorburn	  calls	  Moore	  and	  Duff’s	  legal	  moralism	  “the	  new	  orthodoxy	  in	  English-­‐language	  criminal	  law	  theory.”	  	  Thorburn,	  Malcolm,	  “Constitutionalism	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Law,”	  R.	  A.	  Duff,	  Lindsay	  Farmer,	  S.	  E.	  Marshall,	  Massimo	  Renzo,	  and	  Victor	  Tadros	  (eds.),	  The	  Structures	  of	  Criminal	  Law,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  86. 
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such13	  would	  turn	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  into	  a	  stringent	  moral	  conservatism	  that	  takes	  the	  preservation	  of	  the	  particular	  character	  of	  a	  society	  to	  be	  intrinsically	  good.14	  	  Neither	  Moore	  nor	  Duff	  fall	  into	  this	  camp.	  	  Rather,	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralists	  generally	  argue	  for	  legally	  enforcing	  what	  we	  may	  call	  ‘true	  morality’.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  legal	  moralists	  like	  Moore	  and	  Duff	  count	  the	  immorality	  of	  conduct	  as	  a	  strong	  reason	  in	  favour	  of	  criminalizing	  it	  only	  if	  it	  is	  actually	  immoral,	  independent	  of	  whether	  the	  community,	  or	  anyone,	  recognizes	  it	  as	  such.	  	  Plausible	  versions	  of	  the	  non-­‐instrumental	  thesis	  acknowledge	  the	  difficulty	  in	  discerning	  what	  true	  morality	  consists	  in	  and,	  accordingly,	  proceed	  with	  epistemic	  humility	  and	  the	  caution	  that	  entails.15	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.3	  –	  Instrumental	  Legal	  Moralism	  is	  Untenable	  
4.3.1	  –	  Devlin’s	  Ambiguous	  Legal	  Moralism	  Devlin	  appears	  to	  advance	  the	  quintessential	  account	  of	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism.	  	  However,	  as	  Hart	  argues,	  Devlin	  makes	  several	  vague	  and	  unsubstantiated	  claims	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  community	  morals	  and	  the	  integrity	  of	  society	  that	  render	  his	  position	  ambiguous	  between	  instrumental	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  The	  Wolfenden	  Report	  introduces	  the	  language	  of	  enforcing	  morality	  as	  such	  in	  paragraph	  257.	  	  Devlin	  acknowledges	  this	  language,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  3,	  and	  Hart	  uses	  it	  throughout	  Law,	  Liberty,	  and	  Morality.	  	  I	  understand	  enforcing	  morality	  as	  such	  to	  mean	  enforcing	  morals	  as	  morals,	  and	  enforcing	  morality	  for	  the	  
sake	  of	  enforcing	  morality,	  as	  opposed	  to	  enforcing	  morality	  incidentally	  in	  the	  course	  of	  doing	  something	  else,	  say,	  establishing	  public	  safety.	  	  So	  we	  do	  not	  enforce	  morality	  as	  such	  when	  the	  morality/immorality	  of	  the	  conduct	  plays	  no	  role	  in	  justifying	  its	  enforcement.	  	  	  	  	  14	  I	  return	  to	  this	  version	  of	  the	  non-­‐instrumental	  thesis	  when	  I	  consider	  how	  Devlin’s	  supposed	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  may	  collapse	  into	  a	  version	  of	  the	  non-­‐instrumental	  thesis.	  15	  Moore,	  Michael	  S.	  “A	  Tale	  of	  Two	  Theories,”	  Criminal	  Justice	  Ethics,	  28:1,	  32.	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non-­‐instrumental	  versions	  of	  legal	  moralism.	  	  Ultimately	  I	  argue	  that	  however	  we	  understand	  Devlin’s	  legal	  moralism,	  it	  is	  fatally	  flawed.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  explore	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  Hart-­‐Devlin	  debate	  to	  identify	  the	  two	  possible	  interpretations	  of	  Devlin’s	  ambiguous	  legal	  moralism.	  	  	  	  	  First,	  Devlin	  is	  widely	  recognized	  as	  the	  primary	  proponent	  of	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism.	  	  He	  maintains	  that	  a	  society	  may	  enforce	  its	  morals	  through	  the	  criminal	  law	  because	  the	  preservation	  of	  society’s	  shared	  morals	  is	  essential	  for	  society’s	  continued	  existence.	  	  Devlin	  bluntly	  states	  that,	  “Society	  cannot	  live	  without	  morals.”16	  	  He	  asserts	  that	  the	  bonds	  of	  common	  moral	  thought	  hold	  societies	  together,	  and	  that	  without	  those	  bonds,	  societies	  would	  disintegrate.	  	  If	  societies	  are	  entitled	  to	  act	  to	  preserve	  themselves	  from	  disintegration,	  they	  may	  act	  to	  preserve	  the	  morals	  that	  are	  necessary	  for	  that	  purpose.	  	  Devlin	  draws	  an	  analogy	  between	  immoral	  action	  and	  treason.	  	  He	  suggests	  that	  a	  shared	  moral	  code	  is	  as	  necessary	  to	  the	  integrity	  of	  society	  as	  an	  established	  government.	  	  If	  societies	  are	  justified	  in	  prohibiting	  treason	  and	  other	  politically	  subversive	  activities	  that	  seek	  to	  destroy	  the	  system	  of	  government	  that	  is	  essential	  for	  society’s	  existence,	  so	  may	  they	  prohibit	  action	  that	  deteriorates	  the	  shared	  morals	  that	  are	  equally	  necessary	  for	  preserving	  society.17	  	  	  	  In	  his	  most	  decisively	  instrumental	  moment	  Devlin	  asserts	  that,	  “…	  before	  a	  society	  can	  put	  a	  practice	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  tolerance	  there	  must	  be	  a	  deliberate	  judgement	  that	  the	  practice	  is	  injurious	  to	  society.”18	  	  This	  amounts	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  24.	  17	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  13.	  18	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  17.	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each	  criminal	  prohibition	  of	  supposedly	  immoral	  conduct	  requires	  justification	  that	  points	  to	  some	  detriment	  to	  society	  that	  it	  endeavours	  to	  avoid.	  	  The	  instrumentality	  of	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morals	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  society	  must	  be	  apparent	  in	  every	  instance.	  	  More	  generally,	  Devlin	  claims	  that,	  “There	  must	  be	  toleration	  of	  the	  maximum	  individual	  freedom	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  integrity	  of	  society.”19	  	  That	  is,	  governments	  should	  only	  ever	  consider	  enforcing	  morals	  with	  criminal	  sanctions,	  in	  effect	  limiting	  individuals’	  liberty,	  where	  the	  integrity	  of	  society	  is	  evidently	  at	  stake.	  	  	  These	  claims	  constitute	  a	  legal	  moralism	  that	  is	  definitively	  instrumental.	  	  The	  legal	  enforcement	  of	  morals	  is	  justified	  exclusively	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  preserving	  society.	  	  Each	  instance	  of	  legally	  enforced	  morals	  must	  have	  in	  view	  identifiable	  damage	  to	  society.	  In	  other	  moments,	  however,	  Devlin’s	  remarks	  colour	  his	  legal	  moralism	  as	  a	  version	  of	  the	  non-­‐instrumental	  thesis.	  	  As	  Hart	  observes,	  “…	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  that	  for	  [Devlin]	  the	  statement	  that	  immorality	  jeopardizes	  or	  weakens	  society	  is	  a	  statement	  of	  empirical	  fact.”20	  	  Rather,	  at	  times,	  Devlin	  advances	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  shared	  morality	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  society	  as	  an	  a	  priori	  assumption,	  or	  a	  necessary	  truth.21	  	  He	  writes,	  “What	  makes	  a	  society	  of	  any	  sort	  is	  community	  of	  ideas,	  not	  only	  political	  ideas	  but	  also	  ideas	  about	  the	  way	  its	  members	  should	  behave	  and	  govern	  their	  lives;	  these	  latter	  ideas	  are	  its	  morals.”22	  	  Devlin	  explicitly	  presents	  this	  as	  an	  a	  priori	  claim.	  	  Instead	  of	  offering	  empirical	  support,	  he	  suggests	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  16.	  20	  Hart,	  Law,	  Liberty,	  and	  Morality,	  50.	  21	  Hart,	  Law,	  Liberty,	  and	  Morality,	  50.	  22	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  9.	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that	  shared	  morals	  are	  constitutive	  of	  society.	  	  If	  the	  moral	  ideas	  wither,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  any	  specific	  damage	  to	  society	  can	  be	  observed,	  he	  supposes	  society	  to	  be	  at	  risk	  of	  disintegration.23	  Here,	  Devlin’s	  conception	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  community	  morals	  and	  society	  makes	  it	  immune	  from	  empirical	  falsification.	  	  Though	  he	  vaguely	  alludes	  to	  historical	  examples	  of	  “the	  loosening	  of	  moral	  bonds”	  leading	  to	  the	  disintegration	  of	  society,24	  his	  understanding	  of	  community	  morals	  as	  constitutive	  of	  society	  renders	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  the	  link	  between	  morals	  and	  the	  preservation	  of	  society	  redundant.	  	  Having	  stipulated	  that	  the	  preservation	  of	  a	  shared	  morality	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  society’s	  continued	  existence,	  Devlin	  is	  able	  to	  leave	  considerations	  of	  specific	  societal	  harms	  aside	  and	  focus	  solely	  on	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morality.	  	  Insofar	  as	  Devlin’s	  position	  is	  unresponsive	  to	  empirical	  evidence	  showing	  a	  connection	  between	  conduct	  that	  contravenes	  community	  moral	  standards	  and	  harm	  to	  society,	  it	  begins	  resembling	  a	  non-­‐instrumental	  version	  of	  legal	  moralism	  in	  that	  it	  aims	  to	  uphold	  morals	  for	  their	  own	  sake.	  	  	  	  Hart	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  accuse	  Devlin	  of	  mistakenly	  identifying	  society	  with	  its	  morals	  at	  each	  moment	  in	  its	  history.	  	  Hart	  argues	  that	  such	  a	  notion	  of	  society	  is	  absurd	  because	  it	  entails	  that	  a	  community’s	  morals	  cannot	  evolve	  or	  change	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  I	  further	  explore	  Devlin’s	  conception	  of	  society,	  see	  4.3.1,	  116.	  	  Insofar	  as	  we	  regard	  society	  as	  political	  society	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  damage	  to	  society	  consists	  in	  anything	  that	  hinders	  society’s	  ability	  to	  function	  to	  that	  end.	  	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that,	  on	  Devlin’s	  view	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  society	  and	  its	  morals,	  damage	  to	  society’s	  morals,	  and	  damage	  to	  society	  itself	  are	  indistinguishable.	  	  	  	  	  24	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  13.	  	  Hart,	  Law,	  Liberty,	  and	  Morality,	  50.	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without	  one	  society	  disintegrating	  and	  another	  taking	  its	  place.25	  	  In	  light	  of	  Devlin’s	  assertions	  that	  “What	  makes	  a	  society	  of	  any	  sort	  is	  community	  of	  ideas…”26	  and	  that	  “…society	  means	  a	  community	  of	  ideas…”27	  Hart’s	  suspicion	  is	  justified.	  	  Devlin	  however	  denies	  that	  he	  is	  guilty	  of	  this	  mistake.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  while	  not	  every	  deviation	  from	  community	  morals	  will	  damage	  society,	  any	  deviation	  from	  community	  morals	  may.	  	  	  While	  society	  is	  not	  identical	  to	  its	  morals,	  he	  again	  stresses	  that	  they	  are	  essential	  to	  its	  existence.28	  	  	  	  	  In	  light	  of	  Devlin’s	  remarks,	  it	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear	  how	  we	  should	  understand	  his	  conception	  of	  society.	  	  Perhaps	  we	  can	  understand	  society	  in	  Devlin’s	  scheme	  as	  a	  political	  society	  of	  the	  kind	  I	  argue	  for	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  There	  I	  argue	  for	  a	  Lockean	  conception	  of	  society	  as	  a	  system	  of	  political	  cooperation	  among	  independent	  persons	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  their	  civil	  interests.29	  	  On	  this	  conception,	  society	  is	  not	  merely	  shared	  ideas,	  but,	  rather,	  shared	  ends	  and	  the	  institutions	  necessary	  for	  realizing	  those	  ends.	  	  A	  strong	  case	  can	  be	  made	  that	  some	  moral	  ideas	  must	  in	  fact	  be	  shared	  among	  a	  sufficiently	  large	  number	  of	  members	  of	  a	  political	  society	  to	  ensure	  its	  stability.	  	  The	  Wolfenden	  Report	  states,	  “We	  clearly	  recognize	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  any	  society	  must	  be	  acceptable	  to	  the	  general	  moral	  sense	  of	  the	  community	  if	  they	  are	  to	  be	  respected	  and	  enforced.”30	  	  And	  Hart	  writes,	  “It	  is	  of	  course	  clear	  (and	  one	  of	  the	  oldest	  insights	  of	  political	  theory)	  that	  society	  could	  not	  exist	  without	  a	  morality	  which	  mirrored	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Hart,	  Law,	  Liberty,	  and	  Morality,	  51-­‐52.	  26	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  9.	  	  Emphasis	  added.	  27	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  10.	  	  Emphasis	  added.	  28	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  13-­‐14,	  note:	  1.	  29	  See	  3.4	  above.	  30	  Wolfenden	  Report,	  paragraph	  12.	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supplemented	  the	  law’s	  proscriptions	  of	  conduct	  injurious	  to	  others.”31	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  society’s	  political	  institutions	  would	  be	  unstable,	  continuously	  susceptible	  to	  collapse,	  if	  the	  members	  of	  that	  society	  did	  not	  in	  fact	  believe	  that	  they	  were	  the	  appropriate	  institutions;	  however,	  this	  does	  not	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  society’s	  laws	  
should	  reflect	  the	  community’s	  morals,	  whatever	  they	  happen	  to	  be.	  	  This	  is	  merely	  the	  descriptive	  claim	  that	  if	  members	  of	  a	  society	  do	  not	  support	  their	  political	  institutions,	  those	  institutions	  likely	  will	  not	  last.	  Further,	  this	  conception	  of	  society	  is	  consonant	  with	  the	  conception	  of	  society	  sketched	  by	  the	  Wolfenden	  Report,	  which	  defines	  the	  function	  of	  the	  criminal	  law	  exclusively	  as,	  “the	  preservation	  of	  order	  and	  decency	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  lives	  and	  property	  of	  citizens.”32	  	  Devlin	  rejects	  this	  limited	  account	  of	  the	  function	  of	  the	  law,	  and	  additionally	  rejects	  the	  Report’s	  specific	  recommendations	  on	  decriminalizing	  homosexuality	  and	  prostitution.	  	  In	  arguing	  that	  private	  acts	  that	  transgress	  community	  moral	  standards	  threaten	  the	  integrity	  of	  society,	  and	  concluding	  that,	  “…there	  can	  be	  no	  theoretical	  limits	  to	  legislation	  against	  immorality,”33	  Devlin	  appears	  to	  reject	  the	  conception	  of	  society	  as	  a	  system	  of	  political	  cooperation.	  	  	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  very	  little	  space	  between	  the	  conception	  of	  society	  as	  a	  community	  of	  ideas	  identical	  to	  its	  morals	  and	  of	  society	  as	  political	  cooperation	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  In	  any	  case,	  my	  purpose	  in	  this	  section	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  character,	  or,	  rather,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Hart,	  Law,	  Liberty,	  and	  Morality,	  51.	  32	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  2.	  33	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  14.	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characters	  of	  Devlin’s	  ambiguous	  legal	  moralism.	  	  If	  we	  can	  understand	  Devlin’s	  society	  as	  something	  akin	  to	  political	  society,	  supported	  by	  persons’	  moral	  ideas	  wherever	  society	  proves	  viable,	  then	  we	  ought	  to	  understand	  his	  legal	  moralism	  as	  a	  version	  of	  the	  instrumental	  thesis.	  	  Conversely,	  if,	  as	  Hart	  supposes,	  Devlin’s	  society	  is	  identical	  to	  its	  morals,	  or	  if	  Devlin	  advances	  the	  claim	  that	  shared	  morals	  are	  necessary	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  society	  as	  an	  a	  priori	  assumption	  or	  necessary	  truth,	  then	  we	  ought	  to	  understand	  Devlin’s	  legal	  moralism	  as	  a	  version	  of	  the	  non-­‐instrumental	  thesis.	  	  In	  the	  two	  sections	  that	  follow,	  I	  argue	  that	  on	  either	  interpretation	  of	  Devlin’s	  legal	  moralism,	  it	  is	  fatally	  flawed.	  	  His	  instrumental	  thesis	  is	  untenable	  as	  a	  version	  of	  legal	  moralism	  because,	  if	  we	  take	  seriously	  its	  commitment	  to	  preserving	  society,	  it	  loses	  its	  claim	  to	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morals	  as	  such;	  and,	  his	  non-­‐instrumental	  thesis	  presents	  a	  politically	  illegitimate	  justification	  for	  political	  action.	  	  	  
4.3.2	  –	  Devlin’s	  Instrumental	  Legal	  Moralism	  To	  resist	  the	  pull	  of	  the	  non-­‐instrumental	  thesis,	  Devlin’s	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  must	  maintain	  that	  the	  end	  of	  the	  legal	  enforcement	  of	  morals	  is	  the	  preservation	  of	  society	  or	  some	  other	  pressing	  societal	  objective	  that	  is	  essential	  in	  maintaining	  society’s	  integrity.	  	  Again,	  Devlin	  writes,	  “...	  before	  a	  society	  can	  put	  a	  practice	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  tolerance	  there	  must	  be	  a	  deliberate	  judgement	  that	  the	  practice	  is	  injurious	  to	  society.”34	  	  If,	  as	  the	  instrumental	  thesis	  holds,	  political	  authority	  is	  justified	  in	  legally	  enforcing	  community	  morals	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  17.	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protecting	  society	  from	  disintegration,	  before	  actually	  making	  putatively	  immoral	  conduct	  illegal,	  we	  must	  have	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  really	  is	  detrimental	  to	  society.	  	  But	  where	  the	  preservation	  of	  society	  is	  the	  ultimate	  goal,	  we	  can	  ask	  what	  role	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morals	  as	  such	  really	  plays	  in	  justifying	  criminal	  prohibitions.	  	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  argued	  that	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  the	  means	  of	  securing	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  falls	  within	  civil	  government’s	  jurisdiction	  and	  is	  a	  legitimate	  object	  of	  political	  action.	  	  Therefore,	  protecting	  society	  and	  its	  institutions,	  the	  very	  thing	  that	  enables	  any	  cooperative	  action	  for	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  is	  a	  legitimate	  end	  of	  the	  law.	  	  So,	  Devlin’s	  liberal	  opponents	  should	  readily	  concede	  that	  the	  coercive	  force	  of	  political	  authority	  may	  legitimately	  be	  used	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  preserving	  society	  insofar	  as	  society	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  political	  arrangement	  established	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  However,	  in	  doing	  so,	  they	  leave	  aside	  considerations	  of	  community	  moral	  standards	  entirely.	  We	  can	  reconcile	  the	  distinctively	  instrumental	  aspects	  of	  Devlin’s	  view	  with	  liberal	  statements	  of	  the	  legitimate	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  This	  shows	  that	  insofar	  as	  we	  are	  actively	  concerned	  with	  the	  preservation	  of	  society	  or	  other	  pressing	  societal	  goals,	  we	  do	  not	  concern	  ourselves	  with	  enforcing	  a	  community’s	  morals	  as	  such.	  	  That	  is,	  insofar	  as	  Devlin’s	  view	  retains	  the	  features	  that	  make	  it	  a	  distinctively	  instrumental	  form	  of	  legal	  moralism,	  it	  loses	  the	  essential	  feature	  that	  makes	  it	  legal	  moralism,	  namely,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morality	  as	  such.35	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  See	  note	  13	  above	  for	  my	  understanding	  of	  enforcing	  morality	  as	  such.	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We	  find	  a	  close	  parallel	  to	  the	  distinctively	  instrumental	  aspects	  of	  Devlin’s	  view	  in	  Locke’s	  Letter.	  	  Both	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  political	  action	  that	  preserves	  the	  integrity	  of	  society.	  	  In	  a	  passage	  that	  strongly	  resembles	  Devlin’s	  words,	  Locke	  writes,	  “No	  Opinions	  contrary	  to	  human	  Society,	  or	  to	  those	  moral	  Rules	  which	  are	  necessary	  to	  the	  preservation	  of	  Civil	  Society,	  are	  to	  be	  tolerated	  by	  the	  Magistrate.”36	  	  However,	  Locke	  ultimately	  argues	  for	  toleration	  of	  unpopular	  beliefs	  and	  practices,37	  while,	  on	  very	  similar	  premises,	  Devlin	  aims	  to	  justify	  intolerant	  conclusions.	  	  Locke’s	  argument	  and	  examples	  show	  that	  insofar	  as	  we	  concern	  ourselves	  with	  pressing	  societal	  objectives,	  there	  is	  no	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  enforce	  morality	  as	  such.	  For	  example,	  Locke	  infamously	  argued	  that	  Muslims	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  tolerated.38	  	  However,	  we	  must	  note	  that	  he	  argues	  against	  the	  toleration	  of	  Muslims	  for	  political	  rather	  than	  religious	  or	  moral	  reasons.	  	  Muslims,	  claimed	  Locke,	  necessarily	  find	  themselves	  loyal	  to	  a	  foreign	  political	  authority.	  	  He	  writes:	  	  	  That	  church	  can	  have	  no	  right	  to	  be	  tolerated	  by	  the	  magistrate,	  which	  is	  constituted	  upon	  such	  a	  bottom,	  that	  all	  those	  who	  enter	  into	  it,	  do	  thereby	  
ipso	  facto	  deliver	  themselves	  up	  to	  the	  protection	  and	  service	  of	  another	  prince.	  For	  by	  this	  means	  the	  magistrate	  would	  give	  way	  to	  the	  settling	  of	  a	  foreign	  jurisdiction	  in	  his	  own	  country,	  and	  suffer	  his	  own	  people	  to	  be	  listed,	  as	  it	  were,	  for	  soldiers	  against	  his	  own	  government.39	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Locke,	  John,	  A	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration,	  in	  David	  Wootton	  (ed.),	  John	  Locke:	  
Political	  Writings,	  (Indianapolis,	  IN:	  Hackett,	  2003),	  424.	  	  Hereafter	  cited	  as	  Letter.	  37	  The	  toleration	  for	  which	  Locke	  argues	  is	  not	  absolute.	  	  As	  I	  examine	  below,	  Locke	  acknowledges	  limits	  to	  his	  toleration.	  	  Here	  I	  mean	  only	  that	  he	  argues	  for	  toleration	  of	  unpopular	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  in	  that	  their	  unpopularity	  is	  never	  a	  salient	  reason	  for	  suppressing	  them.	  	  38	  Catholics,	  though	  Locke	  does	  not	  name	  them	  here,	  are	  supposed	  to	  fall	  outside	  Locke’s	  toleration	  for	  similar	  reasons.	  Locke,	  Letter,	  426.	  	  39	  Locke,	  Letter,	  426.	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Political	  authority	  is	  justified	  in	  acting	  to	  preserve	  political	  society,	  and	  expressions	  of	  loyalty	  to	  foreign	  powers	  threaten	  the	  integrity	  of	  society.	  	  Therefore,	  political	  authority	  is	  justified	  in	  prohibiting	  the	  outward	  expression	  of	  religious	  beliefs	  by	  Muslims	  and	  other	  groups	  that	  fall	  into	  this	  category.	  	  But	  it	  is	  imperative	  to	  note	  that	  Locke	  argues	  that	  Muslims	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  tolerated,	  not	  because	  the	  community	  regards	  their	  religious	  beliefs	  as	  sinful,	  but	  because	  he	  supposed	  their	  religious	  commitments	  to	  conflict	  with	  and	  supersede	  their	  political	  commitments	  making	  them	  unfit	  to	  participate	  in	  civil	  society.	  	  This	  becomes	  clear	  when,	  shortly	  after	  this	  argument	  for	  limiting	  toleration,	  he	  writes,	  “…neither	  Pagan,	  nor	  Mahometan,	  nor	  Jew,	  ought	  to	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  civil	  rights	  of	  the	  commonwealth,	  because	  of	  his	  religion.”40	  	  This	  is	  because,	  “…the	  commonwealth,	  which	  embraces	  indifferently	  all	  men	  that	  are	  honest,	  peaceable,	  and	  industrious,	  requires	  it	  not.”41	  	  So	  no	  individuals	  or	  groups,	  Muslims,	  Catholics,	  or	  any	  others,	  ought	  to	  be	  denied	  toleration	  simply	  because	  their	  beliefs	  are	  popularly	  regarded	  as	  false	  or	  offensive.	  	  As	  Locke	  writes,	  “…the	  business	  of	  laws	  is	  not	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  opinions,	  but	  for	  the	  safety	  and	  security	  of	  the	  commonwealth,	  and	  of	  every	  particular	  man’s	  goods	  and	  person.”42	  	  	  	  	  So,	  though	  Locke	  advocates	  for	  toleration,	  he	  sets	  out	  clear	  limits	  for	  its	  practice.	  	  Further,	  he	  defines	  these	  limits	  exclusively	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  need	  to	  preserve	  political	  society	  and	  secure	  political	  society’s	  ends.	  	  Community	  morals	  play	  no	  role	  in	  justifying	  the	  limits	  of	  toleration.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Locke,	  Letter,	  431.	  41	  Locke,	  Letter,	  431.	  42	  Locke,	  Letter,	  420.	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Devlin	  considers	  the	  example	  of	  widespread	  excessive	  drinking	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  show	  that	  there	  should	  be	  no	  theoretical	  limits	  to	  the	  state’s	  authority	  to	  legislate	  against	  immorality.	  	  But	  through	  this	  example	  we	  can	  see	  that,	  as	  with	  Locke’s	  arguments	  for	  limiting	  toleration,	  community	  morals	  do	  no	  work	  in	  justifying	  political	  action	  aimed	  at	  preserving	  society.	  	  Devlin	  prompts	  his	  reader	  to	  consider	  a	  society	  in	  which	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  population	  drinks	  excessively,	  and	  asks	  rhetorically,	  “what	  sort	  of	  society	  would	  it	  be?”43	  	  He	  suggests	  that	  if	  a	  community	  regards	  excessive	  drinking,	  even	  if	  only	  alone	  in	  one’s	  home,	  as	  immoral,	  then	  they	  may	  legitimately	  criminalize	  the	  sale	  or	  consumption	  of	  alcohol.	  	  However,	  if	  we	  take	  the	  instrumental	  thesis’	  commitment	  to	  the	  preservation	  of	  society	  seriously,	  to	  justify	  criminal	  prohibitions,	  we	  must	  identify	  the	  specific	  negative	  effects	  of	  excessive	  drinking	  on	  society.	  	  It	  may	  well	  be	  the	  case	  that	  a	  society	  in	  which	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  population	  drinks	  excessively	  cannot	  continue	  to	  function	  normally.	  	  If,	  for	  example,	  children’s	  caregivers,	  police	  officers,	  and	  other	  administrators	  of	  public	  services	  were	  unable	  to	  perform	  their	  duties	  due	  to	  rampant	  alcohol	  consumption,	  society	  would	  be	  at	  risk	  of	  disintegrating.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  society	  may	  justify	  prohibiting	  the	  sale	  and	  consumption	  of	  alcohol	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  protect	  their	  society	  against	  the	  ills	  of	  widespread	  drinking.44	  	  Devlin	  takes	  his	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  to	  justify	  the	  community’s	  attempt	  to	  eradicate	  excessive	  drinking;	  however,	  in	  the	  end,	  we	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  perceived	  immorality	  of	  excessive	  drinking	  to	  establishing	  the	  need	  for	  restrictions.	  	  Rather,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  14.	  44	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  14.	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the	  damage	  to	  society	  that	  widespread	  alcohol	  consumption	  occasions	  justifies	  the	  restrictions,	  independently	  of	  any	  consideration	  of	  morals.45	  Devlin	  claims	  that	  he	  advocates	  for,	  “toleration	  of	  the	  maximum	  individual	  freedom	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  integrity	  of	  society.”46	  	  Locke’s	  arguments	  in	  his	  
Letter	  unfold	  along	  very	  similar	  lines,	  however,	  Locke	  ultimately	  argues	  for	  the	  toleration	  of	  unpopular	  beliefs	  and	  practices,	  while	  Devlin	  ultimately	  argues	  for	  the	  suppression	  of	  such	  things.	  	  The	  main	  thrust	  of	  Devlin’s	  arguments	  is	  that	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	  enforce	  community	  moral	  standards.	  	  The	  main	  thrust	  of	  Locke’s	  arguments	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not.	  	  Both	  claim	  to	  ultimately	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  preservation	  of	  society;	  however,	  Locke	  shows	  that	  as	  long	  as	  we	  concern	  ourselves	  exclusively	  with	  the	  preservation	  of	  society,	  there	  is	  no	  conceptual	  space	  for	  enforcing	  morals	  as	  such.47	  Instrumental	  legal	  moralism,	  insofar	  as	  it	  takes	  seriously	  the	  end	  for	  which	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morals	  is	  supposedly	  instrumental,	  namely,	  the	  preservation	  of	  society,	  ends	  up	  neglecting	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morals	  as	  such.	  	  The	  preservation	  of	  society	  is	  a	  legitimate	  end	  of	  political	  action	  independently	  of	  community	  morals.	  	  If,	  as	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  holds,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morals	  is	  only	  justified	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  preserving	  society,	  and	  preserving	  society	  is	  justified	  on	  grounds	  entirely	  independent	  of	  community	  morals,	  then	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  becomes	  a	  conceptually	  untenable	  version	  of	  legal	  moralism.	  	  That	  is,	  instrumental	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Devlin	  does	  not	  spell	  it	  out	  like	  this.	  	  Here	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  his	  excessive	  drinking	  example	  in	  line	  with	  a	  distinctively	  instrumental	  reading	  of	  his	  legal	  moralism.	  	  As	  Devlin	  presents	  it,	  the	  excessive	  drinking	  example	  is	  ambiguous	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  his	  legal	  moralism	  generally	  is.	  	  46	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals,	  16.	  47	  See	  note	  13	  above.	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legal	  moralism	  fails	  to	  justify	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morals	  such	  that	  immorality	  itself	  is	  a	  salient	  reason	  for	  criminalization.	  	  	  
4.3.3	  –	  Devlin’s	  Non-­instrumental	  Legal	  Moralism	  Again,	  unlike	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism,	  which	  regards	  the	  legal	  enforcement	  of	  morality	  as	  instrumental	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  society,	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  regards	  the	  legal	  enforcement	  of	  morality	  as	  an	  essential	  facet	  of	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system.	  Instrumental	  legal	  moralists	  advocate	  the	  legal	  enforcement	  of	  morality	  with	  a	  view	  to	  the	  damage	  to	  society	  that	  immoral	  conduct	  occasions;	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralists	  do	  not.	  	  Again,	  Devlin	  appears	  to	  advance	  the	  quintessential	  account	  of	  the	  instrumental	  thesis.	  	  However,	  insofar	  as	  he	  presents	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morals	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  society	  as	  a	  necessary	  truth,	  or	  a	  priori	  assumption,	  or	  insofar	  as	  he	  mistakenly	  identifies	  society	  with	  its	  morals	  at	  a	  particular	  moment	  in	  history,	  he	  forfeits	  any	  plausible	  claim	  to	  instrumental	  legal	  moralism.	  	  Instead,	  we	  must	  understand	  Devlin’s	  position	  as	  an	  instantiation	  of	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  that	  aims	  at	  the	  preservation	  of	  morals	  for	  their	  own	  sake.	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Insofar	  as	  we	  can	  understand	  Devlin	  as	  advancing	  a	  version	  of	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism,	  his	  justification	  for	  criminal	  prohibitions	  is	  politically	  illegitimate.	  	  Non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism,	  coupled	  with	  community	  morals	  as	  the	  standard	  of	  morality,	  results	  in	  a	  moral	  conservatism	  aimed	  at	  preserving	  the	  particular	  character	  of	  the	  community’s	  morals.	  	  Further,	  it	  justifies	  preserving	  community	  morals	  without	  appealing	  to	  any	  further	  end.	  	  Communities	  may	  enforce	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their	  morals	  to	  preserve	  the	  particular	  character	  of	  their	  moral	  code	  as	  they	  see	  fit.	  	  On	  this	  model,	  the	  morality	  that	  Devlin	  argues	  for	  enforcing	  closely	  resembles	  a	  set	  of	  life	  values	  that	  I	  rule	  out	  as	  a	  possible	  object	  of	  agreement	  among	  independent	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.48	  	  There	  I	  define	  life	  plans	  and	  values	  as	  the	  values	  according	  to	  which	  persons	  desire	  to	  live	  their	  lives	  and	  argue	  that	  any	  attempt	  at	  agreement	  among	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  on	  the	  inclusion	  of	  substantive	  aspects	  of	  life	  plans	  and	  values	  among	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  political	  authority	  would	  be	  either	  oppressive	  or	  superfluous.49	  	  Community	  morals	  of	  the	  kind	  Devlin	  advocates	  enforcing	  through	  the	  criminal	  law	  are	  no	  more	  than	  values	  and	  life	  plans	  that	  a	  community	  supposedly	  favours,	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  could	  similarly	  not	  be	  the	  object	  of	  agreement	  among	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  for	  protection	  and	  promotion	  in	  political	  society.	  	  	  	  	  	  Additionally,	  Devlin’s	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism,	  because	  it	  is	  non-­‐committal	  on	  the	  content	  of	  community’s	  morals,	  would	  justify	  societies	  in	  legally	  enforcing	  substantively	  unjust	  moral	  codes.	  	  In	  arguing	  that	  societies	  may	  legitimately	  enforce	  their	  morals	  through	  the	  criminal	  law,	  he	  makes	  no	  distinction	  between	  societies	  whose	  prevailing	  morality	  condones	  violence,	  oppression,	  or	  even	  slavery,	  of	  which	  there	  are	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  examples,	  and	  societies	  committed	  to	  comprehensive	  personal	  rights	  and	  freedoms.	  	  Devlin	  took	  his	  own	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  See	  3.4,	  102-­‐104	  above.	  49	  Briefly,	  a	  lack	  of	  enforcement	  of	  substantive	  life	  plans	  and	  values	  is	  only	  a	  problem	  persons’	  face	  outside	  of	  political	  society	  if	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  could	  not	  all	  agree	  to	  enforcement	  without	  some	  subordinating	  their	  aims	  and	  interests	  to	  others’.	  	  The	  enforcement	  of	  substantive	  life	  plans	  and	  values	  is	  oppressive	  if	  all	  persons’	  could	  not	  agree	  to	  it	  (in	  light	  of	  their	  independence),	  and	  superfluous	  if	  all	  persons’	  could	  (in	  light	  of	  the	  problems	  they	  would	  face	  outside	  of	  political	  society).	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society’s	  morals	  to	  disapprove	  of	  homosexuality,	  and,	  contra	  the	  Wolfenden	  Report’s	  recommendations,	  argued	  for	  the	  right	  of	  his	  society	  to	  prohibit	  homosexual	  conduct.	  	  These	  considerations	  make	  the	  version	  of	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  that	  we	  can	  attribute	  to	  Devlin	  very	  unappealing.50	  	  	  In	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  look	  at	  a	  new	  school	  of	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  that	  does	  not	  suffer	  from	  this	  defect.	  	  Rather,	  it	  aims	  to	  justify	  the	  legal	  enforcement	  of	  true	  moral	  principles	  that	  are	  substantively	  liberal,	  and	  it	  does	  so	  in	  a	  careful	  and	  limited	  way.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  has	  gained	  widespread	  acceptance	  among	  criminal	  law	  theorists.	  	  However,	  as	  I	  argue,	  even	  in	  its	  strongest	  form,	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  provides	  a	  politically	  illegitimate	  justification	  for	  political	  action.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  One	  might	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  third	  interpretation	  of	  Devlin’s	  legal	  moralism	  that	  I	  have	  failed	  to	  consider.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  strongest	  interpretation	  of	  Devlin’s	  legal	  moralism	  is	  that	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morals	  is	  necessary	  to	  establish	  a	  kind	  of	  social	  cohesion	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  society.	  	  This	  interpretation	  does	  not	  solve	  any	  of	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  Devlin’s	  view;	  it	  only	  postpones	  them.	  	  If	  the	  morals	  of	  the	  community	  are	  substantively	  unjust,	  social	  cohesion	  that	  preserves	  a	  society	  that	  reflects	  them,	  as	  Hart	  argues,	  should	  probably	  not	  be	  promoted	  (Hart,	  
Law,	  Liberty,	  and	  Morality,	  19).	  	  If	  the	  society	  aims	  at	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  and	  promoting	  moral	  ideas	  fosters	  social	  cohesion	  in	  a	  way	  that	  stabilizes	  legitimate	  political	  institutions	  as	  discussed	  above	  (4.3.1,	  116),	  then	  we	  should	  regard	  the	  promotion	  of	  those	  ideas	  as	  legitimate.	  	  However,	  these	  moral	  ideas	  are	  not	  the	  community’s	  morals	  that	  Devlin	  advocates	  enforcing.	  	  Rather,	  they	  are	  ideas	  that	  reflect	  a	  liberal	  political	  morality	  (more	  political	  morality	  below,	  4.4.4).	  	  If,	  for	  some	  reason,	  enforcing	  community	  morals	  that	  do	  not	  reflect	  a	  liberal	  political	  morality	  fosters	  social	  cohesion	  that	  nonetheless	  stabilizes	  legitimate	  political	  institutions,	  then	  I	  suppose	  promoting	  them	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  legitimate,	  but,	  again,	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  qualify	  as	  enforcing	  morals	  as	  such.	  	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  how	  Alan	  Ryan	  regards	  Hobbes’	  requirement	  of	  uniformity	  of	  public	  religious	  worship.	  	  But	  Ryan	  argues	  that	  this	  makes	  Hobbes	  tolerant	  as	  it	  turns	  public	  religious	  worship	  merely	  into	  a	  “police	  matter”	  (See	  2.3,	  64	  	  above.	  	  Ryan,	  Alan,	  “A	  More	  Tolerant	  Hobbes?”	  Susan	  Mendus	  (ed.),	  Justifying	  Toleration:	  
Conceptual	  and	  Historical	  Perspectives,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1988),	  57).	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4.4	  –	  Non-­instrumental	  Legal	  Moralism	  is	  Politically	  Illegitimate	  
4.4.1	  –	  Moore	  and	  Duff’s	  Legal	  Moralism	  	  Moore	  and	  Duff	  each	  argue	  that	  moral	  wrongs	  are	  the	  proper	  object	  of	  the	  criminal	  law.	  	  For	  Moore,	  the	  requirement	  that	  criminal	  wrongs	  be	  moral	  wrongs	  follows	  from	  his	  theory	  of	  the	  function	  of	  the	  criminal	  law	  and	  his	  theory	  of	  punishment.	  	  Moore	  argues	  that	  the	  function	  of	  the	  criminal	  law	  is	  to	  achieve	  retributive	  justice.	  	  Retributive	  theories	  of	  punishment	  hold	  that	  wrongful	  action	  merits	  punishment,	  full	  stop.	  	  Punishment	  does	  not	  serve	  any	  further	  end	  than	  responding	  to	  wrongful	  conduct.	  	  So,	  Moore	  contends,	  the	  proper	  aim	  of	  the	  criminal	  law	  is	  to	  mete	  out	  deserved	  punishment;	  and,	  one	  cannot	  deserve	  punishment	  unless	  he	  has	  committed	  a	  wrong,	  specifically,	  a	  moral	  wrong.	  	  After	  all,	  as	  Moore	  asks,	  “What	  is	  there	  to	  pay	  for	  if	  one	  has	  done	  no	  moral	  wrong?”51	  	  Immorality	  is	  therefore	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  criminalization.	  	  Strengthening	  his	  claim,	  Moore	  states	  that,	  “The	  moral	  wrongness	  of	  any	  sort	  of	  behaviour…	  is	  always	  some	  reason	  to	  legislate	  against	  it	  in	  the	  criminal	  law.”52	  	  For	  Moore,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  prima	  facie	  reason	  for	  criminalizing	  all	  moral	  wrongs.	  	  From	  this	  seemingly	  simplistic	  legal	  moralism,	  Moore	  offers	  a	  number	  of	  “limitations	  and	  qualifications”.	  	  	  These	  include	  a	  relatively	  minimal	  view	  of	  the	  content	  of	  morality,	  epistemic	  caution	  in	  assessing	  moral	  truth,	  a	  presumption	  in	  favour	  of	  liberty,	  and	  an	  occasional	  right	  to	  do	  wrong.53	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Duff’s	  argument	  follows	  a	  similar	  pattern;	  however,	  he	  locates	  the	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  criminal	  justice	  not	  in	  punishment,	  but,	  rather,	  in	  the	  criminal	  trial.	  	  Duff	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Moore,	  Michael,	  Placing	  Blame,	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1997),	  70.	  52	  Moore,	  Placing	  Blame,	  72.	  53	  Moore,	  “A	  Tale	  of	  Two	  Theories,”	  32-­‐33.	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argues	  that	  the	  criminal	  trial	  is	  a	  large-­‐scale,	  institutionalized	  version	  of	  the	  common	  practice	  of	  calling	  persons	  to	  account	  for	  their	  moral	  wrongdoing.	  	  Duff	  suggests	  that	  the	  defining	  feature	  of	  the	  criminal	  law	  is	  that	  it	  condemns	  the	  conduct	  that	  it	  prohibits.54	  	  One	  might	  object	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  criminal	  law	  is	  merely	  to	  deter	  undesirable	  conduct;	  however,	  as	  Duff	  points	  out,	  governments	  can	  curb	  undesirable	  conduct	  through	  taxation,	  or	  education.	  	  When	  we	  criminalize	  conduct,	  we	  clearly	  and	  forcefully	  condemn	  it.	  	  To	  be	  justified	  in	  this	  condemnatory	  act,	  and	  to	  call	  persons	  to	  answer	  for	  their	  actions	  as	  Duff	  suggests	  we	  do	  in	  criminal	  trials,	  criminal	  law	  must	  take	  immoral	  conduct	  as	  its	  object.55	  	  Duff,	  however,	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  the	  criminal	  law	  ought	  to	  concern	  itself	  with	  all	  moral	  wrongs.	  	  Rather,	  the	  criminal	  law	  ought	  to	  concern	  itself	  exclusively	  with	  a	  subset	  of	  moral	  wrongs,	  what	  he	  calls	  public	  wrongs.	  	  Duff	  argues	  that	  public	  wrongs	  are	  wrongs	  that	  concern	  persons	  in	  their	  role	  as	  citizens,	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  the,	  “defining	  aims	  and	  values”	  of	  the	  polity.56	  	  While	  Duff	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  full	  account	  of	  the	  aims	  and	  values	  of	  liberal	  polities,	  he	  provides	  examples	  of	  crimes	  that	  we	  can	  safely	  suppose	  represent	  “serious	  violations	  of	  any	  polity’s	  core	  values,”	  namely,	  murder,	  serious	  physical	  assault,	  rape,	  and	  attacks	  on	  property.57	  	  These	  wrongs,	  Duff	  argues,	  ought	  to	  be	  criminalized	  by	  any	  political	  society	  concerned	  with	  protecting	  citizens,	  and	  allowing	  them	  to	  live	  ordinary	  lives.	  	  The	  implication	  of	  this	  claim	  is	  that	  protecting	  citizens’	  lives,	  and	  assuring	  them	  a	  space	  to	  live	  a	  life	  of	  their	  choosing,	  are	  essential	  aims	  for	  all	  political	  societies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Duff,	  Antony,	  Answering	  for	  Crime,	  (Portland,	  OR:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2007),	  81.	  55	  Duff,	  Answering	  for	  Crime,	  81,	  93.	  56	  Duff,	  Answering	  for	  Crime,	  142.	  57	  Duff,	  Answering	  for	  Crime,	  143.	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It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  for	  Duff	  public	  wrongs	  are	  a	  subset	  of	  pre-­legal	  moral	  wrongs.58	  	  By	  emphasizing	  that	  morality	  is	  pre-­‐legal,	  Duff	  pushes	  us	  to	  conceive	  morality	  as	  conceptually	  prior	  to	  legality	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  defining	  wrongs	  in	  political	  society.	  	  Though	  the	  notion	  of	  “the	  public"	  functions	  to	  whittle	  down	  the	  class	  of	  moral	  wrongs	  that	  are	  uniquely	  appropriate	  for	  enforcement	  in	  political	  society,	  those	  wrongs	  are	  identified	  as	  moral	  wrongs	  independently	  of,	  and	  prior	  to,	  a	  conception	  of	  a	  legal	  system,	  and	  of	  a	  political	  system	  in	  which	  the	  legal	  system	  play	  a	  part.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  Duff’s	  public	  wrongs	  are	  pre-­‐legal,	  and,	  further,	  pre-­‐political.59	  	  And,	  it	  is	  in	  light	  of	  his	  commitment	  to	  the	  enforcement	  of	  pre-­‐political	  morality	  that	  his	  non-­‐instrumental	  moralism	  is	  most	  pronounced.	  	  	  
4.4.2	  –	  Public	  Wrongs	  as	  Political	  Wrongs	  Duff’s	  identification	  of	  criminal	  wrongs	  as	  public	  wrongs	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  largely	  correct.	  	  Though	  Duff	  does	  not	  formulate	  a	  complete	  account	  of	  the	  aims	  of	  political	  cooperation,	  the	  examples	  he	  gives,	  and	  quick	  implications	  he	  draws,	  are	  consonant	  with	  the	  argument	  I	  developed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  He	  categorizes	  wrongs	  as	  public	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  aims	  and	  values	  of	  the	  polity,	  and,	  the	  examples	  of	  crimes	  he	  gives	  are	  emblematic	  of	  a	  political	  society	  committed	  to	  the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  of	  life	  and	  liberty.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  argue	  against	  the	  inclusion	  of	  life	  plans	  and	  values	  in	  the	  aims	  and	  values	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Duff,	  Answering	  for	  Crime,	  86.	  	  Thorburn,	  Malcolm,	  “Criminal	  Law	  as	  Public	  Law,”	  R.	  A.	  Duff	  and	  S.	  Green	  (eds.),	  Philosophical	  Foundations	  of	  Criminal	  Law	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  23. 59	  The	  system	  of	  political	  cooperation	  plays	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  whittling	  down	  the	  scope	  of	  wrongs	  that	  are	  appropriate	  to	  enforce,	  but	  not	  in	  defining	  them	  as	  wrong.	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of	  political	  society,	  and,	  as	  I	  argue	  below,	  pre-­‐political	  morality	  is	  relevantly	  similar	  to	  a	  set	  of	  life	  values.	  	  Therefore,	  concerns	  for	  morality	  as	  such	  cannot	  be	  the	  impetus	  of	  political	  action,	  and,	  in	  the	  present	  discussion,	  morality	  simpliciter	  cannot	  serve	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  criminal	  law.	  	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  social	  contract	  argument	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter	  shows	  that	  the	  enforcement	  of	  pre-­‐legal	  or	  pre-­‐political	  morality	  is	  illegitimate.	  	  That	  is,	  Duff	  errs	  in	  assuming	  that	  public	  wrongs	  must	  be	  a	  subset	  of	  pre-­‐political	  moral	  wrongs.	  	  Rather,	  we	  can	  animate	  Duff’s	  notion	  of	  public	  wrongs	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  criminal	  law	  while	  eschewing	  his	  moralism	  if	  we	  appeal	  solely	  to	  the	  ends	  of	  political	  cooperation,	  without	  a	  concern	  for	  true	  pre-­‐political	  morality.	  Pre-­‐political	  morality	  cannot	  legitimately	  be	  the	  impetus	  for	  political	  action,	  and	  cannot	  be	  a	  legitimate	  justification	  for	  the	  criminal	  law	  in	  general,	  or	  particular	  criminal	  laws.	  	  This	  follows	  from	  the	  contractarian	  argument	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  There	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  only	  legitimate	  ends	  of	  political	  action	  are	  the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  persons’	  civil	  interests.	  	  Further,	  I	  suggested	  that	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  include	  only	  their	  lives	  and	  liberty,	  and	  cannot	  include	  the	  substance	  of	  their	  life	  plans	  and	  values.	  	  Briefly,	  this	  is	  because	  to	  determine	  the	  legitimate	  ends	  of	  political	  action,	  we	  must	  consider	  the	  unique	  undertaking	  that	  political	  cooperation	  is.	  	  That	  is,	  our	  answer	  to	  the	  question,	  “what	  are	  the	  legitimate	  ends	  of	  political	  society	  and	  authority?”	  must	  respect	  the	  conditions	  that	  make	  political	  society	  both	  necessary	  and	  possible.	  	  Protecting	  persons’	  lives	  and	  liberty	  responds	  to	  a	  problem	  that	  persons	  would	  face	  outside	  of	  political	  society,	  and	  could	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be	  the	  object	  of	  agreement	  among	  independent	  persons.60	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  life	  values	  either	  does	  not	  respond	  to	  a	  problem	  that	  persons	  would	  face	  outside	  of	  political	  society,	  or	  could	  not	  be	  the	  object	  of	  agreement	  among	  independent	  persons	  endeavouring	  to	  cooperate	  politically.61	  	  	  	  I	  contend	  that,	  on	  the	  contractarian	  standard	  on	  which	  I	  rely,	  pre-­‐political	  morality	  is	  sufficiently	  similar	  to	  a	  set	  of	  life	  values,	  and,	  therefore,	  is	  not	  a	  legitimate	  ground	  for	  political	  action.	  	  Like	  the	  enforcement	  of	  a	  set	  of	  life	  values,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morality	  as	  such	  would	  be	  either	  oppressive	  or	  superfluous	  to	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract.62	  	  As	  Arthur	  Kuflik	  points	  out,	  we	  should	  expect	  disagreement	  about	  the	  content	  of	  morality	  among	  independent	  persons.63	  	  	  If	  persons	  could	  not	  agree	  on	  the	  content	  of	  morality,	  its	  enforcement	  would	  be	  oppressive.	  	  Some	  persons’	  participation	  in	  political	  society	  would	  require	  them	  to	  subordinate	  their	  conceptions	  of	  morality,	  and	  therefore,	  their	  life	  plans	  and	  values,	  to	  others’	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  political	  participation.	  If	  they	  could	  agree	  on	  the	  content	  of	  morality,	  it	  would	  be	  unnecessary	  to	  charge	  political	  authority	  with	  its	  enforcement.64	  	  Persons	  would	  need	  to,	  and	  could	  agree	  to,	  charge	  political	  authority	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  See	  3.4	  above.	  61	  See	  3.4,	  102-­‐104	  above.	  	  And	  on	  the	  worry	  of	  smuggling	  in	  pre-­‐political	  rights	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  see	  2.2,	  39-­‐41,	  52,	  on	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  social	  contract	  of	  Locke’s	  Second	  Treatise	  (strong	  pre-­‐political	  rights	  and	  obligations	  institutionalized	  in	  political	  society),	  and	  the	  social	  contract	  of	  Locke’s	  Letters	  (pre-­‐political	  independence	  and	  the	  social	  contract	  to	  protect	  and	  promote	  civil	  interests).	  62	  Wootton,	  David,	  Introduction	  to	  John	  Locke:	  Political	  Writings,	  (Indianapolis,	  IN:	  Hackett,	  2003),	  100.	  63	  Kuflik,	  Arthur.	  “Liberalism,	  Legal	  Moralism	  and	  Moral	  Disagreement.”	  Journal	  of	  
Applied	  Philosophy,	  Vol.	  22,	  No.	  2,	  2005,	  190.	  64	  See	  3.4,	  102-­‐104	  above.	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  agreement	  on	  morality	  appears	  to	  be	  necessary	  and	  possible	  for	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract,	  I	  contend	  that	  this	  agreement	  is	  actually	  an	  agreement	  on	  political	  principles	  and,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  is	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with	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  only	  their	  civil	  interests,	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  their	  lives	  and	  liberty.	  	  	  More	  important	  than	  the	  classification	  of	  particular	  things	  as	  civil	  interests,	  is	  the	  role	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  argument	  in	  demonstrating	  that	  the,	  in	  Duff’s	  words,	  “defining	  aims	  and	  values”	  of	  the	  polity	  ought	  to	  be	  specified	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  endeavour	  of	  cooperating	  politically,	  and	  not	  by	  any	  pre-­‐political	  values,	  religious,	  moral,	  or	  otherwise.	  	  To	  make	  a	  legitimate	  claim	  on	  persons,	  we	  must	  understand	  political	  action,	  including,	  and	  perhaps	  especially,	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  criminal	  law,	  to	  advance	  the	  aims	  and	  values	  that	  independent	  persons	  engaging	  in	  political	  cooperation	  could	  agree	  to.	  	  To	  enforce	  pre-­‐political	  values	  on	  persons,	  understood	  as	  values	  defined	  conceptually	  prior	  to	  political	  cooperation,	  is	  to	  make	  an	  illegitimate	  claim	  on	  them.	  	  It	  amounts	  to	  coercing	  conformity	  to	  aims	  and	  values	  established	  independently	  of	  persons’	  political	  cooperation,	  rather	  than	  because	  they	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  aims	  and	  values	  that	  all	  participants	  in	  political	  society	  would	  and	  could	  endorse.65	  	  So,	  in	  large	  part,	  Duff	  is	  correct	  that	  criminal	  law	  ought	  to	  concern	  itself	  with	  public	  wrongs,	  and	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  understand	  public	  wrongs	  as	  actions	  that	  undermine	  the	  defining	  aims	  and	  values	  of	  the	  polity.	  	  However,	  Duff	  is	  incorrect	  in	  assuming	  that	  the	  wrongness	  of	  public	  wrongs	  must	  emanate	  from	  their	  inclusion	  among	  the	  class	  of	  pre-­‐political	  moral	  wrongs.	  	  Rather,	  we	  ought	  to	  understand	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  an	  agreement	  on	  morality,	  it	  is	  an	  agreement	  on	  political	  morality.	  	  Substantively	  liberal	  accounts	  of	  morality	  will	  mirror	  liberal	  political	  principles.	  	  I	  consider	  this	  further	  at	  4.4.2,	  133-­‐134,	  and	  4.4.4	  below.	  	  	  65	  And,	  as	  I	  argue	  below,	  this	  feature	  of	  legal	  moralism	  undermines	  legal	  moralists	  like	  Duff	  and	  Moore’s	  core	  commitment	  to	  respect	  for	  persons.	  	  See	  4.4.3	  below.	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public	  wrongs	  as	  wrongs	  that	  refer	  to	  the	  defining	  aims	  and	  values	  of	  “the	  public,”	  understood	  as	  political	  cooperation	  between	  independent	  persons,	  and	  no	  further.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralists	  like	  Duff	  or	  Moore,	  and	  contractarian	  liberals	  (who	  define	  the	  legitimate	  aims	  and	  values	  of	  political	  society	  as	  those	  that	  independent	  persons	  engaging	  in	  political	  cooperation	  could	  agree	  to),	  may	  well	  make	  similar	  assessments	  of	  actual	  systems	  of	  criminal	  law.	  	  That	  is,	  so	  long	  as	  the	  legal	  moralist	  has	  a	  sufficiently	  liberal	  account	  of	  “true	  morality,”	  the	  criminal	  laws,	  and	  limits,	  for	  which	  they	  advocate	  will	  be	  very	  similar	  to	  those	  endorsed	  by	  contractarian	  liberals.	  	  Moore	  acknowledges	  that	  his	  theory	  is	  “liberal-­‐in-­‐content	  if	  illiberal-­‐in-­‐form”.66	  	  Malcolm	  Thorburn	  says	  of	  Moore’s	  theory	  that	  it	  “provides	  illiberal	  arguments	  for	  designing	  a	  system	  of	  criminal	  law	  that	  would	  look	  a	  lot	  like	  the	  sort	  of	  system	  of	  which	  a	  liberal	  would	  approve.”67	  	  My	  disagreement	  with	  legal	  moralists	  like	  Moore	  and	  Duff	  then	  is	  essentially	  philosophical.	  	  More	  precisely,	  given	  that	  philosophical	  disagreement	  can	  occur	  at	  various	  levels,	  my	  philosophical	  disagreement	  with	  legal	  moralists	  occurs	  at	  the	  political	  level.	  	  That	  is,	  we	  disagree	  about	  what	  the	  criminal	  law	  ought	  fundamentally	  to	  be	  concerned	  with,	  and	  the	  precise	  claim	  that	  it	  makes	  on	  persons,	  even	  though	  we	  will	  likely	  agree	  on	  what	  the	  content	  of	  criminal	  law	  ought	  to	  be.	  	  Further,	  I	  contend	  that	  the	  plausibility	  of	  any	  particular	  version	  of	  legal	  moralism,	  especially	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  liberals,	  hinges	  on	  the	  moralist’s	  basis	  of	  true	  morality	  mirroring	  the	  contractarian	  liberal	  basis	  for	  political	  society.	  	  The	  contractarian	  liberal	  account	  of	  political	  society	  starts	  with	  the	  assumption	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Moore,	  Placing	  Blame,	  80	  	  67	  Thorburn,	  “Constitutionalism	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Law,”	  91.	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persons’	  independence	  from	  natural	  authority	  and	  develops	  standards	  of	  conduct	  by	  considering	  the	  ends	  of	  persons	  cooperating	  politically,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  by	  considering	  the	  shape	  that	  political	  society	  must	  take	  to	  be	  acceptable	  to	  the	  participants.	  	  This	  is	  an	  account	  of	  political	  society	  and	  political	  action.	  	  Importantly,	  it	  is	  a	  liberal	  account	  of	  political	  society	  and	  action	  in	  that	  it	  assumes	  persons	  independence,	  is	  non-­‐committal	  on	  fundamental	  moral	  truth,	  and,	  therefore,	  provides	  the	  space	  for	  substantial	  personal	  liberties.	  	  The	  comparable	  account	  of	  political	  action	  put	  forward	  by	  legal	  moralists	  contends	  that	  standards	  of	  true	  morality	  ought	  to	  be	  legally	  enforced.	  	  This	  account	  of	  political	  action,	  as	  Moore	  acknowledges,	  is	  decidedly	  illiberal.	  	  On	  the	  political	  theoretical	  level,	  the	  liberal	  and	  the	  legal	  moralist	  are	  sharply	  opposed.	  	  However,	  when	  legal	  moralists	  fill	  in	  their	  account	  of	  political	  action	  with	  a	  substantively	  liberal	  account	  of	  morality,	  that	  is,	  an	  account	  of	  morality	  that	  mirrors	  the	  political	  liberal’s	  account	  of	  legitimate	  political	  action	  by	  acknowledging	  the	  centrality	  of	  persons’	  independence,	  or	  advocating	  for	  a	  series	  of	  personal	  liberties,	  the	  space	  between	  the	  political	  liberal	  and	  the	  legal	  moralist	  appears	  to	  shrink.	  	  Moore	  and	  Duff’s	  legal	  moralisms	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  substantively	  liberal	  versions	  of	  legal	  moralism.	  	  	  Though	  the	  systems	  of	  criminal	  law	  that	  liberal	  legal	  moralists	  like	  Moore	  and	  Duff,	  and	  a	  contractarian	  political	  liberal	  like	  myself,	  would	  endorse	  might	  be	  nearly	  indistinguishable,	  this	  analysis	  reveals	  the	  illiberal	  and	  politically	  illegitimate	  claims	  that	  all	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralists	  take	  the	  criminal	  law	  to	  make	  on	  persons.	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4.4.3	  –	  Respect	  for	  Persons	  The	  putative	  virtue	  of	  Duff	  and	  Moore’s	  versions	  of	  legal	  moralism	  is	  that	  they	  show	  a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  respect	  for	  persons.	  	  In	  fact,	  their	  moralism	  flows	  directly	  from	  features	  of	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system	  that	  they	  take	  to	  be	  essential	  for	  showing	  due	  respect	  for	  persons.	  	  Again,	  Moore’s	  legal	  moralism	  follows	  from	  his	  retributivist	  theory	  of	  punishment.	  	  He,	  like	  other	  retributivists,	  justifies	  his	  approach	  to	  criminal	  punishment	  by	  contrasting	  it	  with	  utilitarian	  theories	  that	  justify	  punishment	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  positive	  social	  outcomes	  that	  punishment	  can	  occasion	  through	  incapacitation	  and	  deterrence.68	  	  Utilitarian	  theories,	  however,	  treat	  persons	  as	  tools	  to	  achieve	  broader	  social	  benefits,	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  fail	  to	  show	  persons	  the	  respect	  that	  is	  due	  to	  them	  as	  entities	  with	  capacities	  and	  ends	  of	  their	  own.	  	  Punishment,	  retributivists	  contend,	  is	  only	  consistent	  with	  respect	  for	  persons	  if	  we	  understand	  it	  as	  the	  proper	  response	  to	  wrongdoing	  itself.	  	  Punishment	  is	  then	  justified	  in	  reference	  to	  persons	  themselves,	  and	  their	  culpable	  conduct,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  diffuse	  benefits	  to	  others.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  we	  can	  understand	  his	  moralism	  as	  motivated	  by	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  respect	  for	  persons.	  	  Duff’s	  theory	  is	  also	  animated	  by	  a	  keen	  commitment	  to	  respect	  for	  persons.	  Again,	  his	  moralism	  follows	  from	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  trial	  to	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system.	  	  Duff	  envisions	  the	  criminal	  trial	  as	  a	  large-­‐scale,	  institutionalized	  version	  of	  the	  common	  moral	  practice	  of	  calling	  persons	  to	  account	  for	  their	  immoral	  action.	  	  It	  is	  an	  opportunity	  for	  those	  accused	  of	  criminal	  conduct	  to	  justify	  their	  actions,	  or	  take	  responsibility	  for	  their	  wrongful	  conduct.	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  persons	  that	  we	  do	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Moore,	  Placing	  Blame,	  Chapter	  2.	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not	  expect	  to	  answer	  for	  their	  wrongful	  conduct	  include	  young	  children	  and	  persons	  with	  a	  diminished	  capacity	  for	  responsible	  action.	  	  Calling	  persons	  to	  account	  for	  their	  wrongful	  conduct	  is	  a	  show	  of	  respect	  for	  their	  personhood,	  for	  their	  responsibility	  over	  their	  actions.69	  	  In	  the	  everyday	  context	  we	  expect	  to	  hold	  persons	  to	  account	  for	  their	  moral	  wrongs.	  	  In	  the	  political	  context,	  we	  should	  similarly	  expect	  persons	  to	  answer	  for	  their	  public	  moral	  wrongs.	  	  	  We	  ought	  to	  praise	  Moore	  and	  Duff’s	  theories	  of	  criminal	  law	  for	  their	  commitment	  to	  promoting	  a	  view	  of	  criminal	  justice	  that	  aims	  to	  show	  due	  respect	  to	  persons.	  	  However,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  strength	  of	  this	  commitment	  to	  respect	  for	  persons	  is	  only	  decisive	  over	  alternative	  conceptions	  of	  law	  when	  considering	  the	  criminal	  law	  in	  isolation.	  	  If	  instead	  we	  consider	  criminal	  law	  as	  a	  subset	  of	  political	  action,	  emanating	  from	  political	  authority,70	  and	  governing	  the	  relationships	  between	  independent	  persons	  engaged	  in	  political	  cooperation,	  as	  contractarian	  liberals	  do,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  legal	  moralism	  to	  which	  Moore	  and	  Duff	  commit	  themselves	  undermines	  their	  commitment	  to	  respect	  for	  persons.	  	  	  We	  can	  contrast	  the	  claims	  that	  legal	  moralists,	  like	  Moore	  and	  Duff,	  and	  contractarian	  liberals	  take	  the	  criminal	  law	  to	  make	  on	  persons	  by	  considering	  the	  example	  of	  a	  religious	  extremist	  who	  attempts	  to	  justify	  a	  criminal	  act	  by	  appealing	  to	  his	  religious	  beliefs.	  	  Suppose	  a	  citizen	  bases	  his	  conception	  of	  morality	  on	  religious	  teachings.	  	  Suppose	  further	  that	  his	  religion	  holds	  that	  apostates	  ought	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Thorburn,	  “Constitutionalism	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Law,”	  94.	  	  Duff,	  
Answering	  for	  Crime,	  178.	  70	  Thorburn,	  in	  “Criminal	  Law	  as	  Public	  Law,”	  advocates	  conceiving	  of	  the	  criminal	  law	  “as	  concerned	  with	  the	  basic	  question	  of	  public	  law:	  when	  the	  use	  of	  state	  power	  is	  legitimate.”	  24.	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be	  killed.	  	  We	  can	  ask	  what	  the	  legal	  moralist	  and	  the	  contractarian	  liberal	  respectively	  take	  the	  criminal	  law’s	  claim	  to	  be	  in	  trying	  and	  punishing	  a	  religiously	  motivated	  murderer.	  	  The	  contractarian	  liberal	  justifies	  the	  prohibition	  on	  murder,	  and	  a	  conviction	  in	  this	  case,	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  principal	  aim	  of	  political	  cooperation,	  that	  of	  protecting	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  which	  I	  take	  to	  consist	  of	  their	  lives	  and	  liberty.	  	  Prohibiting	  murder	  is	  a	  direct	  instantiation	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  civil	  interests	  that	  persons’	  would	  enter	  political	  society	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  protecting.	  	  If,	  as	  I	  argue,	  we	  understand	  political	  cooperation	  as	  the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  and	  persons’	  lives	  and	  liberty	  are	  included	  among	  those	  civil	  interests,	  it	  is	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  to	  understand	  political	  cooperation	  without	  a	  prohibition	  on	  killing.	  	  So,	  to	  the	  religiously	  motivated	  killer,	  the	  contractarian	  liberal	  takes	  the	  criminal	  law	  to	  declare	  that	  all	  killing,	  including	  religiously	  motivated	  killing,	  subverts	  the	  ends	  of	  political	  cooperation	  among	  independent	  persons,	  and,	  therefore,	  cannot	  be	  permitted.	  	  Note	  that,	  in	  parsing	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  criminal	  law	  makes	  on	  persons,	  the	  contractarian	  liberal	  makes	  no	  claim	  regarding	  the	  veracity	  of	  the	  religious	  beliefs	  that	  motivate	  the	  killer’s	  actions.	  	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  killer’s	  beliefs,	  contractarian	  liberals	  claim	  only	  that	  religious	  beliefs	  cannot	  justify	  killing	  in	  a	  system	  of	  political	  cooperation	  among	  independent	  persons.	  The	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  legal	  moralists	  take	  the	  criminal	  law	  to	  make	  on	  persons	  in	  this	  case	  and	  in	  similar	  cases.	  	  The	  legal	  moralist	  is	  committed	  to	  holding	  that	  the	  justly	  convicted	  criminal	  has	  contravened	  the	  true	  standards	  of	  morality,	  and,	  consequently,	  if	  his	  action	  was	  motivated	  by	  his	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conception	  of	  morality,	  that	  he	  is	  wrong	  about	  moral	  truth.71	  	  If,	  as	  legal	  moralists	  maintain,	  legal	  wrongs	  must	  be	  moral	  wrongs,	  and,	  further,	  the	  moral	  wrongness	  of	  criminalized	  conduct	  is	  the	  salient	  reason	  in	  favour	  of	  criminalizing	  it,	  then	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  in	  prohibiting	  that	  conduct,	  political	  authority,	  through	  the	  criminal	  law,	  asserts	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  conception	  of	  morality	  that	  animates	  the	  criminal	  law,	  and	  denies	  the	  truth	  of	  any	  alternative	  conception	  of	  morality	  that	  motivates	  prohibited	  conduct.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  I	  do	  not	  dispute	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  murder,	  whether	  religiously	  motivated	  or	  not,	  is	  morally	  wrong.	  	  I	  do	  however	  take	  issue	  with	  the	  legal	  moralist’s	  claim	  that	  claims	  about	  moral	  truth	  as	  such	  can	  be	  legitimately	  expressed	  by	  the	  criminal	  law.	  	  In	  this	  rather	  extreme	  case,	  the	  criminal	  law	  straightforwardly	  expresses	  the	  falsity	  of	  some	  persons’	  intimately	  held	  conception	  of	  moral	  or	  religious	  truth.	  	  Some	  may	  applaud	  this	  feature	  of	  the	  moralists’	  conception	  of	  criminal	  law;	  however,	  it	  makes	  clear	  that	  in	  all	  cases,	  legal	  moralists	  take	  the	  authority	  of	  criminal	  law	  to	  ultimately	  rest	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  pre-­‐political	  morality.	  	  Even	  if	  the	  law	  ultimately	  prohibits	  conduct	  motivated	  by	  one’s	  conception	  of	  morality,	  or	  the	  good,	  we	  can	  justify	  those	  prohibitions	  in	  ways	  that	  do	  a	  better	  or	  worse	  job	  showing	  respect	  for	  persons.	  I	  contend	  that	  the	  conception	  of	  political	  society	  to	  which	  this	  commits	  legal	  moralists	  reveals	  a	  lack	  of	  the	  respect	  for	  persons	  that	  they	  take	  to	  motivate	  their	  approach.	  	  	  In	  any	  endeavour	  persons	  may	  be	  treated	  either	  as	  active	  participants,	  or	  as	  passive	  subjects.	  	  Active	  participants	  play	  a	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  endeavour;	  passive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  This	  additionally	  supposes	  that	  the	  law	  accurately	  reflects	  true	  morality,	  which,	  presumably,	  a	  law	  against	  murder	  does.	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subjects	  find	  themselves	  bound	  by	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  endeavour	  without	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  shaping	  its	  course.	  	  We	  do	  a	  better	  job	  respecting	  persons	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  we	  treat	  them	  as	  active	  participants	  in	  their	  endeavours.	  	  As	  active	  participants,	  persons’	  capacities	  and	  ends	  shape	  the	  ends	  of	  the	  endeavour;	  their	  purposes	  are	  taken	  seriously	  and	  they	  are	  shown	  due	  respect.	  	  In	  political	  society,	  we	  show	  respect	  for	  persons	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  we	  treat	  them	  as	  active	  participants	  whose	  ends	  shape	  the	  ends	  of	  political	  cooperation.	  	  We	  do	  a	  worse	  job	  respecting	  persons	  when	  we	  treat	  them	  as	  political	  subjects,	  liable	  to	  the	  constraints	  of	  political	  society,	  without	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  shaping	  its	  ends.	  	  We	  can	  use	  this	  scheme	  of	  respecting	  persons	  by	  treating	  them	  as	  participants	  in	  their	  endeavours	  to	  understand	  how	  Duff	  and	  Moore’s	  conceptions	  of	  criminal	  law	  succeed,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  do	  when	  considering	  the	  criminal	  law	  in	  isolation,	  in	  showing	  respect	  for	  persons.	  Duff,	  in	  placing	  the	  trial	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  his	  conception	  of	  criminal	  law,	  prompts	  us	  to	  recognize	  persons	  as	  active	  participants	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  criminal	  justice.	  	  In	  calling	  persons	  to	  answer	  for	  their	  wrongful	  conduct,	  we	  treat	  accused	  criminals	  with	  respect	  by	  acknowledging	  their	  responsibility	  for	  their	  conduct,	  and	  providing	  a	  platform	  in	  which	  they	  may	  justify	  their	  wrongful	  conduct,	  or	  accept	  responsibility	  for	  it.	  	  On	  this	  understanding	  of	  criminal	  justice,	  persons’	  capacities	  and	  ends	  are	  acknowledged	  and	  play	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  system.	  	  So	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  commitment	  to	  respect	  for	  persons,	  as	  a	  commitment	  to	  understand	  persons	  as	  active	  participants	  in	  their	  endeavours,	  in	  which	  their	  capacities	  and	  ends	  are	  acknowledged	  by,	  and	  shape	  the	  endeavours	  they	  find	  themselves	  involved	  in,	  and	  affected	  by.	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Moore,	  in	  placing	  retributive	  punishment	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  this	  theory	  of	  criminal	  law,	  casts	  criminal	  punishment	  as	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  persons’	  culpable	  conduct.	  	  This,	  in	  contrast	  to	  utilitarian	  theories	  of	  punishment,	  acknowledges	  persons’	  capacities	  and	  ends,	  and	  treats	  them	  as	  participants	  in	  the	  criminal	  process.	  	  Though	  criminals	  ultimately	  participate	  in	  the	  criminal	  process	  in	  an	  undesirable	  role,	  their	  personhood	  is	  respected.	  	  Utilitarian	  theories	  of	  punishment,	  in	  focusing	  solely	  on	  the	  benefits	  to	  others	  that	  punishment	  occasions,	  treat	  criminals	  as	  subjects	  of	  criminal	  justice,	  without	  any	  role	  to	  play	  in	  shaping	  the	  process.	  That	  said,	  If	  we	  step	  back	  and	  consider	  criminal	  justice	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  broader	  political	  system	  in	  which	  it	  plays	  a	  role,	  we	  see	  that	  legal	  moralists	  do	  a	  worse	  job	  respecting	  persons	  when	  they	  hold	  that	  criminal	  law	  makes	  claims	  about	  pre-­‐political	  moral	  truth.	  	  By	  making	  persons	  liable	  to	  retributive	  punishment,	  or	  answerable	  for	  their	  conduct	  in	  criminal	  trials,	  based	  on	  a	  standard	  of	  conduct	  derived	  independently	  of,	  and	  conceptually	  prior	  to,	  their	  political	  cooperation,	  legal	  moralists	  cast	  persons	  as	  political	  subjects.72	  	  The	  contractarian	  liberal	  view,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  views	  persons	  as	  independent	  political	  cooperators.	  	  It	  defines	  the	  standards	  of	  acceptable	  conduct	  in	  political	  society	  by	  considering	  the	  interests	  that	  those	  persons	  could	  agree	  to	  protect	  and	  promote.	  	  So,	  the	  impermissibility	  of	  murder,	  religiously	  motivated	  or	  not,	  lies	  not	  in	  the	  dictates	  of	  pre-­‐political	  standards	  of	  morality,	  but,	  rather,	  in	  properly	  political	  aims	  and	  values	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  This	  may	  seem	  uncharitable	  to	  Duff	  who	  explicitly	  argues	  that	  the	  law	  ought	  to	  address	  persons	  as	  citizens	  rather	  than	  subjects,	  Duff,	  Antony,	  Punishment,	  
Communication	  and	  Community,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  59;	  
Answering	  for	  Crime,	  86.	  	  However,	  I	  believe	  that	  Duff	  fails	  to	  recognize	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  his	  legal	  moralism	  interferes,	  for	  reasons	  I	  identify,	  with	  this	  laudable	  ideal.	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independent	  persons	  would	  and	  could	  endorse.73	  	  And,	  therefore,	  when	  we	  consider	  criminal	  law	  not	  in	  isolation	  but	  in	  the	  broader	  scheme	  of	  political	  action	  of	  which	  it	  is	  a	  subset,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  contractarian	  liberal	  model	  does	  better	  than	  the	  legal	  moralist	  model	  at	  treating	  persons	  as	  active	  participants	  in	  political	  cooperation,	  and,	  therefore,	  affording	  respect	  for	  persons.	  If	  the	  appeal	  of	  Moore	  and	  Duff’s	  versions	  of	  legal	  moralism	  is	  that	  they	  better	  display	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  respect	  for	  persons	  than	  alternative	  models	  of	  criminal	  law,	  the	  considerations	  of	  this	  section	  should	  significantly	  weaken	  that	  appeal.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.4.4	  –	  Anti-­moralism	  and	  Political	  Morality	  One	  may	  object	  to	  my	  argument	  against	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  it	  too	  is	  a	  moral	  argument.	  	  The	  notions	  of	  independence	  and	  legitimacy	  on	  which	  I	  rely	  are	  moral	  notions,	  the	  agreement	  I	  envision	  among	  parties	  to	  the	  social	  contract	  is	  an	  agreement	  on	  moral	  principles,	  and	  the	  contractarian	  argument	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter	  is	  a	  moral	  argument.74	  	  That	  is,	  in	  arguing	  against	  legal	  moralism,	  one	  may	  accuse	  the	  anti-­‐moralist	  of	  hypocrisy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  One	  could	  ask	  whether	  we	  really	  treat	  the	  religiously	  motivated	  murderer	  as	  a	  participant	  in	  political	  society	  when	  we	  straightforwardly	  thwart	  his	  religious	  ends.	  	  Insofar	  as	  he	  participates	  in	  political	  society	  and	  enjoys	  the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  his	  life	  and	  liberty	  among	  independent	  others,	  his	  religious	  ends	  contradict	  his	  ends	  as	  a	  political	  participant.	  	  We	  resolve	  the	  contradiction	  by	  prohibiting	  religiously	  motivated	  violence	  and	  preserving	  the	  conditions	  of	  political	  cooperation	  among	  independent	  persons.	  	  If	  he	  would	  choose	  to	  pursue	  his	  religious	  ends	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  his	  political	  ends,	  political	  society	  is	  justified	  in	  thwarting	  him,	  but	  again,	  we	  do	  a	  better	  job	  respecting	  his	  personhood	  by	  holding	  that	  he	  is	  mistaken	  about	  the	  grounds	  of	  political	  cooperation	  rather	  than	  about	  the	  truth	  of	  morality.	  	  	  	  74	  Jan	  Narveson	  actually	  raised	  this	  objection	  to	  an	  early	  version	  of	  this	  chapter	  at	  the	  CS-­‐IVR	  2014	  meeting	  at	  Brock	  University,	  St.	  Catharines,	  Ontario.	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   To	  be	  clear,	  in	  arguing	  against	  legal	  moralism,	  I	  do	  not	  purport	  to	  offer	  an	  amoral	  alternative	  account	  of	  the	  criminal	  law,	  or	  of	  political	  action	  in	  general.	  	  I	  do	  not	  purport	  to	  derive	  political	  principles	  exclusively	  from	  prudential	  considerations,	  or	  to	  justify	  and	  limit	  political	  authority	  with	  anything	  less	  than	  moral	  arguments.	  	  	  While	  I	  do	  not	  argue	  against	  moral	  argument	  in	  political	  philosophy,	  I	  do	  argue	  against,	  and	  offer	  an	  alternative	  to,	  legal	  moralism.	  	  Legal	  moralists	  provide	  moral	  arguments	  contending	  that	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  straightforwardly	  apply	  standards	  of	  true	  pre-­‐political	  morality	  to	  the	  legal	  sphere	  because	  they	  are	  the	  true	  standards	  of	  moral	  conduct.	  75	  	  In	  response,	  I	  provide	  (admittedly)	  moral	  arguments	  that	  this	  straightforward	  application	  of	  moral	  standards	  to	  the	  legal	  sphere	  is	  inappropriate.	  	  Hart	  attempts	  to	  clarify	  the	  levels	  at	  which	  morality	  enters	  debates	  regarding	  legal	  moralism	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  we	  are	  asking	  questions	  not	  only	  
about	  morality,	  but	  of	  morality	  as	  well.	  	  That	  is,	  we	  are	  asking,	  “whether	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morality	  is	  morally	  justified”.76	  	  Arthur	  Kuflik	  acknowledges	  this	  understanding	  of	  the	  debate	  and	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  “good	  moral	  reason	  not	  to	  
enforce	  by	  law	  all	  of	  what	  there	  is	  nevertheless	  perfectly	  good	  moral	  reason	  to	  do.”77	  The	  position	  I	  advance	  is	  anti-­‐moralist	  in	  an	  additional	  way	  that	  Hart	  and	  Kuflik’s	  remarks	  do	  not	  capture.78	  	  Not	  only	  do	  I	  agree	  that	  there	  are	  good	  moral	  reasons	  not	  to	  legally	  enforce	  morality	  as	  such,	  I	  additionally	  maintain	  that	  those	  reasons,	  and	  all	  moral	  reasoning	  about	  legal	  enforcement,	  and	  political	  action	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Often,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  with	  some	  qualifications.	  76	  Hart,	  Law,	  Liberty,	  and	  Morality,	  17.	  77	  Kuflik,	  Arthur,	  “Liberalism,	  Legal	  Moralism	  and	  Moral	  Disagreement,”	  186.	  78	  Though,	  Kuflik	  ultimately	  does	  acknowledge	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  political	  context	  in	  his	  case	  against	  legal	  moralism	  by	  stressing	  the	  centrality	  of	  moral	  disagreement	  among	  persons	  who	  must	  cooperate	  politically.	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generally,	  ought	  to	  be	  circumscribed	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  	  Specifically,	  all	  moral	  reasoning	  about	  the	  criminal	  law,	  and	  about	  political	  action	  in	  general,	  ought	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  uniquely	  political	  considerations.	  	  Richard	  Vernon	  suggests	  that	  one	  of	  the	  strongest	  enduring	  contributions	  of	  Locke’s	  Letters	  to	  contemporary	  political	  theory	  is	  the	  case	  he	  builds	  for	  a	  uniquely	  political	  morality,	  the	  view	  that	  “what	  is	  politically	  legitimate	  cannot	  simply	  be	  read	  off	  from	  what	  can	  be	  ethically	  (or	  religiously,	  or	  epistemically)	  justified.”79	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  appropriate	  grounds	  for	  political	  action	  do	  not	  follow	  immediately	  from	  moral	  truth;	  rather,	  they	  must	  emerge	  from	  specifically	  political	  considerations.	  	  Vernon	  further	  explains	  that,	  for	  Locke,	  those	  political	  considerations	  emerge	  from	  the	  social	  contract.80	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  my	  case	  against	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  is	  strongly	  Lockean.	  	  	  The	  reasoning	  appropriate	  for	  justifying	  legitimate	  political	  action	  must	  ultimately	  appeal	  to	  the	  ends	  and	  terms	  of	  political	  association.	  	  I	  understand	  these	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  social	  contract	  in	  response	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics.81	  	  Recall	  that	  I	  understand	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics	  as	  the	  necessity	  of	  political	  cooperation	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  insecurity	  of	  persons’	  civil	  interests,	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  political	  cooperation	  in	  light	  of	  persons’	  independence.82	  	  When	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  justification	  of	  political	  action	  ought	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  uniquely	  political	  reasoning,	  I	  mean	  that	  it	  ought	  to	  ultimately	  respond	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics	  so	  understood.	  	  By	  responding	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics,	  we	  acknowledge	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Vernon,	  Richard,	  Introduction	  to	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  Richard	  Vernon	  (ed.),	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  xxx.	  80	  Vernon,	  Richard,	  The	  Career	  of	  Toleration:	  John	  Locke,	  Jonas	  Proast,	  and	  After,	  (Montreal,	  QC:	  McGill	  Queen’s	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  90.	  81	  See	  3.4	  above.	  82	  See	  3.4,	  92-­‐93	  above.	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moral	  starting	  point	  of	  liberal	  political	  theory,	  namely,	  persons’	  independence	  from	  natural	  authority,	  and	  acknowledge	  a	  limited	  sphere	  of	  legitimate	  political	  action.	  	  Further,	  responding	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics	  allows	  us	  to	  define	  the	  political	  sphere	  without	  straightforwardly	  enforcing	  our	  best	  account	  of	  morality	  and,	  therefore,	  respect	  persons	  as	  independent	  political	  cooperators.	  	  So	  while	  the	  contractarian	  account	  of	  political	  action	  is	  generally	  moral	  in	  that	  it	  ultimately	  concerns	  how	  persons	  ought	  to	  act	  in	  relation	  to	  others,	  and	  it	  has	  an	  unequivocally	  moral	  starting	  point,	  namely,	  persons	  independence	  from	  natural	  authority,	  it	  is	  uniquely	  political	  in	  a	  way	  that	  legal	  moralism	  is	  not.	  	  That	  is,	  it	  responds	  directly	  to	  the	  circumstances	  that	  make	  political	  cooperation	  necessary	  and	  possible.83	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  I	  am	  not	  alone	  in	  responding	  to	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralism	  by	  stressing	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  political	  context.	  	  Notably,	  Malcolm	  Thorburn	  argues	  that,	  in	  justifying	  the	  criminal	  law,	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralists	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  the	  state	  dominated	  character	  of	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system,	  and	  its	  coerciveness.	  In	  its	  place,	  Thorburn	  offers	  a	  “public	  law	  account”	  of	  criminal	  justice	  that	  confronts	  the	  question	  of	  political	  power’s	  legitimacy.	  	  To	  make	  sense	  of	  criminal	  law’s	  place	  in	  the	  political	  context,	  Thorburn,	  following	  Kant,	  begins	  with	  a	  conception	  of	  persons	  as	  free	  and	  equal	  moral	  agents	  and	  argues	  that	  the	  state	  is	  the	  “unique	  instrumentality”	  through	  which	  persons	  can	  interact	  with	  each	  other	  as	  such.	  In	  other	  words,	  political	  society	  and	  authority	  respond	  to	  a	  particular	  problem	  that	  persons’	  outside	  of	  political	  society	  would	  face,	  that	  of	  interacting	  with	  others	  as	  free	  and	  equal	  persons.	  	  So,	  Thorburn	  responds	  to	  legal	  moralism	  by	  presenting	  an	  account	  of	  the	  criminal	  law	  in	  the	  broader	  political	  context.	  	  Thorburn’s	  account	  of	  political	  cooperation,	  however,	  differs	  from	  my	  own	  in	  that,	  following	  Kant,	  he	  maintains	  that	  engaging	  in	  political	  cooperation	  is	  morally	  obligatory	  because	  it	  responds	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  being	  unable	  to	  interact	  with	  others	  as	  free	  and	  equal	  actors.	  	  I	  envision	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics	  such	  that	  political	  cooperation	  is	  necessary	  to	  remedy	  certain	  problems	  persons	  would	  face	  in	  its	  absence,	  and	  possible	  insofar	  as	  it	  respects	  persons’	  independence.	  	  See	  Thorburn,	  “Constitutionalism	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Law,”	  and	  “Criminal	  Law	  as	  Public	  Law,”	  especially	  42-­‐43.	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4.5	  –	  Conclusion	  I	  take	  legal	  moralism,	  in	  all	  its	  forms,	  to	  be	  a	  defective	  grounding	  of	  criminal	  law,	  and	  theory	  of	  criminalization.	  	  Instrumental	  legal	  moralists,	  insofar	  as	  they	  keep	  in	  view	  the	  supposed	  damage	  to	  society	  that	  immoral	  conduct	  occasions,	  fail	  to	  enforce	  morals	  as	  such.	  	  Alternatively,	  if	  they	  adopt	  a	  spurious	  definition	  of	  society,	  or	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  society	  and	  its	  morals,	  instrumental	  legal	  moralists	  make	  illegitimate	  political	  claims	  on	  persons,	  and	  permit	  the	  legal	  enforcement	  of	  substantively	  unjust	  systems	  of	  law.	  	  Contemporary	  non-­‐instrumental	  legal	  moralists	  who	  hold	  substantively	  liberal	  accounts	  of	  morality	  fare	  better	  by	  advocating	  for	  substantively	  liberal	  and	  just	  systems	  of	  criminal	  law,	  and	  pursuing	  the	  ideal	  of	  respect	  for	  persons.	  	  However,	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  criminal	  law	  in	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  the	  political	  system	  in	  which	  it	  plays	  a	  part,	  we	  see	  that	  legal	  moralists	  do	  not	  do	  as	  good	  a	  job	  respecting	  persons	  as	  their	  liberal	  political	  opponents.	  	  Ultimately,	  legal	  moralism	  provides	  a	  politically	  illegitimate	  justification	  for	  criminalization,	  and	  political	  action	  in	  general.	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Conclusion	  The	  conclusion	  of	  the	  fourth	  chapter	  provides	  a	  fitting	  conclusion	  to	  this	  dissertation.	  	  As	  Richard	  Vernon	  argues,	  the	  enduring	  appeal	  of	  Locke’s	  Letter	  is	  the	  case	  it	  builds	  for	  a	  political	  morality.1	  	  From	  Locke’s	  Letters	  on	  toleration	  I	  have	  identified	  a	  distinctly	  Lockean	  political	  morality	  that	  defines	  the	  political	  sphere	  by	  showing	  that	  the	  only	  values	  appropriate	  for	  enforcement	  in	  political	  society	  are	  those	  that	  emerge	  from	  considering	  the	  ends	  and	  terms	  of	  persons’	  political	  cooperation.	  	  We	  can	  identify	  a	  limited	  range	  of	  interests	  that	  are	  uniquely	  suited	  for	  protection	  and	  promotion	  acting	  in	  concert	  with	  independent	  others	  in	  political	  society.	  	  These	  interests	  constitute	  the	  legitimate	  object	  of	  political	  authority’s	  concern.	  	  These	  are	  our	  civil	  interests.	  	  	   I	  have	  argued	  that	  Locke’s	  contractarian	  argument	  for	  identifying	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  as	  things	  other	  than	  their	  salvation	  is	  a	  prominent	  line	  of	  argument	  in	  his	  Letters,	  and	  a	  good	  argument	  for	  toleration.	  	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  analyzing	  social	  contract	  theories	  in	  light	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  civil	  interests	  enriches	  our	  understanding	  of	  social	  contract	  theory	  generally.	  	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  persons’	  civil	  interests	  consist	  of	  only	  their	  lives	  and	  liberty,	  and	  that	  political	  action	  may	  be	  legitimately	  deployed	  only	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  these	  things	  and	  the	  means	  of	  enjoying	  them.	  	  And,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  this	  rules	  out	  the	  enforcement	  of	  morality	  as	  such	  as	  a	  legitimate	  goal	  of	  the	  criminal	  law,	  and	  of	  political	  action	  in	  general.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Vernon,	  Richard,	  Introduction	  to	  Locke	  on	  Toleration,	  Richard	  Vernon	  (ed.),	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  xxx.	  
	   147	  
	   The	  work	  of	  this	  dissertation	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  future	  study	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  and	  liberal	  political	  theory.	  	  Having	  identified	  the	  reasoning	  appropriate	  for	  identifying	  the	  values	  appropriate	  for	  enforcement	  in	  liberal	  political	  society,	  we	  are	  well	  equipped	  to	  apply	  that	  reasoning	  to	  hard	  cases	  in	  Canadian	  constitutional	  law.	  	  What	  reasoning	  could	  justify,	  for	  example,	  the	  federal	  government’s	  proposed	  ban	  on	  religious	  face	  coverings	  in	  citizenship	  ceremonies?	  	  In	  2011	  the	  Canadian	  Immigration	  Minister	  cited	  the	  “Canadian	  values”	  of	  equality	  and	  of	  openness	  in	  support	  of	  the	  ban.2	  	  We	  can	  certainly	  recognize	  equality	  as	  a	  value	  appropriate	  for	  promotion	  in	  a	  system	  of	  political	  cooperation	  among	  independent	  persons,	  though	  we	  must	  recognize	  the	  tension	  between	  religious	  equality	  and	  gender	  equality.	  	  I	  am	  not	  as	  confident	  that	  we	  can	  recognize	  the	  relatively	  vague	  notion	  of	  openness	  as	  a	  value	  that	  legitimately	  shapes	  our	  political	  cooperation	  in	  a	  diverse	  polity.	  	  In	  this	  case	  and	  analogous	  cases,3	  we	  must	  ask	  whether	  legislatures,	  ministers,	  and	  courts	  have	  justified	  their	  actions	  consistently	  with	  the	  conception	  of	  political	  society	  as	  cooperation	  among	  independent	  persons	  for	  the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  their	  civil	  interests.	  	  We	  can	  further	  investigate	  how	  requests	  for	  religious	  accommodations	  and	  exemptions	  force	  us	  to	  precisely	  define	  the	  objectives	  of	  our	  laws,	  and	  recognize	  the	  dialogue	  this	  creates	  between	  legislative	  objectives	  and	  persons’	  liberties.	  	  What,	  for	  example,	  is	  the	  exact	  purpose	  of	  a	  citizenship	  oath,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Kim	  Mackrael	  and	  Les	  Perreaux,	  “Muslim	  women	  must	  show	  faces	  when	  taking	  citizenship	  oath,”	  The	  Globe	  and	  Mail,	  December	  12,	  2011.	  	  Retrieved	  from	  www.theglobeandmail.com.	  3	  For	  example,	  the	  case	  of	  polygamous	  religious	  sects	  in	  Bountiful,	  British	  Columbia	  challenging	  the	  prohibition	  on	  polygamy	  in	  the	  name	  of	  their	  religious	  freedom,	  and	  Sikh	  men	  being	  denied	  exemption	  from	  Ontario’s	  motorcycle	  helmet	  laws	  where	  exemptions	  exist	  in	  British	  Columbia	  and	  Manitoba.	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can	  and	  should	  we	  aim	  to	  fulfil	  that	  purpose	  in	  a	  way	  that	  impairs	  persons’	  religious	  freedom	  less?	  	   And	  then	  there	  is	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  quasi-­‐religious	  associations	  determined	  to	  satirically	  push	  the	  boundaries	  of	  religious	  accommodation.	  	  In	  British	  Columbia	  an	  “ordained	  minister	  in	  the	  Church	  of	  the	  Flying	  Spaghetti	  Monster”	  lost	  his	  fight	  with	  the	  Insurance	  Corporation	  of	  British	  Columbia	  (ICBC)	  in	  charge	  of	  driver	  licensing	  to	  wear	  a	  colander	  on	  his	  head	  in	  his	  driver’s	  licence	  photo.4	  	  The	  man	  desired	  to	  wear	  the	  colander	  according	  to	  the	  same	  permissions	  that	  allow	  members	  of	  other	  religions	  to	  wear	  head	  coverings	  in	  their	  driver’s	  licence	  photos.	  	  His	  request	  was	  denied	  when	  he	  failed	  to	  provide	  evidence	  that	  his	  faith	  prevents	  him	  from	  removing	  the	  headgear	  for	  his	  photo.	  	  Notably,	  in	  jurisdictions	  such	  as	  Oklahoma	  and	  Austria,	  similar	  requests	  by	  “Pastafarians”	  have	  been	  permitted.	  	  We	  may	  be	  inclined	  to	  dismiss	  these	  claims	  as	  frivolous;	  however,	  they	  ought	  to	  move	  us	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  political	  demands	  we	  place	  on	  one	  another	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  more	  conventional	  cases	  do.	  	  Why	  do	  we	  require	  photographs	  on	  driver’s	  licences,	  and	  how	  does	  headgear,	  religious	  or	  otherwise,	  interfere	  with	  those	  reasons?	  	  Further,	  what	  would	  count	  as	  sufficient	  evidence	  of	  one’s	  religious	  requirements,	  and,	  really,	  what	  sets	  religious	  life	  choices	  apart	  from	  other	  life	  choices?	  	  A	  similar	  but	  more	  serious	  driver’s	  licence	  photo	  dispute	  arose	  in	  South	  Carolina	  when	  a	  transgender	  teen	  was	  required	  to	  remove	  her	  makeup	  for	  her	  driver’s	  licence	  photo	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  requirement	  that	  persons	  not	  alter	  their	  appearance	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  misrepresent	  their	  identity.	  	  She	  won	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Josh	  Elliot,	  “B.C.	  ‘Pastafarian’	  loses	  driver’s	  licence	  over	  holy	  colander	  hat,”	  CTV	  
News,	  October	  6,	  2014.	  	  Retrieved	  from	  www.ctvnews.ca.	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her	  subsequent	  lawsuit	  against	  the	  motor	  vehicle	  agency	  and	  prompted	  them	  to	  change	  the	  requirement	  such	  that	  persons	  be	  photographed	  the	  way	  they	  regularly	  appear.5	  	  	  Analyzing	  political	  action	  in	  terms	  of	  civil	  interests	  can	  help	  us	  navigate	  these	  difficult	  questions.	  	  We	  can	  ask	  what	  civil	  interest	  is	  protected	  or	  promoted	  through	  the	  law,	  regulation,	  or	  political	  action,	  and	  we	  can	  ask	  how	  that	  civil	  interest	  is	  identified	  as	  such	  by	  considering	  the	  ends	  of	  persons’	  cooperating	  politically.	  	  More	  concretely,	  we	  can	  ask	  how	  the	  measure	  fares	  in	  its	  task	  and	  whether,	  in	  light	  of	  persons’	  claims	  that	  it	  unduly	  interferes	  with	  their	  liberty	  to	  live	  as	  they	  please,	  an	  interest	  for	  which	  they	  undoubtedly	  participate	  in	  political	  society,	  the	  measure’s	  objective	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  a	  more	  balanced	  approach.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  persons’	  driver’s	  licence	  photos,	  we	  can	  ask	  whether	  headwear	  of	  any	  kind	  interferes	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  promoting	  persons’	  safety	  by	  requiring	  licensed	  drivers	  to	  identify	  themselves	  as	  such	  when	  necessary.	  	  In	  this	  case	  we	  see	  that	  it	  should	  not	  matter	  whether	  persons’	  reasons	  for	  appearing	  a	  certain	  way	  are	  religiously	  motivated	  or	  not.	  	  The	  important	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  regulation	  promotes	  a	  bona	  fide	  civil	  interest,	  and	  whether	  persons’	  preferred	  manner	  of	  appearance	  interferes	  with	  that	  objective.	  	  Governments	  and	  their	  agents	  need	  not	  enter	  the	  business	  of	  deciphering	  persons’	  religious	  beliefs,	  their	  gender	  identities,	  or	  any	  other	  part	  of	  their	  life	  plans.	  	  Where	  a	  law	  or	  regulation’s	  objective	  can	  be	  achieved	  while	  interfering	  less	  with	  persons’	  abilities	  to	  live	  as	  they	  please,	  a	  civil	  interest	  for	  sure,	  regulations	  ought	  to	  be	  tweaked	  as	  they	  were	  in	  South	  Carolina.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Colleen	  Jenkins,	  “Transgender	  teen	  gets	  South	  Carolina	  to	  change	  driver’s	  license	  policy,”	  Reuters,	  April	  22,	  2015.	  	  Retrieved	  from	  www.reuters.com.	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It	  has	  been	  my	  aim	  in	  this	  dissertation	  to	  articulate	  the	  view	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  persons’	  political	  cooperation	  constrains	  the	  legitimate	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  I	  have	  presented	  a	  Lockean	  conception	  of	  political	  society	  as	  political	  cooperation	  among	  independent	  persons	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  their	  civil	  interests.	  	  This	  clarifies	  scope	  of	  legitimate	  political	  action,	  and	  helps	  us	  better	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  participation	  in	  political	  society.	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